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ABSTRACT 
 
Teaching the Leviathan: 
Secrecy, Ignorance and Nuclear Proliferation 
 
Gaurav Kampani, PhD 
Cornell University 2014 
 
When compared to other nuclear weapon powers why has India historically lagged in the 
development, deployment, and operational planning of its nuclear force despite 
unambiguous national security threats? My dissertation answers this question through a 
cross-sectional study of three decades of Indian nuclear decision-making from 1980 until 
2010. Using a multi-disciplinary approach, which combines insights from New 
Institutionalism, organization theory and Cognitive Psychology with historical process 
tracing and elite interviewing methods, I argue that there are two interrelated causes for the 
Indian state’s historic underperformance: (a) the absence of a strongly institutionalized 
“epistemic community” within the state; and (b) the absence of shared policy-planning and 
decision-making processes. The first cause is institutional while the second is organizational. 
I show that epistemic communities as knowledge brokers are necessary for socializing a 
state’s decision-makers into new learning practices. For learning to occur, epistemic 
communities must also operate in relatively open and non-monopolistic policy planning and 
decision-making environments. The latter reduce the scope for heuristics and cognitive 
biases and are conducive for relatively rational and optimal policy outcomes. I present 
evidence to show that Indian decision-makers partially mobilized a national security-centric 
“epistemic community” in the pre-1998 era; and only slowly institutionalized it within the 
state in the post-1998 decade. These base conditions when grafted on to highly centralized, 
compartmentalized and monopolistic policy planning and decision-making processes,  
attenuated the Indian state’s policy capacity. The net result has been policy outcomes riddled 
with heuristic and cognitive biases alongside the weak actualization of instituted policies.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE PUZZLE OF INDIA’S LAGGING NUCLEAR PERFORMANCE 
What is Odd About Indian Nuclear Behavior? 
Since the late-1970s, India has exhibited a pattern of lagging national security responses to 
unambiguous nuclear threats. Realist theory posits that states confronting protracted power 
rivalries and lacking the benefits of great power nuclear protection will acquire nuclear 
weapons.1 India however bucked that trend until the late1980s despite mounting threats 
from Pakistan’s nuclearization and Sino-Pakistani nuclear collaboration. Even after India 
built nuclear weapons in the 1990s, it continued to show slack by not building institutional 
capacities necessary to wield them. Organizational theorists who maintain that India’s 
nuclear drive is the consequence of advocacy efforts by a “strategic enclave” consisting of 
nuclear scientist-bureaucrats2 have never explained the 24 year gap between its first and 
second round of nuclear tests; or why the scientist-bureaucrats refrained from seeking 
alliances with the Indian military, the surest route to a weapons program. Similarly, 
explanations that cite prestige as the reason for not just why India has sought nuclear 
weapons but also for why it minimizes their operational utility3, must surely find it 
perplexing that four Indian governments kept the existence of the arsenal secret for a 
decade; and that successive Indian governments remain committed to investing in the 
organizational and technical accoutrements of a nuclear force even after India has been 
accorded the status of a de facto nuclear weapon power. The many theories for such behavior 
                                                
1 T. V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons, (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2000).  
2 Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State, 
(New York: Zed Books, 1998).  
3 Karsten Frey, India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security, (New York: Routledge, 2006).  
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notwithstanding, Indian nuclear policy remains in Winston Churchill’s famous words from 
another context “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” 
 
From the late 1970s on, Indian decision-makers had clear evidence of Pakistan’s nuclear 
quest.4 Indian national security elites understood that a Pakistani nuclear arsenal would alter 
the balance of power in South Asia. It would sharply degrade the conventional superiority 
India had historically enjoyed over Pakistan since their founding.5 Of greater concern to 
them was the negative shift in the “balance of threat”6 as evidenced by Pakistan’s attempts at 
breaking up the Indian union: first by supporting secessionist insurgents in the sensitive 
Indian state of Punjab7 and later Kashmir.8 In the winter of 1986-87 when India and 
Pakistan almost came to blows during a crisis triggered by India’s Brasstacks military war 
games,9 Pakistan communicated a nuclear threat through the Indian ambassador in 
                                                
4 “Nuclear Backdrop,” The Kargil Review Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning, (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 186.  
5 For example, the late Chief of Army Staff General Sundarji published a series of seminal 
papers on the effects of nuclear asymmetry on conventional war fighting in the early 1980s. 
“Effects of Nuclear Asymmetry on Conventional Deterrence,” Combat Paper No. 1, (Mhow: 
College of Combat, 1981); “Nuclear Weapons in a Third World Context,” Combat Paper No. 
2, (Mhow: College of Combat, 1981).  
6 I borrow this phrase from Stephen Walt who argues that states’ balancing behavior is 
triggered not just by a shift in the balance of power, but by their perceptions of threats 
inherent in that shift based on the opposing state’s strength, geographical proximity, 
offensive capabilities and offensive intentions. Although Walt’s argument concerns states’ 
external balancing versus bandwagoning behavior, I extend his concept to ‘internal 
balancing’. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 
International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4, (1985), pp. 3-43.  
7 “Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Paper No. 8/94 on Anti-India Activities of the ISI on 
the Indian Sub-Continent,” cited in “Review of Events Leading up to Kargil,” in The Kargil 
Review Committee Report, p. 71.  
8 Ibid., pp. 53-78.  
9 P.R. Chari, Kanti P. Bajpai Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, 
Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia, (New Delhi: Manohar, 
1995), pp. 23-67.  
 3 
Islamabad.10 India’s response, beginning in the early 1980s, to these adverse shifts in the 
balance of power and threat was an experimental and disaggregated effort to develop 
advanced nuclear weapon designs and ballistic missiles.11 In the spring of 1988 top Indian 
policy planners and decision-makers received confirming evidence that China had passed on 
a nuclear weapon design tested in 1966 to Pakistan and that “Pakistan was in possession of 
at least three nuclear devices of 15-20 kiloton yield.”12 However, the Indian prime minister 
waited until the spring of 1989 before authorizing weaponization to formally commence and 
appointing a lead coordinator within government to oversee that effort.13 The doyen of 
Indian strategists and nuclear consultant to virtually all Indian governments since the early 
1980s, the late K. Subrahmanyam subsequently disclosed: “in the period between 1987-1990 
India was totally vulnerable to a Pakistani nuclear threat.”14  
 
This late start point, behind Pakistan’s weaponization efforts, had negative downstream 
effects for India in the decade of the 1990s. When the next Indo-Pakistani crisis blew up 
over Kashmir in the winter/spring of 1989-1990, India had no ready arsenal.15 During this 
crisis, the Pakistani foreign minister delivered what Delhi thought was a veiled nuclear 
threat.16  But the prototype weaponized device under development had until then not even 
                                                
10 “Nuclear Backdrop,” The Kargil Review Committee Report, p. 191.  
11 B.G. Deshmukh, “Keep the Faith,” Hindustan Times, (September 7, 2006), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1698250/posts, (December 2010). 
12 “Nuclear Backdrop,” The Kargil Review Committee Report, pp. 188, 190.  
13 Raj Chengappa, “The House Is On Fire,” Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to 
be a Nuclear Power, (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 332-333.  
14 K. Subrahmanyam, “Indian Nuclear Policy – 1964-98 (A personal recollection),” in Jasjit 
Singh ed., Nuclear India, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p. 44.  
15 Chengappa, “End the Wink and Nudge Approach,” Weapons of Peace, p. 354.  
16 The Kargil Review Committee Report, pp. 65, 204.  
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been shown to the air force.17 Neither had the government done any nuclear contingency 
planning. Nuclear command and control apparently consisted of the prime minister, his 
principal secretary and the scientific advisor to the defense minister. Nor did there exist 
institutional guidelines and procedures to help political authorities cobble up a nuclear 
response.18 Although many assumed that India and Pakistan were nuclear capable in the early 
1990s, it is highly unlikely that India achieved the technical capability to deliver nuclear 
weapons safely and reliably before 1994-1995.19 But equally germane, the state did not 
develop the institutional capacity to manage its nuclear hardware in any instrumentally 
meaningful way in the decade of the 1990s. The term institutional capacity here refers to the 
civil-military chain of command, use doctrine, standard operating procedures, practice drills 
and ground rehearsals to coordinate action among and across the various agencies tasked 
with responding to a nuclear emergency. It also refers to operational planning in the 
military’s tactical meaning of the term.20 This state of affairs continued even after India 
conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 and formally laid claims to nuclear power status; until 
the summer of 1999 when it suddenly found itself at war with Pakistan over the latter’s 
                                                
17 Shekhar Gupta, “Know What They Did That Summer,” Indian Express, August 12, 2006, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/know-what-they-did-that-summer/10366/, 
(December 2010).  
18 Chengappa, “End The Wink And Nudge Approach,” Weapons of Peace, p. 355.  
19 According to Scientific Advisor to the Defense Minister APJ Abdul Kalam’s testimony 
before the Kargil Review Committee, weaponization was completed during 1992-94. The 
records of this and other conversations pertaining to India’s nuclear weapons program from 
the early 1980s until 1998 are contained in the annexure to the report, which has not been 
declassified. The author’s interviews with several senior retired Indian Air Force officers at 
the highest levels suggest that India achieved an air deliverable capability sometime in 1995. 
See, “Nuclear Backdrop,” p. 205; senior Indian defense official ‘Z’, non-attributable 
interviews with author, December 2009 & February 2010, New Delhi, India. 
20 Senior Indian defense official ‘X’, non-attributable interviews with author, October & 
November 2009, New Delhi, India. 
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unprovoked occupation of the Kargil heights in Kashmir. This was the historical moment 
when the Indian government initiated nuclear operational planning with the air force.21 
 
Post-1998, India set out to create the institutional and ideational edifice for a “credible 
minimum deterrent.”22 Indian political decision-makers are now committed to taking nuclear 
capabilities beyond technological symbolism into realizable forces in the field. However, in 
the past decade, the socialization of the Indian state into the operational practices of nuclear 
deterrence has proceeded slowly. Three problems abound. First, serious reliability concerns 
continue to dog the lethality of the Indian nuclear force, both nuclear warheads and missile 
delivery systems.23 Second, although the Indian government has institutionalized the role of 
the military in nuclear force management through the creation of a Strategic Forces 
Command (SFC), the latter’s role within the Indian military is relatively isolated. It, the SFC, 
does not control delivery systems, which remain under the separate custody of the three 
conventional services (army, navy and air force).24 The institutional quarantining of the SFC 
and fragmented control of the arsenal has raised serious questions about the military’s intra-
agency coordination practices. The absence of strong institutional coordination mechanisms 
at the top within the Indian military has made this problem particularly acute. Institutional 
problems afflict not only nuclear force management, but they also prevent synergization 
                                                
21 Senior Indian defense official ‘A’, non-attributable interviews with author, July & August 
2010, New Delhi, India. 
22 See section titled ‘Objectives’ in National Security Advisory Board, India’s Draft Nuclear 
Doctrine, (New Delhi: Government of India, August 17, 1999).  
23 Verghese Koithara, “Nuclear Hardware,” Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, (Washington, D.C: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2012), pp. 123-138. 
24 Admiral (retd.) Arun Prakash, Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (2005-2006), interview 
with author, April 2009, Dehradun, India.  
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between the military’s conventional and nuclear arms.25 Other institutional lacunae stem 
from the task of inter-agency coordination between the military and the scientific agencies. 
The latter retain exclusive control over nuclear warheads, an institutional routine that 
stretches the logistical demands for operability.26 These technical and institutional concerns 
raise serious doubts about the operational effectiveness of the Indian nuclear force. 
 
The Research Questions and the Dissertation’s Answers in Brief 
How did India, a regional power with a proven nuclear capability as early as 1974, a state 
with greater resources, and a considerably larger and more sophisticated scientific, industrial, 
and nuclear establishment than Pakistan end up in a position of relative vulnerability to the 
latter from the late-1980s until the mid-1990s? Similarly in the decade of the 1990s, despite 
the history of Pakistani nuclear threats, the high regional political and military volatility, and 
the threat of war with Pakistan ever present due to the latter’s low-intensity operations in 
Kashmir, why did the Indian state not create institutional capacities to instrumentally 
manage its fledgling nuclear force? Even odder still, why has India been so slow in resolving 
the technical and institutional lacunae in its current nuclear operational practices when 
external nonproliferation pressures no longer constrain domestic policy and regional nuclear 
rivalries and the threat of war with Pakistan and China remain a constant? 
 
I answer these questions by analyzing three cases of Indian nuclear decision-making between 
1980 and 2010. Using a multi-disciplinary approach, which combines theoretical insights 
from New Institutionalism, and cognitive psychology and organizational theory with 
                                                
25 Air Marshal (retd.) Ajit Bhavnani, C-in-C, Strategic Forces Command (2004-2006), 
interview with author, April 2009, New Delhi, India.  
26 Prakash, interview with author; also see, Koithara, “Operational Level Management,” 
Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, pp. 169-174. 
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historical process tracing and elite interviewing methods, I shine the spotlight on the process 
of learning within the Indian state. In my definition, learning means the modification of 
existing knowledge or the acquisition of new knowledge and its institutionalization into a 
state’s habitual routines. Through my research I present evidence to show that whereas the 
Indian state has adapted to external pressures, it has generally been weak in nuclear learning. 
In adaptation, systems change incrementally. They satisfice by adding new programs to old 
ones without holistically questioning the means and ends relationships. In learning, however, 
systems optimize by synergizing the means and ends relationships. 
 
I argue that the process of learning in states is contingent upon the growth of internal 
information and knowledge markets, the structured processing of information and the 
robust management of human capital. Learning in any state will be as good as its institutional 
and organizational capacity to aggregate information and knowledge markets, integrate them 
with human capital and monitor their performance. However, learning in covertly 
proliferating states is problematic because it occurs under an institution of severe internal 
secrecy. The latter is necessary to hide the state’s activities from the scrutiny of a hostile 
nonproliferation regime. However, secrecy is also problematic because it spawns internal 
opacity and compartmentalizes information. These institutional conditions cocoon decision-
makers in a regime of relative ignorance. Unless decision-makers consciously apply 
themselves to counteract the pernicious effects of this regime of ignorance, learning and 
socialization practices in the state will be weak and performance lags will remain a recurring 
phenomenon.  
 
 8 
At a basic level, the fundamental security challenge that states face in the international 
system is one of uncertainty. All states dealing with uncertainty confront three instrumental 
questions: What is to be accomplished? When must it be accomplished? And how should it 
be accomplished? To answer these questions, states typically mobilize society’s curators of 
knowledge, its “epistemic community.” Epistemic communities are knowledge brokers that 
enable decision-makers frame answers to these questions. Through this process of educating 
decision-makers, they help states learn. Hence, the institutionalization of epistemic 
communities within the state is a necessary precursor for socializing decision-makers into 
new learning practices. However, the strong institutionalization of epistemic communities 
alone is a necessary but insufficient condition in itself for inducing learning within a state. 
For the latter to happen, a second condition is necessary. The epistemic communities must 
operate in decision-making environments, which permit relatively open access to 
information and subject policy planning and decision-making processes to a “wisdom of the 
crowds” peer review process. The institutionalization of epistemic communities and shared 
policy planning and decision-making processes together constitute the base conditions for 
strong learning within the state. They reduce the scope for heuristics and cognitive biases in 
decision-making and pave the way for rational and relatively optimal policy outcomes. 
Finally, decision-makers should also be able to effectively monitor their epistemic and 
bureaucratic agents within the state. Otherwise, “information asymmetries” can produce 
sub-optimal outcomes often unbeknownst to decision-makers.  
 
I present evidence to show three interrelated causes for weak state learning or what I 
characterize as the Indian state’s lagging performance. The first is Indian decision-makers’ 
partial mobilization of a national security-centric epistemic community prior to 1998 and it’s 
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slow-institutionalization within the state in the post-1998 decade. These base conditions 
when grafted on to highly centralized, compartmentalized and monopolistic decision-making 
processes have historically attenuated the Indian state’s policy capacity. Secrecy and the 
compartmentalization of information also have denied political principals the means to 
effectively monitor the performance of the scientific and bureaucratic agents in the state. 
The net result has been policy outcomes riddled with heuristic and cognitive biases alongside 
the weak actualization of instituted policies.  
 
Understanding Lag 
The term lagging performance means the latency between signals that stress threatening 
changes in a target state’s external environment and the state’s institutional responses to 
address them. Lag also implies sub-optimality. Measures of sub-optimality, however, can be 
problematic depending on one’s choice of framing. One method of assessing the optimality 
of the Indian state’s policy choices would be against some form of rational choice, formal 
and informal. But there is a problem with abstract models of structured choice. Their 
emphasis on utility maximization, rank ordering of preferences, transitive preference 
orderings, and utility payoffs are more likely to inform the decisions of methodologically 
trained social scientists than those of political leaders. Further, leaders’ stated and revealed 
preferences are often difficult to reconcile making the use of formal rational choice models 
highly assumptive.27  
 
An alternative approach would be to use informal rational choice. This means some 
measurement of outcomes against understandings of what we would consider sane, 
                                                
27 Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications 
in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 14-17.  
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commonsensical and internally consistent. Reasonable as this may sound, our notions of 
informal rationality are also highly context and domain specific. This makes comparative 
measurement difficult. Due to the inherent biases in both formal and informal rational 
choice models, I adopt three alternative means to measure the Indian state’s nuclear 
performance. The first measure is global. It compares the Indian state’s degree of 
isomorphic adaptation to the nuclear practices of all the other nuclear weapon powers. The 
three metrics of measurement I use in this regard are timelines for: (1) nuclear device 
development; (2) weaponization; and (3) basic operational planning. As a second regional 
measure, I compare Indian and Pakistani nuclear developments along each of these metrics. 
The third measure is local. It compares the gap between the institution and the actualization 
of the Indian state’s nuclear policy goals from 1980-2010.  
  
Organizations, as Schelling observed, “respond to an environment that consists of other 
organizations responding to an environment.”28 Since the invention of nuclear weapons in 
1945, the five legally recognized nuclear weapon states (henceforth referred to as the NPT-
5), all followed a broadly similar path from the development process of the weapons to their 
operational deployment. The gold standard for comparison in this case would be the 
technical, institutional, and operational art of the NPT-5. In DiMaggio and Powell’s 
isomorphic typology for example, organizations homogenize by responding to coercive 
environmental, mimetic, or normative pressures.29 However, state nuclear responses to such 
pressures will typically vary depending on where their relative power and position in the 
international system. The responses of great powers will differ from those of regional 
                                                
28 Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review,  
Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 1983), p. 149.  
29 Ibid.: 150. 
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powers. Domestic political consolidation, economic, and technological capacity also shapes 
the capacity of states to adapt to external pressures. Mimicry and normative socialization in 
the case of nuclear proliferation work in reverse as proliferators face negative incentives for 
replicating the practices of the NPT-5.30 But despite these problems, timelines for nuclear 
device development and weaponization provide a rough measurement for comparative 
performance. Categories such as ‘institutional capacity’ and ‘operational art’ are inherently 
more sophisticated means and fuller measures to compare baseline performance. Credible 
and unambiguous data concerning them are generally not available for most “second-tier” 
nuclear weapon powers.31 For this reason, I use the simpler metric of basic operational 
planning.  
 
A nuclear device is commonly understood as “…fission and fusion materials, together with 
their arming, fuzing, firing, chemical high explosive, and effects-measuring components, that 
have not yet reached the development status of an operational weapon…system designed to 
produce a nuclear explosion for purposes of testing the design, for verifying nuclear theory, 
or for gathering information on system performance.”32 When measuring timelines for 
nuclear device development among various nuclear powers I take the start point as the year 
in which the nuclear weapon power made a political decision to develop such a device for 
ostensibly peaceful or military purposes. The end point of device development is not an 
actual test explosion in the field but technical completion in the laboratory. Based on these 
criteria, India’s decade-long development period is a little below the global average of eight 
                                                
30 Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2009), pp. 1-33. 
31 I categorize countries that developed nuclear devices and weapons after the passage of the 
1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as “second-tier” nuclear weapon powers. 
32 Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History, (New York: Orion Books, 1988) p. 
13.  
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years. But if we assume that second-tier nuclear weapon powers operate on a different 
“world time” then India’s development timeline is equivalent to that of its peers. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
However, when we turn to weaponization, “the conversion or modification of a nuclear test 
device into a combat-ready warhead,” which “includes the design and production of a 
ballistic casing (and any required retardation and impact-absorption or shock-mitigation 
devices) as well as special fuses, power sources, and arming and safing systems or 
equipment,”33 India stands out as an outlier. On average nuclear weapon powers took 14 
years to build weaponized systems. India’s timeline was twice that. The transition time 
                                                
33 Ibid., p. 17.  
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between weapon development and weaponization for a nuclear weapon power on average 
was five years. India’s timeline for completing weaponization was 20 years, four times that 
average. For the most part, nuclear powers have developed operational routines fairly quickly 
in the wake of weaponization. In the case of US, Britain, Israel and Pakistan there were no 
gaps at all. The gap was only one year for the former Soviet Union and China; and two for 
France.  In India that gap was five years.  
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The global trends are replicated at the regional level in South Asia as well. Despite India’s 
decade-long head start over Pakistan in the development of nuclear devices, both countries 
ended near simultaneously in developing reliable and safe air deliverable capabilities in 
1995.34 However, Pakistan followed up this technical threshold with preliminary operational 
planning led by the military’s Combat Directorate; and “joint exercises” between its scientific 
agencies, the air force and the military command.35 In India, basic operational readiness 
languished until the summer of 1999. Further, in the aftermath of the 1998 tests and overt 
claims to nuclear status, Pakistan systematically revamped it nuclear command authority and 
nuclear weapons-related management practices. Between 1999 and 2001, the Pakistani 
military redesigned its nuclear command and control structure, developed an operational 
nuclear doctrine and completed preliminary plans to integrate nuclear weapons with 
conventional war planning. Matching efforts in India only began in 2003 and did not take 
institutional root until 2004-2005.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
34 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Building the Bomb,” Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 186-187. 
35 Ibid.; “Establishment of Robust Command and Control,” Eating Grass, pp. 325-328. 
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Table 1.2 
 
 
 
 
Finally, apart from global and regional trends, I also include local metrics, by which I mean 
the Indian state’s self-identified nuclear threats and policy measures to address them, as a 
tertiary basis for comparison. Using open-source literature and elite interviews, I measure lag 
against three successive policy goals during the 1980s, the 1990s, and the post-1998 decade. 
During the 1980s, the Indian government’s policy of keeping its nuclear option open was 
not simply a passive option. The goal, in Indian parlance, was to “keep everything ready” so 
that as then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi put it “…if India decided to become a nuclear 
power, it would take a few weeks or a few months.”36 However, the process of becoming a 
                                                
36 Leonard S. Spector, New Nuclear Nations, (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), p. 95.  
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“nuclear power” that was expected to last a few months, took six years to accomplish. Policy 
evolved in the immediate aftermath of the Kashmir Crisis with Pakistan in 1990. The new 
goals were to develop an assured retaliatory capability and an emergency management system 
to enable the government respond to Pakistan-specific nuclear contingencies.37 India 
achieved the narrow goal of weaponization in the sense of developing the capacity to deliver 
nuclear weapons safely and reliably by the mid-1990s. But the organizational-management 
procedures and tactical operational planning necessary to actualize technical means went 
unrealized. Finally, in the last decade, with overt nuclear status, the Indian state resolved to 
credibly wield a minimum nuclear deterrent. There has since been an expansion in the state’s 
technical, organizational, and procedural capacities with the latter goal in mind. But lacking 
in this equation once again are well-developed ideational, intra- and inter-agency institutional 
practices to tie force structure with policy ends.38  
 
The above observations, at both the global and local levels, problematize the Indian state’s 
performance. The notion of a lagging response concerns the state’s ability to create military 
power. As such it is different from and indirectly relates to military effectiveness. Studies of 
military effectiveness largely concern the military’s institutional and organizational 
performance on the battlefield. Generally, such studies deal with the military’s unit cohesion, 
tactical leadership, generalship, information management, technical skills, logistics, training, 
morale and so on.39 In the fields of Sociology and military operations research, the focus of 
                                                
37 K. Subrahmanyam, interview with author, October 2009 (Noida, India). 
38 Bharat Karnad, “Maturing Nuclear & Missile Capabilities,” India’s Nuclear Policy (Westport: 
Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 63-106; Stephen P. Cohen & Sunil Dasgupta, 
Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization, (New Delhi: Penguin, 2010), pp. 29-52, 
97-122.  
39 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Understanding Arab Military Effectiveness,” Arabs at War: Military 
Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), pp. 1-13.  
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military effectiveness is on the tactical or unit level of warfare. Political Scientists deal with 
broader categories: culture, social structure, domestic institutions, and the international 
system to assess military effectiveness.40 But their focus too is the military’s performance on 
the battlefield.41  
 
Undoubtedly, the state’s ability to create military power will have an effect on military 
effectiveness. However, state capacity precedes operational use on the ground. Furthermore, 
in the case of nuclear weapons, technical, institutional, and ideational capacities should be 
treated as a proxy for potential effectiveness because no military has used nuclear weapons 
after World War II. The term lag also resonates with but is different from Randall 
Schweller’s concept of “underbalancing.” Underbalancing, as Schweller describes it, is a 
“theory of mistakes.” The “mistakes” in essence are the “non-balancing” or “inefficient 
balancing” behaviors of states against aggressive or unappeasable adversaries, which either 
provokes or prolongs a war that could have been avoided.42 However, in my definition the  
touchstone of lag is not war. Rather, it is the state’s underperformance. 
 
Scholars of comparative politics often attribute variations in state performance to 
differentials in their infrastructural capacities. The latter can include: the ‘strong state-weak 
state’ typology, the state-society dialectic, the degree of state autonomy, the extent of state 
penetration of society, the state’s ability to extract resources from its social base, the state’s 
                                                
40 Risa A. Brooks, “Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and 
International Forces on Military Effectiveness,” in Risa A. Brooks & Elizabeth A. Stanley, 
eds., Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2007), pp. 1-9.  
41Ibid.  
42 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 10.  
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legitimacy, the state’s ability to regulate society, the nature of a state’s bureaucratic structures 
and so on.43 However, the scope of my study sidesteps these analytic frames for several 
reasons. First, the post-colonial Indian state is above all a modern state in Weber’s rational-
legal meaning of the term. It enjoys a high degree of autonomy in functional areas such as 
foreign policy and national security. Whatever the degree of its fragmentation in the 
domestic sphere or its inability to carry out ambitious projects, the defense and nuclear 
sectors remain highly insulated and enable the state to conduct itself persuasively.44 
Moreover, if elections, peaceful transfers of power, and constitutional authority are used as 
metrics, then nearly all Indian central governments since 1947 have enjoyed political 
legitimacy. Whatever weaknesses may exist in the Indian state’s relative revenue extraction 
capacity either against unrealized potential or when compared with peers, its absolute ability 
to finance self-identified strategic nuclear, space, and indigenous defense sectors has not 
suffered. In fact, the Indian state has consistently made large and stable revenue allocations 
to a group of scientific and industrial baronies devoted to developing nuclear, space, and 
advanced weapon systems.45 These reasons apart, state-society balance metrics are useful for 
making comparative assessments of a society’s cumulative capacity to generate military 
power, fight protracted hegemonic wars, or sustain long-term power rivalries in the 
international system.46 But they have only secondary and tertiary effects on narrower sectors 
devoted to specialized tasks.  
 
                                                
43 Janice Bially, Ashley J. Tellis, Christopher Layne & Melissa McPherson, “Measuring 
National Performance,” Measuring Power in the Postindustrial Age, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), 
pp.102-122.  
44 Itty Abraham, “India’s Strategic Enclave: Civilian Scientists & Military Technologies,” 
Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter 1992), pp. 231-252.  
45 Ibid. 
46 For example see, Stephen P. Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996).  
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In contrast, nuclear infrastructural capacities have an immediate tie to performance 
differentials. The scientific, technical, and engineering demands for fissile material 
production, weapons fabrication, testing, and deployment are vast.47 States’ inability to 
overcome bottlenecks in their scientific and technical infrastructure can impose significant 
delays. The long development timeline of Iran’s enriched uranium production facilities and 
the faltering and now defunct Iraqi and Libyan nuclear weapon programs are cases that 
demonstrate this point. However, I exclude technical assessments of India’s nuclear 
infrastructure as a cause for the lag in performance due to the presumption that India by 
1974 had a proven capacity to produce fissile material as well as build at least simple fission 
devices. That said, it is not my purpose to argue that India’s ascent up the nuclear 
weaponization ladder was frictionless. During the 1990s for example, the challenges of 
weaponizing and integrating nuclear weapons with delivery platforms proved formidable.48 
The evidence, however, suggests that these were second order problems that followed in the 
wake of political and institutional management practices. Therefore, an appraisal of the 
quality of India’s strategic scientific and industrial infrastructure would only be in order if the 
scope of the research question concerned the size and sophistication of India’s nuclear 
forces.  
 
My scope conditions for lag primarily focus on the “software” side of security management, 
by which I mean the state’s “ policy capacity.” Azar and Moon originally formulated the 
distinction between national security hardware and software. They categorized software as a 
mix of state legitimacy, integration and policy capacity. Because legitimacy and integration 
                                                
47 “Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Office of Technology Assessment, 
(Washington, D.C.: US Congress, 1993), pp. 119-180.  
48 Senior Indian Air Force officers (retd.) ‘A’ & ‘B’, non-attributable interviews by author, 
January & February 2010 (Gurgaon and Noida, India). 
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overlap with a state’s political infrastructural capacities and only indirectly relate to nuclear 
weaponization in India’s context, I exclude them from consideration.49 I therefore zero in on 
policy capacity, which I define as the network of institutional and organizational arrangements 
that enable a state to formalize national values, identify threats, make national security 
determinations, formulate plans, coordinate an internal response, and implement policy.50 
 
Case Selection and Method 
In this dissertation I study three cases of Indian nuclear decision-making between 1980 and 
2010. Each case study is an analysis of decision-making episodes that span the length of a 
decade: the 1980s, the 1990s and the period from 1998 until 2009. The first case concerns 
India’s delayed weaponization. The second analyzes India’s lack of an operational nuclear 
capability during the 1990s in the aftermath of acquiring nuclear weapons. The third traces 
India’s slow march to resolve institutional and organizational anomalies in the management 
of its nuclear force in the wake of formal claims to nuclear status and international 
recognition as a de facto nuclear weapons power.  
 
Within case studies are especially useful in domains such as proliferation where the N is 
small and the information concerning states’ operational practices, especially among second-
tier nuclear weapon powers, is scarce. It also helps control for history, culture, and the 
                                                
49 Edward E. Azar  & Chung-in Moon, “The ‘Software’ Side of Third World National 
Security,” in Edward E. Azar & Chung-in Moon, eds., National Security in the Third World: The 
Management of Internal and External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1988), pp. 
77-91.  
50 Ibid., pp. 91-98. 
 21 
effects of structural economic and security variables.51 The contextualized and structured 
comparison keeps a leash on “conceptual stretching” and avoids the inclusion of cases that 
are not analytically equivalent. By undertaking to study this humanly, messy, and compelling 
real-world problem, I am not attempting to discover what Hempel described general 
“covering laws.”52 Rather, my goal is to uncover middle-range intervening mechanisms and 
processes that lie between the “start” and “finish” of phenomenon.53  The approach I adopt 
is especially relevant for sorting through the problem of “equifinality” where outcomes have 
several explanations that lead to the same outcome.  
 
In my study, I combine historical “process tracing,” and elite interviewing methods to 
establish the basis of argument. The process tracing method lends itself particularly well to 
detailed historical investigations and is useful to understand the interaction between 
leadership agency and systemic structure, leadership selection effects, sequential processes, 
path dependencies and feedback loops.54 Substantial data for my research were obtained 
through elite interviews during the year I spent in India doing field research. Some of it 
comes from the small number of senior civilian and defense officials who constituted India’s 
informal nuclear network in the 1990s, prior to Delhi’s formally claiming nuclear status. 
Other interview data comes from members of India’s military elites and the newly formed 
                                                
51 James Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Assessment,” in James Mahoney and Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 360-367.  
52 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), p. 7.  
53 For general arguments on the value of single- small-N studies see: Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 
“Can One or Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains,” in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, 305-36; Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, 
“Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen 
V. Milner eds., Political Science: State of the Discipline, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2002), pp. 713-718. 
54 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pp. 205-232.  
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Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Some of the interviews were obtained on record. But 
most officials agreed to be interviewed on condition of anonymity. The data presented in 
this study are unique to the extent that no archival material in India pertaining to and related 
to the nuclear weapons program has been opened to scholars or the public. Further, much 
of what passed as institutional knowledge of India’s nuclear weapons program in the pre-
1998 era was not committed to paper for security reasons. It was orally transmitted among 
members of the nuclear network never numbering more than a dozen individuals. Thus the 
data used in this project represents one of the first attempts to study India’s nuclear 
weaponization and operational planning processes through means of oral history.  
 
Alternative Explanations 
Traditional explanations for Indian proliferation outcomes can be divided into two 
categories. In the first are “nuclear demand” explanations, which spell out the structural  
security imperatives that cause states to proliferate. These arguments are the most widely 
accepted explanations among the general public, academics and policy practitioners for 
India’s nuclear state of affairs. However, because India’s historical nuclear outcomes are 
empirically a poor fit with structural demand explanations, scholars have advanced a second 
set of  “supply side” constraint arguments – prestige, normative-cultural and economic – to 
bridge the gap between the expected and actual outcomes. The demand side explanations  
are deductive and function at the level of the international system. The supply side 
explanations on the other hand are inductive and draw from the specific and peculiar meso-
level constraints of the Indian state.  
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I take up swathes from these two sets of arguments below and show that neither offers a 
credible or consistent explanation for India’s nuclear behavior.  
 
NUCLEAR DEMAND SIDE ARGUMENTS 
 
Defensive Realism 
Structural Realism, especially its ‘Defensive’ variant, is the most widely accepted theoretical 
explanation for India’s nuclear behavior. The theory’s fundamental tenets, which barely need 
repeating, are that the structural condition of anarchy in the international system forces 
states to rely on the institution of self-help. Nuclear weapons, because of their enormous 
destructive power, are game changers in the international system. States therefore either ally 
themselves with nuclear weapon powers, seek the shelter of their nuclear umbrellas or 
develop nuclear weapons independently.55 In this framework, India faced a negative security 
relationship with its two regional neighbors: China and Pakistan.  When confronted with 
independent nuclear threats from both countries, as well as evidence of mounting nuclear 
collusion between them, Delhi decided to build a nuclear arsenal.56  
 
The more nuanced Defensive Realist argument has been advanced by Paul who concedes 
that both Realism and Liberalism influence states’ proliferation behavior.57 He argues that 
unlike great powers, which are “greedy security maximizers,” regional powers are “prudential 
                                                
55 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphi Paper 
171, (London: IISS, 1981), pp. 7-8. 
56 Ashely J. Tellis, “Strategic Factors Affecting India’s Nuclear Posture,” India’s Emerging 
Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed and Ready Arsenal, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), pp. 39-75; 
Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s 
Nuclear Weapons Program,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, (Spring 1999), pp. 148-177. 
57 Paul, “Explaining Nuclear Forbearance,” Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear 
Weapons, pp. 14-15. 
 24 
realists.” In their interactions with regional peers, they balance “interests, capabilities, and 
intentions” to avoid creating negative security dilemmas.58 Paul’s typologizes the 
international system into regions of “high,” “medium” and “low” conflict characterized by 
differences in the nature of state rivalries and conflicts. Only states in regions of 
“protracted” and “enduring rivalries and conflict” are likely to follow the logic of “hard 
realism” and proliferate. States in regions of “medium” and “low” conflict will more likely be 
receptive to liberal norms and institutional incentives.59 Unlike great powers, regional powers 
also do not proliferate easily. But those regional powers that harbor great power aspirations 
will have added incentives to acquire nuclear arms.60 Thus in Paul’s model and Structural 
Realism in general, India’s decision to proliferate is a no brainer.  
 
The problem with Structural Realism however is not the outcome but the outcome’s delayed 
onset and its attenuated form in every decade since India initiated a nuclear weapons 
program. The historical evidence that India delayed weaponization until the late-1980s, well 
after Pakistan’s nuclear advances, amid conditions of high political and military volatility, is 
puzzling. To be sure Indian scientists were working on “developing sophisticated nuclear 
weapons.” Yet as B.G. Deshmukh who served as cabinet secretary and principal secretary to 
the prime minister subsequently disclosed, “…there was no major mission to integrate and 
manufacture deliverable systems.”61 Although this may sound like a trivial distinction to the 
non-technical observer, the developing of “technology” and the building of “technics” are 
distinct. Technology is “engineering know how, a practical knowledge of how natural 
principles can be put to work…” Technics on the other hand, are “actual tangible machines, 
                                                
58 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
59 Ibid., pp. 18-27. 
60 Ibid., p. 18. 
61 Deshmukh, “Keep the Faith.” 
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apparatuses, and devices that are the product of labor and technology applied to natural 
resources.”62 The existence of the first is not interchangeable with the second. The Indian 
program illustrates this point well. Although 1989 was the start date for weaponization, the 
end date of its first phase was 1994. Further, it wasn’t until 1995-96 that India achieved the 
means to deliver nuclear weapons safely and reliably via aircraft. There was thus a six to 
seven-year gap before technology could be transformed into technics. 
 
Likewise, structural arguments cannot explain the gap in India’s institutional capacities to 
manage nuclear operations in the 1990s. Nuclear operations share several common 
characteristics with any complex emergency management task. The first institutional and 
organizational challenge is to establish a “common knowledge base” and “common 
operating base.”63 In India, however, the tight compartmentalization of information 
regarding the weapons existence comported against establishing any shared understanding 
among all the players. Further, Neorealism has no answer for why institutional anomalies in 
India’s higher military command and inter-agency coordination practices, so crucial to 
address security dilemmas, remain unresolved a decade after it publicly claimed nuclear 
power status and has been accepted as much by the world’s other great powers. Essentially, 
Neorealism, like any good deductive theory, is concerned with parsimonious explanations 
and getting a few big things right. And the one big regularity it predicts is that states faced 
                                                
62 Daniel Deudney, “Dividing Realism: Structural Realism versus Security on Nuclear 
Security and Proliferation, in, Zachary S. Davis & Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation 
Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread, (Frank Cass, 1993), p. 22.  
63 For an overview of some of the challenges of inter-organizational coordination during 
extreme events and emergencies see, Louise K. Comfort, “Crisis Management in Hindsight: 
Cognition, Communication, Coordination and Control,” Public Administration Review, 
(December 2007), pp. 189-197; _____, “Managing Intergovernmental Responses to 
Terrorism and Other Extreme Events,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 32, No. 4, (Fall 
2002), pp. 29-49.  
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with structural conditions of anarchy will balance against them. By that measure, the theory 
is correct. India has balanced and acquired nuclear weapons. Arguably, the debate is over. 
And yet, the theory tells us nothing about the timing and content of India’s national security 
responses to structural pressures.  
 
NUCLEAR “SUPPLY SIDE” CONSTRAINT ARGUMENTS 
 
PRESTIGE 
The most favored alternative explanation for India’s nuclear behavior is that it is prestige-
oriented. Scholars who make this argument draw on prestige theories from Classical Realism 
and Sociological New Institutionalism. They point to Classical Realists such as Morgenthau 
who emphasized the role of prestige as an instrument of power;64 and Gilpin who referred to 
“prestige rather than power” as “the everyday currency in international relations.”65 Further 
back, theorists now considered the predecessors of modern Realism, Thucydides, Hobbes, 
Machiavelli, and Rousseau, also refer to prestige motivations as intrinsic ends in 
themselves.66 This argument has parallels in Sociology’s New Institutionalism literature, 
which makes the case that individuals and organizations mimic each other’s behavior not 
because of underlying competitive pressures or functional logic, but because they feel the 
need to belong to a shared system of beliefs and ideas considered legitimate in particular 
time and space contexts.67 The prestige theorists similarly rationalize that the Indian state has 
                                                
64 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 95. 
65 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), p. 31. 
66 Daniel S. Markey, The Prestige Motive in International Relations, PhD Dissertation, (Princeton 
University, November 2000), pp. 19-31.  
67 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” pp. 
73-76. 
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never treated nuclear weapons as instrumental to address security dilemmas, but only sought 
them because they have became institutionalized as attributes of great power status. Karsten 
Frey sums up this logic when he says: “In India’s nuclear policy formulation, status seeking 
became a national interest in its own right…not by increasing the substance of state 
power…but by displaying it.”68 
 
The prestige argument is rich in evidence. But it ignores something very basic, which is that 
prestige depends on public knowledge of the possession of a value or material object held in 
esteem because of its relative scarcity.69 However, for nearly a decade (1989-1998) before 
India ended its policy of nuclear ambiguity, the weaponization program unfolded in secrecy 
within the state. The latter reality undermines the basic operating principle of prestige, which 
is publicity. In India’s case, scholars sometimes collapse the intrinsic and instrumental ends 
or prestige. At other times they parse them. In the intrinsic argument, nuclear weapons are 
associated with the post-colonial Indian state’s foundational notions of legitimacy and 
modern identity. Scholars such as Abraham and Krishna cast nuclear weapons as artifacts of 
modernity that dignify and satisfy the primordial nationalist urges of the subaltern post-
colonial Indian state.70 Indeed, cultural, anthropological and sociological scholarship has 
unpacked the cultural meanings and symbolisms associated with nuclear weapons in the 
collective consciousness of Indian publics and elites. However, it is impossible to tease out 
semiotic associations from the more tangible national security drivers behind policies. This 
                                                
68 Frey, “Conclusion,” India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security, p. 197.  
69 Barry O’Neil, “Nuclear Weapons and the Pursuit of Prestige,” May 2002, 
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70 Abraham, “Introduction,” The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the 
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literature is also embedded in a “soft” epistemology, which makes the task of measurement 
and establishment of causal links to specific outcomes difficult.71  
 
The instrumental argument in comparison has measurable domestic and external goals. For 
example, Markey and Bajpai attribute India’s 1998 decision to conduct nuclear tests and 
claim nuclear power status to the rise of Hindu nationalism and the Hindu-nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) demands for electoral dividends. The trouble with this 
argument is that it ignores the simple historical counterfactual that six prime ministers at the 
head of four centrist and left-of-the center coalitions supported the weaponization program 
for a decade prior to the 1998 tests. In fact, the tests would have been impossible without 
their support. Three prime ministers verged on tests: in 1982-83,72 in 199573 and in 199674 
before finally ordering them in 1998. To be sure, the tests proved enormously popular and 
the Hindu nationalists reaped electoral dividends from them.75 However, this phenomenon 
in and by itself does not establish causality. 
 
On the other hand, Frey’s external prestige argument maintains that nuclear weapons are the 
petard with which India has sought entry into the exclusive club of nuclear great powers. To 
establish this claim, Frey uses the elite discourse analysis method. His evidence consists of a 
random sample of 705 nuclear-related editorials and opinions culled from four Indian 
newspapers between 1986-2005. This sample shows that the Indian elite discourse focused 
                                                
71 Landmark works include: Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and 
the Postcolonial State; ______, ed., South Asian Cultures of the Bomb: Atomic Publics and the State in 
India and Pakistan. 
72 Perkovich, “More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered,” India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 242-243. 
73 Perkovich, “India Verges On Tests,” India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 364-371.  
74 Ibid., pp. 374-376.  
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on security threats during the 1980s, shifted attention to the nonproliferation regime and 
identity-related status issues in the 1990s, reverted back to security issues in the wake of 1998 
tests, and thereafter once again became fixated with status and identity issues.76 Over 20 
years, concerns of self, identity and prestige outpaced national security threats in the public 
discourse.77 Frey treats this shifting elite discourse as a proxy for Indian decision-makers’ 
beliefs and priorities. 
 
However, there are two reasons why Frey’s argument is unpersuasive. First, it does not 
account for the alternative causal logic that punditry takes its cues from and has an 
interactive relationship with historical events and trends. Second, he proposes without any 
supporting evidence that because the Indian state lacked an institutionalized national security 
decision-making apparatus, the strategic elite outside government was “able to monopolize 
the security discourse and thus hold an element of power which, in a Habermasian 
definition, comprises both ‘communicative power’ and ‘administrative power’ associated 
with the functions and institutions of the state.”78 This latter assumption vastly overestimates 
the elite’s capacity to influence the state and underestimates the zealousness with which the 
Indian executive has historically guarded its prerogative over nuclear decision-making.  
 
Thus the prestige advocates err on three counts. First, they ignore the reality that prestige 
associated with nuclear weapons has been a constant in Indian politics since the 1974 nuclear 
test. All prime ministers from 1983 on had the option to test and yet none chose to do so 
until 1998. Second, prestige depends on publicity. Yet, seven Indian governments between 
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1989 and 1998 elected against making India’s nuclear capability public. And finally, nuclear 
issues have ceased to be an electoral issue in Indian politics. But for the technical milestones 
such as platform acquisitions and missile tests that are visible to the general public eye, the 
more substantial organizational, institutional and ideational elements of nuclear force 
development have once again receded into the background. Finally, the instrumentalists’ 
surmise that India has sought nuclear weapons for display purposes is contradicted by the 
steady development of India’s nuclear force capabilities in the last decade even after being 
accepted as a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology.”79  
 
Normative-Cultural 
Aside from Classical Realist and sociological arguments, a case is often made that Indian 
leaders have sought prestige by abjuring what would be considered the normal behavior of 
security seeking states in the international system. Scholars maintain that Indian leaders have 
sought to position India as a moral exemplar; as a country that stands aloof and above the 
riff-raff of security maximizers.80 Indeed, Indian prime ministers until the late-1970s, Nehru, 
Shastri and Desai, had a strong aversion to nuclear weapons and institutionalized their 
preferences through the state’s public advocacy of global nuclear arms control and 
disarmament; as well as by rejecting domestic pressures for nuclear armament.81 There is also 
evidence to show that the two key nuclear decision-makers in the 1980s, Prime Ministers 
Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, opposed weaponization on normative grounds.  
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However, the evidence is more muddied. Although senior policy planners who interacted 
with Rajiv Gandhi have described him a “reluctant believer” in the nuclear cause,82 his 
mother and immediate predecessor’s motives appear to be a mixed bag of economic realism 
and political risk-aversion.83 That said, even Rajiv Gandhi followed a Janus-faced approach, 
which coupled moralism with an insurance strategy of allowing work on the weapon 
program to proceed.84 But more substantially, prime ministers who succeeded the Gandhis 
after 1989 do not appear to have shared their normative predilections. India had a succession 
of six prime ministers in the period 1989-1998. At least three among them, Singh, Rao, and 
Gowda, cited economic constraints for not conducting nuclear tests.85 Further, all prime 
ministers from 1989 on, including Rajiv Gandhi, privately supported the weaponization 
program. Thus the historical evidence shows variation between decision-makers’ public 
statements and private actions.  
 
The above normative argument also does not distinguish between “consequential actions,” 
by which actors consciously resort to agency to achieve identified ends from what 
Sociological Institutionalism categorizes “obligatory” action by which actors ritualistically 
comply with “scripts” and “playbooks” deemed socially appropriate.86 Oddly in 1998, three 
decision-makers at the helm of the BJP-led government (Vajpayee, Advani, and Singh) 
succeeded in revolutionizing the course of the state’s nuclear policy. Such a revolutionary 
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action course would have been impossible had nuclear abstinence norms been deeply 
institutionalized within Indian state and society. This brings us to the third problem with the 
normative argument, which is, that it effectively black boxes the state. Indeed, if we peer 
inside the black box of the state, we discover considerable opposition from scientist-
bureaucrats and military leaders who viewed Pakistan’s nuclear advances in the 1980s and 
1990s with consternation and pushed for a hard Realist course of action.87 Hence the 
normative question inevitably takes an institutional turn: what were the permissive 
institutional conditions that enabled single actors to veto opposition within a legal-rational 
state apparatus? 
 
Coinciding with the post-Cold War wave of ideational-normative studies in international 
security,88 South Asian security studies scholarship has also embraced meso-level cultural 
variables to supplement the minimalism of deductive theories.89 The argument advanced is 
that India’s normatively freighted strategic culture exercises explicit and tacit restraints on 
military maximalism.90 Although this argument is generally popular with academics and 
policy makers, considerable confusion abounds on whether the sources of cultural 
preferences that inform Indian strategic thinking are institutional or normative. It is also 
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unclear if the strategic culture argument applies to ‘grand strategy’, which is the “purposeful 
employment of all instruments of power available to a security community,”91 or the 
narrower ‘military strategy’, which pertains to the planning and execution by military 
organizations of strategic goals.92 In the absence of such specifications, the purchase of the 
strategic culture argument is unclear. Nuclear policy is referred to in a general way in many 
arguments. Some scholars have tied an entire stable of cultural preferences and beliefs 
(Nehru-Gandhi) to at least three evolving nuclear tableaus (option, recessed deterrence and 
overt posture) from the early1980s to the last decade.93 However, this attempt undermines 
the argument that cultural belief systems explain India’s nuclear consistency and restraint in 
the face of system-level pressures. 
 
The debate on cultural explanations for India’s strategic behavior was triggered by Tanham’s 
controversial claim in the early 1990s that India suffered from the “absence of strategic 
thinking.” When making this claim, Tanham made no distinction between grand strategy and 
military strategy. He also based his claims on a mix of historical and cultural factors. At the 
historic plane, Tanham asserted that India lacked imperial unity for most of its history. 
Because it did not evolve into a modern state independently, it never developed a tradition 
of thinking about “national defense.” However, the dominant reasons behind his claims are 
cultural: the Hindu “concept” or the “lack of a sense of time” and the treatment of life as 
vague and “mysterious.” The latter, Tanham maintained, discouraged planning.94 The 
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difficulty with the historical frame is that it ignores the two centuries of the British imperial 
interlude, the strategic planning that accompanied empire and the post-colonial Indian state’s 
inheritance of both the imperial institutions as well as the imperial mindset. The cultural 
arguments also do not account for the materiality of the post-colonial Indian state and its 
primary post-independence project: centralized economic planning and development.95  
 
Although Tanham never drew causal links between his claims on the “absence of strategic 
thinking” and Indian nuclear policy, leading Indian strategic thinkers such as K. 
Subrahmanyam and India’s former foreign minister Jaswant Singh used it to frame what they 
described as the drift in India’s nuclear policy. However, a close study of Subrahmanyam’s 
writings show that both institutional and cultural reasons account for that drift; and that 
institutional reasons are the primary and culture the secondary.96 Singh, on the other hand, 
accepted the validity of Tanham’s reasons but argued that India’s failings were specific to 
‘grand’ strategy and not ‘military’ strategy.97 Whereas Subrahmanyam’s institutional critiques 
of Indian policy planning, borne out of his own experience in government, eclipse the 
cultural argument, Singh’s criticisms have greater applicability to the grand strategic 
principles governing India’s nuclear posture (covert versus overt) and the handling of 
nonproliferation pressures in general. They apply less to the specifics of covert nuclear 
developments and related operational planning. More significant, Singh’s thesis highlights 
the institutional path dependency problems that arose from the personal and non-
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institutionalized system of foreign policy and strategic decision-making in the first two 
decades of Indian independence.98  
 
To date, Rajesh Basrur has applied the strategic cultural argument most rigorously. He 
restricts his argument to a select historical window, narrows its scope to nuclear weapons 
excluding all other strategic questions, and develops a credible methodology of specified 
open-source content analysis and elite interviews to support his case.99 Basrur identifies three 
elements in Indian strategic culture, which he argues are the basis for the continuing nuclear 
minimalism and restraint from the late 1970s until the early 2000s. These are: (a) a very 
limited acceptance of nuclear weapons as a source of national security; (b) political as against 
the technical/operational understanding of nuclear weapons; and (c) incremental responses 
to systemic-level structural pressures to expand nuclear capabilities.100 It is this restrained 
strategic culture, the “habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operation,” 
argues Basrur, which explains the slow institutional changes in India’s nuclear responses: the 
options posture in the 1980s; the recessed posture in the 1990s; and the overt posture post-
1998.101 Remarkably enough, Basur characterizes the tectonic institutional shift between the 
recessed (pre-1998) and overt (post-1998) postures as non-radical, because of the general 
reluctance of the political class to develop an operational capability.102 Thus cultural 
preferences in his view are the connective thread that tie three nuclear institutional postures 
and explain overall restraint.  
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Basrur’s methodology, however, unearths something entirely at odds with his argument. It 
shows that the Indian elite’s post-1998 nuclear beliefs and preferences are dichotomized 
along two lines: between the politicians who view nuclear weapons as political weapons and 
the strategic experts and the military who lean in the direction of espousing an operational 
framework for those same weapons.103 In essence, Basrur’s methodology reveals evidence of 
the existence of two competing sub-cultures within the Indian state, which uneasily cohabit a 
common political space. Although Basrur’s data are restricted to the post-1998 years, his 
methodology when applied to earlier historical periods – the decades of the ‘option’ and 
‘recessed’ posture – shows a similar cultural dichotomy between the political generalists and 
the professional military.104  
 
In advancing the cultural argument, Basrur bucks the obvious institutional and 
organizational ones. In a regime of competing sub-cultures what conditions enable one set 
of cultural beliefs to prevail in the policy market place? Similarly, in a system characterized by 
cultural differences, why is there a systemic bias in favor of the status quo? Basrur indirectly 
answers these questions by showing that pre-1998 nuclear decision-making in India was the 
exclusive preserve of the prime minister to the exclusion of parliament, the civilian 
bureaucracy, the military and public opinion. By his own admission, India’s strategic culture 
is reduced to a set of cultural preferences held by prime ministerial incumbents,105 a process 
which black boxes the state. Finally, and more significant perhaps, Basrur admits to the 
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gradual shift toward an operational bias in Indian strategic culture106 without accounting for 
the mechanisms behind new cultural learning in the system.  
 
Economic 
The final set of “supply side” constraint arguments concern the economics of nuclear 
restraint. This set has two variants. The first concerns India’s economic constraints. The 
second argument is metaphorically akin to Putnam’s “two-level game” model107 where the 
outward/inward orientation of domestic political coalitions shapes the politics of nuclear 
restraint. The strictly domestic level argument is that India’s weak resource conditions 
explain nuclear restraint in the years 1980-98. In 1982-1983 for example, Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi reportedly canceled earlier planned nuclear tests due to the implicit threat of 
US denial of World Bank and IMF funds.108 Similarly in 1985, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
also shelved plans prepared by an interdisciplinary team consisting of scientists and the 
military for a proposed nuclear arsenal because he thought its budgetary price too high.109 
Similarly, Prime Minister Rao considered a program of nuclear tests in 1995-96. But he 
decided against it lest the tests jeopardize the “structural adjustment” program then 
underway with the IMF’s assistance.110  
 
The economic constraints argument therefore credibly explains India’s reluctance to conduct 
hot tests and embrace an overt nuclear posture until 1998. However, it does not address the 
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puzzles I raise, which concern weaponization adjusted to the economic constraints of the 
time. Resource constraints, furthermore, should not impact operational planning, which is a  
software issue that concerns intra- and inter-agency coordination and planning. More 
significant, during the last decade, economic constraints in the form of threatened US 
sanctions have ended with Washington’s acceptance of New Delhi’s de facto nuclear weapon 
power status. Likewise, the Indian economy’s “tiger” performance in the last decade has 
loosened the government’s purse strings on military spending. However, even as these 
externalities have changed, institutional and organizational lacunae in India’s operational 
posture remain; effectively scuttling the economic constraints as the cause for Indian nuclear 
restraint argument.  
 
Etel Solingen has advanced the second economic argument. Solingen highlights the link 
between the orientation of domestic coalitions and grand strategy. Extending the analytic 
treatment that Jack Snyder and Mathew Evangelista applied to the domestic politics of great 
powers in the realms of war making and weapons procurement, she argues that 
nonproliferation outcomes are more likely to emanate from the economic practices of 
liberalizing domestic coalitions.111 In the context of nuclear proliferation Solingen makes two 
specific claims. First, domestic liberalizing coalitions care about access to international 
financial markets, trade, capital, and investments. Such coalitions are aware that non-
acceptance of full-scope nuclear safeguards can result in the denial of access to the global 
economy.112 Second, nuclear weapon programs are usually bound up with domestic inward 
looking “nationalist-confessional” coalitions. In contrast, liberalizers tend to de-regulate the 
                                                
111 Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security, Vol. 19, 
No. 2, (Autumn 1994), pp. 136-142.  
112 Etel Solingen, “Alternative Logics on Denuclearization,” Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in 
East Asia and the Middle East, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 40-41.  
 39 
economy and disinvest in state-controlled strategic industrial sectors. The implications for 
nuclear weapon programs and the nuclear complex in general are that state liberalization of 
the economy and withdrawal from public sector industries will likely generate pressures that 
favor termination of nuclear weapon programs.113  
 
Solingen caveats her argument by cautioning that her theory is more probabilistic than 
deterministic and that her models are more in the nature of Weber’s “ideal types;” 
conceptual constructs and not “historical or true realities.” Furthermore, leaders’ ability to 
successfully implement liberalizing agendas will vary according to their strength vis-à-vis 
domestic competitors as well as whether neighboring regional states adopt similar liberalizing 
agendas. Equally significant, the temporal sequences surrounding nuclear weapons 
acquisition matter. Hence, the argument does not apply once critical nuclear thresholds are 
crossed. For example, leaders will find it harder to give up the weapons they may already 
possess than abandon steps in the direction of weapons acquisition already taken.114  
 
There is however, little empirical support for Solingen’s claims. Sasikumar and Way’s hazard 
model shows for instance that trade liberalization is associated with higher risks of nuclear 
proliferation. Further, the expansion in gross domestic product (GDP) has a non-linear 
relationship with states’ nuclear quest. Per capita GDP expansion only above very high 
thresholds is likely to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Higher levels of trade 
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openness, to be sure, reduce the hazard. But participation in international regimes and 
organizations do not appear to inhibit proliferation.115  
 
Solingen’s test cases are restricted to states in the Far and the Middle East. Her study 
excludes India and Pakistan. Nonetheless, India is an important test case because it meets all 
her theory’s scope conditions: liberalizing coalition, effective domestic leadership, 
neighboring states with liberalizing agendas and a weaponization program in an inchoate 
phase. It also turns out to be the case, which strongly refutes the liberalization as the means 
for de-nuclearization thesis. The weaponization phase of India’s nuclear weapons program  
in 1989 almost precisely overlapped with the launch of economic liberalization policies in the 
late 1980s. In the two decades following that decision, the weaponization program’s scope 
has expanded even as the orientation of the Indian economy has taken an almost irreversible 
global turn. 
 
To summarize the main points: the nuclear demand explanations focus on the role security 
competition plays in forming states’ nuclear preferences. In India’s case, however, they are 
unable to explain the lag in the actualization of those preferences. The nuclear “supply side” 
constraint arguments attempt to fill that gap by drawing on India-specific domestic 
explanations. Among them, prestige arguments ignore counterfactuals and read the evidence 
selectively. Normative accounts conflate the state’s norms with those held by prime 
ministerial incumbents. Cultural arguments, on the other hand, are unable to decide whether 
the source of India’s strategic culture is structural, normative or institutional. Such arguments 
also ignore the institutional elephant in the room, which offers the obvious explanation for 
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why in the midst of competing sub-cultures, one prevails over the other. Finally, economic 
constraint arguments are irrelevant to the issue of covert small-scale weaponization 
programs, institutional planning and organizational coordination. Moreover, India’s rapid 
economic growth in the last decade, its huge expansion in defense spending including 
spending in the strategic nuclear sector and the removal of the threat of external sanctions, 
all disabuse the idea of economics as the cause for the lag in India’s nuclear performance.  
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
In the following chapters I develop the theoretical scope of my argument and present 
empirical evidence to support it.  
 
Chapter 2 fleshes out the concept of “regimes of ignorance” and how such regimes retard 
learning in covertly proliferating states. I argue that strongly institutionalized epistemic 
communities, structured and open decision-making processes and organizational 
transparency are essential for state learning. Epistemic actors are essential to building well-
developed information and corresponding knowledge markets inside states, conditions 
necessary for informed decision-making. Structured decision-making processes that are also 
open to independent peer review reduce the scope for heuristics and biases in decisions. 
Similarly, organizational transparency and high information turnover create permissive 
conditions for political principals to effectively monitor their agents. Learning in state actors 
and agencies, which I define as the incorporation of new routines into existing institutional 
practices, will be spasmodic when such institutional and organizational processes are absent 
or weakly developed.  
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Chapter 3 revisits the puzzle of India’s delayed weaponization in the 1980s. I highlight the 
challenges of imperfect information and uncertainty that confront most decision-makers; 
and how weakly institutionalized epistemic actors and poorly developed information and 
knowledge markets compound the challenges of accurately assessing national security 
threats. I show that India’s sequential problem solving approach and the decision-makers’ 
underestimation of the severity of Pakistan’s challenge are directly traceable to the 
unstructured information processing and national security decision-making system in the 
state. Further, Indian decision-makers’ overestimation of the Indian state’s domestic capacity 
to counter that threat bespeaks of the problems of effective agent monitoring in regimes of 
information compartmentalization and scarcity.  
 
Chapter 4 dwells on India’s problems of nuclear operational planning under domestic 
institutions of secrecy and international scrutiny in the decade of the 1990s. In it I present 
evidence to show the linkages between poor knowledge aggregation within the state and the 
absence of deductive planning. In India’s case, these directly contributed to many of the 
technical and organizational hurdles that hampered execution of the weaponization project 
during the 1990s. I also show that decision-makers’ cognitive biases were the cause for the 
absence of inter-agency planning and coordination on soft nuclear operational routines in 
this period. Information asymmetries and the decision-makers’ lack of effective oversight 
over their agents were also the direct consequence of the state’s internal regime of ignorance. 
I conclude by showing that external assumptions to the contrary, India lacked an operational 
nuclear capability until the summer of 1999. 
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Chapter 5 examines the path dependency effects of existing institutions even after decision-
makers commit to new policy goals. I show how weakly instituted epistemic communities 
and compartmentalized planning adversely affected the actualization of nuclear operational 
practices in the first half of the decade following India’s formal claims to nuclear power 
status; and how stronger institutions in the latter half of the decade gradually changed 
outcomes. The anchoring effects of heuristics and biases are nowhere more evident than in 
the internal debate on the political versus operational understanding of nuclear weapons. I 
also present evidence to show that many of the technical and organizational bottlenecks that 
come in the way of smooth operational practices stem from classic principal-agent problems.  
 
Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, expands the framework I have developed in this 
dissertation to study other cases of proliferation in the international system. I argue that 
among all nuclear weapon powers, India’s case stands out as an exception. But the causality 
for Indian exceptionalism does not run through either the nature of India’s bureaucracy or 
its civil-military institutions. Rather the cause for the difference between India’s nuclear 
performance and that of nuclear weapon powers stems from variation in the institution of 
secrecy that states institute domestically to manage their nuclear weapon programs. In this 
regard, I conceptualize secrecy as a continuum - low, medium and high - along two axes: 
internal and external. I argue that high external secrecy has a less debilitating impact on the 
domestic management of the program than a corresponding regime of high internal secrecy. 
The two are no doubt interlinked.  A state most concerned with hiding its proliferation 
effort from external scrutiny will also be inclined to keep it under tight wraps domestically. 
Correspondingly, a state less concerned with external secrecy will have more breathing room 
for establishing institutionalized management controls within. A lower degree of domestic 
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secrecy also creates more institutional space for structured decision-making and parallel 
problem solving across multiple agencies within the state.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
STATE LEARNING AND A REGIME OF IGNORANCE 
After sitting astride the nuclear fence for over two decades, India in 1998 finally elected to 
join the ranks of declared nuclear weapon powers citing national security reasons.116 In the 
decade following that decision, New Delhi has doubled down on its attempts to acquire the 
technical and organizational accoutrements of an operational arsenal. This is a work in 
progress and serious technical, institutional and organizational lacunae in India’s operational 
capabilities remain at large. Nonetheless, the act of putting money where one’s mouth is, has 
confirmed the logic of the Neorealist observation that states generally proliferate to manage 
the problem of nuclear uncertainty.   
 
However, India’s nuclear fence sitting, the longest in any nuclear weapon power’s history, 
raises serious questions about the fidelity of Neorealist theory’s fundamental observation 
that states respond to structural pressures through external and internal balancing. New 
Delhi’s irresolution opened the door to a host of rival explanations. These latter explanations 
variously linked India’s nuclear behavior to peaceful norms, strategic culture, prestige and 
the political economy of strategic restraint. Without doubt, each of these explanations holds 
some water. For example, Indian decision-makers insist on the impossibility of any nuclear 
exchange while simultaneously engaged in an ambitious nuclear build up. Indian strategic 
elites often refer to India’s ‘Hindu’ culture to rationalize the lag in its operational nuclear 
posture. Public opinion surveys consistently reflect the pride India’s urban middle classes 
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express in the country’s nuclear arsenal. And there is substantial evidence that India’s 
decisions to delay nuclear tests and prevaricate on an overt nuclear posture until 1998 were 
the consequence of perceived economic constraints on the part of prime ministerial 
incumbents.   
 
Yet, as I explained in the introductory chapter, none of these explanations offers an 
argument that is internally consistent or consistent with the historical evidence. The norms 
argument is at odds with evidence of the Indian state’s firm private commitment to a 
weaponization program from 1989 onward. This is also something fundamentally wrong 
with the strategic culture argument. Cultures are viscous. They are resilient to change. If a 
cultural consensus on the symbolic nature of nuclear weapons had been widely prevalent 
within the Indian state, four decision-makers in 1998 would have found it difficult, if not 
impossible, to irretrievably turn the nuclear direction of the ship of state on an operational 
course. Similarly, the political economy of restraint is a reasonable explanation for India’s 
hesitation to make overt and formal claims to nuclear power status. However, it is a weak 
explanation for the absence of intra- and inter-agency planning to give existing weapons 
operational punch. Furthermore, the economic constraints have dissipated in the last decade. 
Nevertheless, the continued prevalence of lacunae in India’s soft operational routines 
suggests that there are other causes for these lags. 
 
With more evidence now available on the covert nuclear weapon program in the two 
decades prior to the 1998 tests, the norms, strategic culture and prestige arguments are more 
or less disproven. Much of the evidence points to national security rationales, a point 
compellingly made in 1998 and thereafter. In that sense, Neorealism is the most persuasive 
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residual explanation for Indian proliferation. And yet, although the broad contours of Indian 
nuclear outcomes conform to the Neorealist logic, the details of Indian nuclear behavior are 
cause for puzzlement. The three puzzles: India’s delayed weaponization during the 1980s 
despite an unambiguous nuclear threat from Pakistan, the underdeveloped soft routines 
following weaponization during the 1990s, and more bafflingly still, the delays in 
infrastructure investments and the intra- and inter-agency coordination gaps in the last 
decade, cannot be reconciled with Neorealist expectations. To be sure, the argument that 
operational gaps are inevitable when countries proliferate covertly may have some validity, 
the same does not hold true for the present era. Especially in light of India’s international 
embrace as a de facto nuclear weapons power and the rapid advances in Pakistan’s operational 
capabilities amid a series of nuclear crises in South Asia.  
 
The problem with Neorealism is that it takes “auxiliary” mechanisms inside states for 
granted; the socialization and learning mechanisms that generate the outcomes the theory 
predicts will occur in response to systemic pressures. Essentially, Neorealism has a very thin 
theory of socialization. It conflates states’ adaptation to structural pressures with learning. 
But adaptation is not tantamount to either socialization or learning. The latter entail a 
fundamental change in the values and belief systems of actors making the adjustment.117 
Adaptation to systemic pressures may or may not stem from changes in values and belief 
systems. It may occur due to coercion or strategic calculation.118 Also problematic is the 
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theory’s assumption that state responses to structural pressures are nearly identical. In doing 
so, Neorealism subsumes rational choice, which imposes exogenous preference orderings on 
all decision-makers across the system without accounting for distortions. The heroic 
assumption behind this reasoning is that all states are socialized into isomorphic beliefs and 
practices, which emanate from the most successful states in the international system.119  
 
International selection and socialization, Waltz argues, are the mechanisms, which ensure 
that states mimic each other. Those states that do not keep up with their peers face 
punishment and decline in power for not doing so.120 States also mimic the example of their 
most successful peers in the international system. In the context of nuclear proliferation 
though, socialization pressures work in reverse. Although the competitive example of the 
most powerful states in the international system is nuclear proliferation, the socialization 
pressures generated through the nonproliferation regime penalize states for replicating those 
power institutions.121 The standard channels of socialization that states usually rely on, 
governments and international organizations, are blocked. Structural theories are therefore at 
a loss to explain how the process of socialization unfolds within proliferating states.  
 
State Learning 
How then do proliferating states learn? In this chapter I develop a theoretical framework to 
map the process of states’ internal learning practices. Learning, as I explain above is the 
modification of existing knowledge or the acquisition of new knowledge and its 
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institutionalization into a state’s habitual routines. Learning can be experiential, can stem 
from policy successes or failures, may occur due to a generational change in leadership or be 
induced through the success of epistemic actors in socializing decision-makers into new 
beliefs and practices.122 In my framework, I am more interested in how states “learn to 
learn.”123 What I mean by the latter is the socialization process that occurs through:  (a) 
interaction between epistemic actors and decision-makers, the appeal of arguments and 
persuasion;124 and (b) institutional and organizational reforms that enable states adopt better 
analytic techniques, methodologies and processes to solve problems.125 My framework of 
learning also incorporates Philip Tetlock’s “efficiency” criterion in which the measure of 
learning is the ability of state leaders to change their belief systems in a manner that reflects 
the world more accurately and their policy decisions offer a better fit between means and 
ends.126 I use the phrase “state learning” metaphorically because all learning takes place at the 
level of individuals. Any state learning that occurs depends on the extent to which 
individuals are successful in transforming their beliefs and practices into routine practices at 
the institutional and organizational levels.127  
 
I maintain that the process of learning across states is uneven because it is contingent on the 
growth of internal information and knowledge markets, the structured processing of 
information and the robust management of human capital. Learning in any state will be as 
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good as its institutional and organizational capacity to aggregate information and knowledge 
markets, integrate them with human capital and monitor their performance. However, 
learning in covertly proliferating states is problematic because it occurs under an institution 
of severe internal secrecy. The latter is necessary to hide the state’s activities from the 
scrutiny of a hostile nonproliferation regime. However, secrecy is also problematic because it 
spawns internal opacity and compartmentalizes information. These institutional conditions 
cocoon decision-makers in a regime of relative ignorance. Unless decision-makers 
consciously apply themselves to counteract the pernicious effects of this regime of 
ignorance, learning and socialization practices in the state will be weak and performance lags 
will remain a recurring phenomenon.  
 
At a base level, the fundamental security challenge that states face in the international system 
is one of uncertainty. The key resources in the management of uncertainty are information 
and knowledge. Information per se is generally not a problem. The world is awash in it. 
However, identifying relevant information is usually a challenge. Further, unprocessed 
information, like raw material, has limited value. Information must be processed into 
knowledge before it becomes actionable. Therefore, as a first step in managing uncertainty, 
states mobilize a society’s curators of knowledge, its “epistemic community.” Epistemic 
actors are central to interpreting information, crafting a state’s response to problem sets, 
identifying alternatives and educating policy makers on actionable policies. Second, states 
require structured information processing institutions to enable decision-makers separate 
signals from noise. This is because research in cognitive psychology shows that individuals in 
isolated and informal decision-making contexts draw conclusions on the basis of heuristics 
and biases. The latter distort reality.  However, decision-makers can avoid the problem of 
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cognitive biases and errors by farming out problem solving to multiple epistemic agents and 
subjecting their output to independent peer review. Finally, states are best able to deal with 
the challenges of uncertainty when decision-makers have the institutional capacity to 
monitor the activities of their epistemic and other bureaucratic agents. Successful monitoring 
in turn is contingent on organizational transparency and an institutional permissiveness that 
allows various agents to monitor one another. It is also contingent on free flowing 
information channels that allow information to percolate up the organizational decision-
making chain.  
 
More specifically in India’s context, I argue that the nuclear policy lags observable across the 
last three decades, are largely self-imposed. They emanate from the state’s weak learning 
practices. They are the consequence of the absence of a well-mobilized and strongly 
institutionalized nuclear epistemic community within the state. Policy in the two decades 
prior to 1998 devolved upon a fragile network of epistemic actors that consisted of a handful 
of nuclear and defense scientists. Lacking independent institutional power, this actor 
network was neither able to extract credible commitments from risk-averse decision-makers 
nor able to impose on them a deductive and well-planned approach to the proliferation 
project. Decision-makers therefore dealt with the project sequentially leaving gaps in several 
areas unaddressed. Further, until the beginning of the 21st century there were no structured 
information processing and knowledge production organizations inside the state to advise 
decision-makers on nuclear issues in particular and national security in general. For the most 
part, heuristic methods of judgment were the basis for decision-making. Secrecy also denied 
the weaponization program a “wisdom of the crowds” scrutiny from multiple actors and 
agencies within that state. The lack of an independent peer review process left several policy 
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biases and program lacunae unaddressed. Finally, the severe regime of internal secrecy not 
only succeeded in denying information about India’s covert weaponization efforts to hostile 
outsiders, but it also created “information asymmetries” within that prevented political 
principals from successfully monitoring their scientific and bureaucratic agents. Although 
these theoretical observations are more germane to the covert phase of India’s nuclear policy 
developments, yet, several negative path dependency effects of the above institutional 
practices have persisted even in the aftermath of 1998 when Indian formally declared itself a 
nuclear weapons power.  
 
In the rest of this chapter I elaborate the theoretical substance of my arguments in three 
parts. The first part draws on literatures from sociology and international relations that dwell 
on the learning and socialization roles epistemic communities play in society. In international 
relations literature, epistemic communities are typically valorized for their role in diffusing 
ideas among states, socializing decision-makers into adopting specific policies and 
coordinating international action. However, my theoretical framework elaborates how 
institutional practices concerning epistemic actors and traditions are central to the formation 
of well-developed knowledge markets and corresponding state learning at the domestic level. 
The second set of arguments tie learning in states to high information turnover, structured 
information processing and decentralized problem solving.  Drawing insights from research 
in cybernetics and cognitive psychology, I argue that decision-makers operating in isolated 
organizational settings are vulnerable to heuristic fallacies. For a variety of reasons, the 
compartmentalization of knowledge and isolated decision-making processes also slows the 
pace of policy innovation. In the third and final section, I turn to principal-agent problems 
of “information asymmetries” and “monitoring” in organizations. This model has been 
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widely used in the study of markets, private firms, governments and a myriad other 
institutions and organizations. Following this tradition, I use theoretical frames from 
economics, agency theory, sociology and ethics and apply them to the challenges of 
management and performance in proliferating states.  
 
The Institutional Role of Epistemic Actors  
An “epistemic community” can be imagined as what Ernst Haas’s famously described as the 
“purveyors” of expertise. In Haas’s idealized characterization, the epistemic community is 
the vessel of a society’s “consensual knowledge.” Consensual knowledge is knowledge 
generally considered authoritative. It is derived through scientific and non-scientific means. 
Such knowledge does not transcend ideology or culture. Rather, consensual knowledge is a 
constructed mix of scientific knowledge and political choices. It differs from ideology to the 
extent that its internal validity is subject to “truth tests” from rival claimants of intellectual 
authority.128  
 
Members of an epistemic community have a “substantive” or “technical” understanding of 
cause and effect in so far it pertains to their domain expertise. They have internally agreed 
upon (formal and informal) methods of testing claims and reaching judgments. They favor 
analytic means and comprehensive solutions to problem sets. Above all, they are united by 
the belief that institutionalizing their knowledge through policy will provide effective 
solutions to the state’s identified problems.129 Epistemic communities are by no means 
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“hegemonic.” Rather, they care about specific domains that correlate with their areas of 
expertise; and they try and shape policies in those areas.130  
 
What epistemic communities bring to the table are shared views of the social and the 
physical world, particularly the ties that bind causes to outcomes. For example, strategic 
nuclear theorists tend to see causal links between the acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
states and the denial of credible threats of nuclear use. Arms controllers favor arms 
reductions and politically determined technology restraints as causal means for strategic 
stability. Experts who study global warming tie the rise in atmospheric temperature and 
climate change to an increase in the emission of greenhouse gases.  
 
Members of an epistemic community are not restricted to any one particular profession. 
They tend to transcend professions and are generally an eclectic lot.131 A community 
favoring nuclear proliferation for example will likely consist of nuclear scientists, military 
leaders, strategic analysts, civilian bureaucrats and politicians. Epistemic communities are 
also different from bureaucracies and interest groups. Bureaucracies are organizations that 
often favor policy positions out of budgetary or organizational concerns. Similarly, interest 
groups are also often coalitions of convenience.132 In contrast, as sociologist Ben David has 
argued, the glue that binds epistemic coalitions is ethical. It is borne out of inner 
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convictions.133 In other words, epistemic coalitions hang together by normative and not 
professional codes.  
 
There are different causal pathways for the formation of epistemic communities within states 
and the international system. Such communities can grow indigenously within states. For 
example, the arms control community that emerged in the United States in the 1950s and 
1960s grew out of a network of scientists, scholars and policy practitioners from nuclear 
labs, universities and think tanks.134 Members of this group wrote, published and played the 
role of public intellectuals. Their critical dialogue took the form of “truth tests.” It helped in 
the formation of “consensual knowledge,” which they shared with US government officials 
and their Soviet counterparts during the Cold War and which ultimately became 
institutionalized through arms control agreements between the superpowers.135  
 
Alternatively, groups of experts occupying critical positions in government within states can 
help forge consensus on policy. Thus during World War II and its immediate aftermath, a 
group of liberal economists and policy planners in the US and Britain helped shape the rules 
of a liberal world economic order that balanced elements of an open trading system with 
Keynesian government intervention, control and stability.136 In another instance, a global 
epistemic community on food aid emerged out of international organizations and private 
sector initiatives between 1950-1990. Through international organizations, international 
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conferences, publications and public criticism, this community reshaped the politics of food 
aid in the United States from one that in the 1950s lumped humanitarian with domestic 
agricultural and geopolitical objectives to one that acquired an overwhelmingly humanitarian 
focus by the 1990s.137  
 
It is more likely that a nuclear weapons-centric epistemic community will grow indigenously 
within a proliferating state, although there may be exceptions to that rule. During the Cold 
War for example, the US arms control epistemic community helped one grow in the former 
Soviet Union. Because the majority of the states in the international system oppose nuclear 
proliferation, foreign governments and international organizations are unlikely to play the 
role of socializers. Furthermore, the nonproliferation regime, despite all its inherent 
contradictions, has gained legitimacy over time.138 If anything, states and international 
organizations will be more likely to diffuse norms and ideas to freeze and rollback 
proliferation. Within the proliferating state, therefore, an epistemic community will in theory 
emerge from the scientific community involved in developing and testing weapons. It will 
draw from the strategic and international relations community in think tanks and universities 
grappling with the challenges, trade-offs and consequences of nuclear weapons acquisition. 
And ultimately, it will have representatives from the military on whom the doctrinal and 
operational challenges of the nuclear arsenal will ultimately devolve. It is also likely that some 
public intellectuals, bureaucrats and politicians could become part of the nuclear epistemic 
community. For the most part, however, the group’s core membership will consist of 
experts from the fields of nuclear weapons design, strategy and use. 
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In one sense, the nuclear epistemic community in clandestinely proliferating states will never 
be a true scientific community that exists outside the state; of the type conceived in 
sociological and international relations literature.139 This is because such a community cannot 
exist independently outside government. Further, in light of the secrecy surrounding the 
nuclear weapons program, the relative paucity of information and political sensitivities 
surrounding public discussion of the program, a robust form of “consensual knowledge” will 
be hard to form. Thus the nuclear epistemic community in a proliferating state can be re-
conceived as a “primitive” group140 consisting of professionals and policy specialists within 
and outside government who share a common normative understanding of nuclear 
deterrence. But exist it must in some institutional form within and outside the state. And 
transmit it must its expertise to key policy planners and decision-makers to give coherent 
direction to the proliferation effort.  
 
The linkages between expertise, learning and policy outcomes are what make modern states 
modern. As Harvey Brooks puts it, “much of the history of social progress in the 20th 
century can be described in terms of the transfer of wider and wider areas of public policies 
from politics to expertise.” This does not of course mean that politics is absent from the 
process of policy making. All policy is ultimately political. However, episteme gives essence 
to policy by defining its content, scope and more significantly by providing the alternatives 
to the status quo. The role of epistemic communities in this regard is to push the envelope 
of research and intellectual innovation, a process necessary to grow society’s knowledge 
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banks and provide decision-makers with optimized solutions to problems. In a sense, 
therefore, the condition of a society’s existing epistemic community is a broad measure of its 
intellectual frontiers in a specific domain at a given time.  
 
But the existence of an epistemic community in and by itself is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for policy learning within a state. For learning to happen, decision-makers must 
take the crucial step of mobilizing the society’s epistemic community. However, decision-
makers will have incentives to undertake such a measure only when they commit the state to 
achieving a set of “expanded” and “interconnected” as against “limited” and “static” goals.141 
An expanded and interconnected set of goals in the context of nuclear proliferation for 
example would be the commitment to fissile material production, weapon development, 
testing, weaponization, and operational planning as part of a program that has an organic 
texture. The example of limited and static goals on the other hand would involve halting 
steps along each rung of the proliferation ladder over an extended time period. Leaders need 
professional expertise when goals are complex; when they are expansive and tightly coupled. 
But decision-makers are less likely to demand the sustained intellectual attention of an 
epistemic community when goals are limited, static or loosely coupled.142 
 
The degree of policy innovation in a proliferating state will therefore depend on whether 
decision-makers decide in favor or against mobilizing its nuclear epistemic community. This 
is because experts apply analytic methods to think through problem and solution sets. They 
carry the intellectual and emotional commitment to apply the cumulative knowledge of their 
domain expertise to a society’s problems. They use holistic approaches to resolve the 
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problem of misaligned means and ends. Instead of incremental advances they generally show 
a preference for strategic approaches, which fundamentally rethink solutions to problems.143 
In comparison to domain specialists, political leaders generally lack expertise and tackle 
problems piecemeal. Not only that. They have short attention spans and even shorter time 
horizons. Epistemic communities, therefore bring together policy innovators and executors. 
They play, in John Ruggie’s characterization, the role of “switchboards.” To be sure, Ruggie 
and other international relations scholars have largely focused on the role epistemic 
communities play in inter-state socialization and coordination functions. However, such 
communities play an equally significant role in educating decision-makers domestically.  
 
Mobilization apart, the strength of an epistemic community’s institutionalization within a 
state will determine that state’s speed of learning and policy innovations. Institutionalization 
can be stated very simply as the “development of new organs, principles of action, and 
administrative practices…designed to improve the performance of the polity…”144 Learning 
within the state will be most effective when epistemic actors are able to inject new 
consensual knowledge and institutionalize it into the state’s habitual routines. In this regard, 
three measures are useful for assessing an epistemic community’s institutional strength 
within a state.  
 
The first is the community’s longevity. By this I mean, its continuous existence across 
successive leaders and governments. Expert communities that are institutionalized within the 
state are able to accumulate information and grow their expertise. Such gains in knowledge 
expand their institutional authority inside and outside the state over time. They become the 
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sources of authoritative knowledge. In this capacity, they also serve as policy transmission 
belts and coordination agents for decision-makers. Hence, entrenched epistemic authorities 
will be in a strong position to educate decision-makers and the state by extension.  
 
Second, epistemic actors should also have some access to sensitive information. Douglas 
North illustrates this point by showing how rapid information turnover in the marketplace is 
crucial for firms’ learning and survival.145 In the policymaking world similarly, data 
availability facilitates the task that epistemic actors do best: judgment formation and idea 
contestation to prepare better policies to deal with political challenges. Curtailed information 
flows on the other hand prevent epistemic actors from performing these tasks and in the 
process from identifying policy flaws and lags. They also become an institutional barrier for 
coordinating action among them.  
 
Information is a critical resource for another reason. Unlike well-functioning markets where 
alternative ideas and institutions often co-exist, political markets embody a “winner takes all” 
approach.146 This is especially true in national security idea markets where the relative scarcity 
of information and high costs make political decisions sticky. Initial decisions impose strong 
adaptive effects on other actors and in the process reinforce their own stability. Hence it is 
vital for epistemic communities to be able to shape the status quo before it becomes self-
reinforcing. Further, in the absence of information, epistemic actors will be unable to 
generate credible alternatives to the status quo in the absence of supporting information.   
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Third and finally, the institutional and continuous presence of an epistemic community 
within government is a necessary but insufficient condition for state learning. For learning to 
occur, the epistemic actors must possess some means to extract commitments for specific 
policy actions from decision makers.147 Decision-makers usually signal commitments to 
specific policies through political, institutional and budgetary means. These latter actions 
bind the agency of decision-makers for the long term because deviations from commitments 
are measurable. They generate internal audience costs and have the potential to hurt the 
reputation of shirking decision-makers. In effect, commitments become a form of a “time 
lengthening” mechanism, which signals to epistemic actors that political actors are bound to 
a policy for the long term.148 Such mechanisms have the benefit of two functions. They 
provide epistemic actors the institutional means to monitor the performance of decision-
makers. They can do this by inflicting reputation losses on the shirking decision-maker. 
Equally significant, on a personal psychological level, they serve as morale boosters for 
epistemic actors because their motivations are primarily professional and ethical. Political 
assurances of credibility help them follow the strength of their intellectual and emotional 
commitments through. 
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Table 2 
Epistemic Actors & State Learning 
 
 
 
Monopolist Decision Making, Psychological Biases and Organizational Learning 
Structural theories also generally assume that nuclear decision makers in emerging nuclear 
powers are rational choice agents. The belief is that nuclear aspirants in the international 
system seek to maximize strategic gains. These theories further assume that rational choices 
are possible because the nuclear decision-making process in proliferating states is secret, 
Condition Impact 
• Sustained institutional presence • Sources of authoritative knowledge 
within government 
• Transmission belts for ideas 
• Coordination agents for decision-
makers 
• High information turnover 
• Access to sensitive information 
• Judgment formation 
• Idea contestation 
• Credible alternatives to status quo 
• Ability to extract political, 
institutional & budgetary 
commitments from decision-makers 
• Bind agency of decision-makers 
• Monitor performance of decision-
makers 
• Sustain emotional commitments to 
policy 
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selective and isolated. The latter conditions prevent the rationality of decisions from being 
contaminated by the hurly burly of domestic and organizational bureaucratic politics.149 
Without doubt, the assumptions of secrecy and isolated decision-making are true.  However, 
the related surmise that a highly select and relatively unitary or monopolistic decision-making 
process renders decisions optimal is highly problematic. 
 
The weight of evidence from experiments in the fields of Cybernetics and Cognitive 
Psychology as well as examples from the real world show that rational optimization is an 
abstract myth removed from reality. Decision-makers do not always have a well-defined set 
of utility functions. Nor do they systematically proceed down deductive decision trees 
making value and utility choices. More often, they lack the capacity to analyze in one sweep 
the entire range of choices before them. Nor do they fully anticipate the consequences of 
their choices. The decisions they make are often sequential, not comprehensive.150 Issue 
frames and the order of choice critically shape decisions. Equally significant, strong internally 
held biases compete with reason in the making of judgment calls. Decision-makers, to use 
Herbert Simon’s famous characterization, are “boundedly rational.”151  
 
Indeed, behavioral insights from cybernetics and cognitive psychology offer a more realistic 
approach to understanding decision-making under monopolistic and secrecy institutions, 
which are the conditions one is likely to find in post-NPT proliferating states. In 
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Streinbruner’s cybernetic model, decision-makers’ primary motivation is uncertainty control 
and the retention of simplicity and consistency of their belief systems.152 They achieve this by 
what Herbert Simon described as the “process decision of reality.”153 The latter is less like a 
constructed blueprint of reality and more like a recipe. Decision-makers typically follow a set 
of instructions sequentially, produce an outcome without fully understanding its implications 
and then await environmental feedback to appraise the quality of their decision before 
making further adjustments.154 Because environments are complex there is always tension 
between decision-makers’ need for control and the demands of adaptation in a complex 
environment. Decision-makers therefore have the choice of resolving this tension in two 
ways: first, they can maintain internal simplicity by screening out information and only 
accepting information through highly selective feedback loops. Second, they can decompose 
problem sets and assign fragmented bits to multiple individuals and organizations to 
resolve.155  
 
If decision-makers choose to screen out information, chances are that optimization will be 
minimal. But even if they decide to parcel out problem sets to individuals and organizations, 
the issue of solutions aggregation will be a challenge.  This is because in monopolist or 
highly centralized decision-making structures, problems can only be resolved sequentially; in 
the manner in which they are raised. Hence the problem of aggregation will be a critical 
roadblock to optimization. Decision-makers will tend to monitor feedback loops and 
discover the effects of their actions as they register feedback. If problems persist, then 
decision-makers can go down the path of “problemistic” search and scan the environment 
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for solutions.156 But in a restricted and secret environment, such as the one encountered by 
proliferating states, they will generally turn to trusted sources and selective mechanisms 
already available at hand. It is also likely that during interaction of the decomposed 
problems’ components decision-makers will leave many of the optimization trade-offs 
unresolved. As a consequence, the system will evolve slowly evoking what Charles Lindblom 
characterized as the process of “muddling through.”157 
 
However, the cybernetic model has two limitations. First, it does not address decision-
making under conditions of great complexity and uncertainty. And second, it does not deal 
with the role values play in judgment formation. Here, cognitive psychology helps us further. 
Its fundamental insight is that individuals simplify highly complex and ambiguous 
environments by imposing their internally held belief systems on it to give it structure and 
make it legible. Their goal remains the same as before: economy, i.e., bringing “simplicity” 
and “stability” to their decision-making.158 Most individuals achieve this goal though what 
Herbert Simon termed as “satisficing” and not optimizing as rational choice theorists would 
have us believe.159 In other words, most individuals reach decisions once some internally 
held values and aspirations are satisfied. Research also shows that individuals tend not to 
make value trade offs under conditions of uncertainty, as rational choice theorists would 
expect.160 Rather, they do that only when compelled under the force of an external shock.  
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Research in the field of cognitive psychology also demonstrates that decision-makers 
generally use analogies, wishful thinking, the notion of impossibility, social reinforcement 
and “group think” to manage uncertainty, which is essentially the gap between the 
environment as it actually is and their knowledge of it.161 In the 1970s and 1980s, Kahneman 
and Tversky’s ‘heuristics and biases’ program and the experimental data it generated 
compellingly demonstrated that individuals reach decisions through the use of heuristics or 
“simple rules of the thumb.”162 Two heuristics in particular, the ‘representative’163 and the 
‘availability’ heuristic,164 explain decision-making more realistically than any rational choice 
model. Both heuristics are anchoring phenomena, which operate on the principle of 
analogies. Experiments show that people reach conclusions about events and people not on 
the statistical probability of an event happening or the population size, but simply on the 
basis of how one event or individual is intuitively perceived as representative of another or 
on how vividly they can recall a similar situation or context from their memories. In 
Gilovich and Griffin’s words, the heuristics that most individuals use yield “serviceable 
solutions” to “compelling problems.” But that which is serviceable is not necessarily 
optimal.165  
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To be sure, even when individuals do not deploy formal optimization models, their decisions 
can be intuitively rational. But this line of reasoning is more germane to specialists who 
acquire expertise over years of training and experiential knowledge. Chess grand masters for 
example can often take in an entire game with a swift glance. But most political decision-
makers are not experts in nuclear arcana. There is also a hidden problem with expertise itself. 
Most experts also zero in on problems through the use of heuristics.166 In other words, the 
experts problem solve on the basis of what they already know; what is strongly etched into 
their memory already; and what they can easily recall. Unless specifically tasked, even experts 
typically do not optimize.  
 
The one method that enables individual decision-makers transcend individual cognitive 
limits is parallel processing, the parceling out of analysis and decision-making to specialist 
organizations. One of the central insights of the Carnegie School was that organizations help 
solve problems of individual cognitive limits that limit organizational optimization.167 After 
all, it was Weber who successfully argued that organizations embody rational choice. Simon 
and March subsequently made the point that unlike individuals who have limited attention 
spans and can only focus on one problem at a time, organizational parallel processing 
permits problem decomposition.168 Although second generation organizational theorists in 
the 1960s such as Allison popularized the view that organizations were the problem due to 
their standard operating procedures (SOP) and hidebound practices,169 a less conventional 
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view propounded by Landau and Wildavsky is that policy innovation occurs when 
organizations compete over it.170  
 
Parallel processing and the decomposition of problems across organizations enable 
optimization in four ways. First, decisions become based less on folk heuristics and more on 
scientific processes. Second, the pooling of expertise creates room for the cross fertilization 
of ideas. Third, just as good hardware engineering involves building redundancies into 
technological systems to guard against sub-system and individual component failures, 
redundancies in the decision-making create an ecosystem for the co-existence of alternative 
logics that can compensate for the failure of any single dominant approach. 171 Finally, 
distributed decision-making serves as an institutional check against what Janis identified as 
“groupthink,” the tendency among closed groups of decision makers to favor group 
harmony and consensus over critical evaluation of alternative points of view.172 Thus 
monopolist decision-making concentrated in a few decision-makers leads to a closed political 
system and retards the process of structured optimization.  
 
Weak Information Markets and the ‘Principal-Agent’ Problem in Proliferating States 
Finally, positive learning and policy growth in a proliferating state will substantially depend 
on how well political principals manage their epistemic and other bureaucratic agents tasked 
with executing the weapons development and its ancillary programs. In a proliferating state, 
the principals can be imagined as the key decision-makers in the political executive and their 
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agents the scientists, the engineers, the bureaucrats, the strategic theorists and the military. 
The principal-agent problem afflicts all organizations. However, regimes of information 
scarcity can exacerbate the dilemmas of effective organizational control and management for 
principals.  
 
In any principal-agent relationship individuals in an organizational hierarchy (principals) 
assign and contract others down the chain (agents) to do tasks for them. The problem in this 
relationship arises from two factors. First, the interests of the principals and their agents do 
not always precisely overlap. And second, the agents are generally the experts in this 
interaction. This latter creates conditions of “information asymmetry” that often allow the 
agents to control their principals. Goal divergence and information asymmetry are 
problematic in any principal-agent relationship because the act of risk taking and the 
responsibility for that risk are bifurcated. The agents take most of the risk, but their 
principals bear most of the responsibility for that risk.173   
 
What this means for situations where the interests of the principals and their agents do not 
fully coincide is that the latter can take actions that have the potential of undermining the 
principals’ interests. One manifestation of this problem is “moral hazard” where due to 
conditions of information asymmetry the principals may be unable to fully monitor the 
actions of their agents.174 Another manifestation is “adverse selection” where the principals 
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might commit to actions their agents recommend without fully understanding the risky 
consequences of those actions.175 The net effect of both moral hazard and adverse selection 
is harm to the principals’ interests.  
 
The most popular application of the principal-agent model is the business firm where the 
interests of the shareholders and professional managers who run operations are often at 
odds with one other. Other successful applications of the model include small partnerships, 
non-profits, charities, schools and governments.176 When applied to business firms, the 
assumption is that property relations create natural incentives for agents to “shirk;” unless, 
of course, the principals devise robust incentive and monitoring mechanisms to control 
them.  More generally, however, sociologists and ethicists contest the model’s applicability to 
the public sector when it does not involve property relations and the maximization of profit.  
 
Charles Perrow for example is deeply skeptical of the principal-agent model because it goes 
against the grain of social cooperation.177  Similarly “stakeholder” theorists such as Neil 
Shankman reject the unethical and depraved view of human nature and point to ethical 
commitments as the basis of cooperation.178 This is not to deny that principal-agent 
problems do not exist in the public sector. However, the goal of agents in the public sector 
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is more often the generation of public goods. In one sense, the building of nuclear weapons 
is the ultimate public good as it enhances a polity’s national security and prestige. Hence a 
safe assumption can be made that agents tasked with proliferation activities will possess a 
high professional and mission drive.  
 
That said, there will always be “knights” and “knaves” among agents even in the public 
sector. Further, individual agents themselves will combine qualities of both in some mix. 
Knights, according to Le Grand, are agents driven by professional and altruistic concerns 
and strive to promote the interests of their principals. The knaves on the other hand tend to 
be selfish and opportunistic.179 What all this means in a proliferating state is that the 
principals’ agents will to a large extent share a high nationalistic, professional and emotional 
commitment to proliferation. Their ethical norms to a degree will ease some of the tensions 
assumed in the more pessimistic business model. Nonetheless, there is also the likelihood 
that the interests of principals and the agents will not precisely overlap.  
 
The reason for this is that political principals’ represent a broad array of national interests. 
Even as they pursue proliferation goals, they will want to balance those goals with other 
competing domestic and foreign policy interests. In contrast, their agents who represent the 
nuclear labs, the military-industrial complex and the armed services more generally, will 
exhibit a narrower set of professional and organizational goals. The latter will share an innate 
propensity to pursue their narrower professional goals disproportionately. As a consequence, 
the principals will nearly always retain some wariness toward their agents, because they 
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disproportionately shoulder the residual risks of proliferation under a hostile 
nonproliferation regime.  
  
The act of nuclear acquisition by any non-nuclear state is a dangerous enterprise because of 
the constant threat of prosecution by the international nonproliferation regime. Hence 
principals in a proliferating state will have incentives to maintain a severe regime of internal 
secrecy to hide the program’s existence. There are however domestic reasons for secrecy as 
well. The principals will fear that their agents might force their hand prematurely through 
information leaks. This fear of loss of agenda control will constitute a secondary incentive to 
treat the weapon development effort as a black program. The only way principals can avoid 
ceding agenda control to their agents is by compartmentalizing the proliferation program 
within an agency executing it. If parts of the program such as fissile material production, 
weapon design, carriage and operational planning are distributed across multiple agents and 
agencies, the principles will attempt to retain agenda control by blocking or limiting inter-
agent and inter-agency information exchange.  
 
However, the twin processes of secrecy and compartmentalization also create a perverse 
problem for the principals in managing their agents. As the principal-agent theory informs 
us, agents enjoy the power of information asymmetry. Principals usually find the costs of 
policing their agents to be very high due to cognitive problems of “bounded rationality” as 
well as their agents’ domain expertise. Furthermore, the agents constitute the permanent 
state. They are usually the best informed about how bureaucratic processes work within their 
specific agency and the state in general. In these circumstances, the best methods available to 
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principals for monitoring their agents’ actions are transparency and information availability. 
However, the latter conditions directly contradict the primary demand for secrecy.  
 
In most organizations, there are three methods available to principals to reduce the cost of 
monitoring their agents. The first is transparency and easy information availability. This 
process renders the agents’ actions easily visible to the principals. The second is competition 
among multiple agents. This process allows agents to monitor one another and also act as 
checks on each other. Further, mutual monitoring among agents is a relatively easy way for 
information to percolate up the organizational chain to the principals. Finally, principals’ use 
institutionalized boards of independent experts (epistemic communities) to level information 
asymmetries between them and their agents in two ways. In the first, the boards vet actions 
at the initiation or project specification stage. In the second, they verify if the outcomes are 
in line with the bargains that agents struck with the principals at the specification stage.180 If 
projects stall or fail, the boards then independently verify if the outcomes are the 
consequence of agents’ shirking or due to random events outside their control.  
 
However, the covert nature of most weapon programs makes the institution of transparency, 
information availability and multiple agent competition difficult. To be sure, even in 
imperfectly functioning information markets principals have screening devices181 to ensure 
baseline quality. Just as education and schools serve as screening devices for employers to 
certify the credibility of potential employees amid uncertainty, the state’s bureaucratic 
organizations, especially its scientific and technical organizations, have internal mechanisms 
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to ensure quality control. Agents too can use signaling devices,182 such as technical 
benchmarks and breakthroughs, thresholds and actual tests of the weapon systems to help 
principals bridge the information gap.  
 
However, the screening and signaling devices that work in the education and employment 
markets for example, don’t work with analogous efficiency in the proliferation market. 
Nuclear proliferation falls in the category of large technological projects. Such projects are 
huge organizational efforts with vastly extended time lines. In such hugely complex projects, 
it is difficult for principals to distinguish if agent successes and failures are due to shirking or 
random effects. Secrecy concerns also prevent covertly proliferating states from conducting 
full-scale weapon tests, thereby limiting the signaling capacity of agents. Further, unless 
institutionalized epistemic bodies can undertake independent peer review, the principals will 
find it hard to filter out signals from the background noise. In markets, product successes 
and failures are the ultimate benchmark to verify the fidelity of agents’ signals. However, the 
likelihood that weapons of mass destruction will ever be used in battle is exceptionally low, 
thus leaving the value of agents’ signaling in the absence of a rigorous program of field tests 
and independent peer review moot.  
 
Expectations of Secrecy’s Rationality-Bending Effects Model 
In contrast to structural theories, which assume that states respond rationally and optimally 
to visceral national security threats, I argue that secrecy generates distortionary effects, which 
stymies the process of rational decision-making. In my framework, the nonproliferation 
                                                
182 For an overview of agents’ use of signaling devices see, Michael Spence, “Job Market 
Signaling,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3 (August 1973), pp. 355-374; also 
see, Milogram and Roberts, “Bounded Rationality and Private Information,” pp. 154-155.  
 75 
regime forces nuclear proliferation in post-NPT nuclear wannabe states underground. The 
process of covert proliferation hobbles nuclear learning because state leaders operate under a 
self-induced regime of ignorance. This ignorance has institutional, organizational and 
cognitive roots and its negative effects operate in three ways. 
 
First, in every state, epistemic communities are central to the process of policy innovation 
and organizational learning. Epistemic actors play a critical role in forming consensual 
knowledge about problems and solution sets. They are also the key mechanism for 
transmitting that knowledge to policy makers, in helping them frame policy choices and in 
coordinating policy implementation across the state. Policy innovation occurs when states 
institutionalize new ideas generated by epistemic communities into their habitual routines.  
However, I expect that decision-makers in clandestinely proliferating states will likely choose 
goals that are static and loosely coupled. Because such goals do not demand the sustained 
attention of an epistemic community, the latter will remain an under utilized resource within 
the state.  
 
Since nuclear proliferation is an activity fraught with high-risk, political decision-makers will 
also prefer autonomy and flexibility in the decision-making process. I therefore expect that 
decision-makers will have incentives against institutionalizing epistemic communities 
strongly within the state. This is because strong institutions carry the risk of increasing 
decision makers’ domestic audience costs and binding their agency. Weak institutions on the 
other hand protect their reputation and autonomy. However, weak institutions also have the 
net effect of attenuating the state’s policy capacity and reducing its scope for policy 
innovation. Further, because prevailing institutions create path dependencies, I expect the 
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negative effects of secrecy to persist and create a drag on learning even after decision-makers 
openly commit themselves to proliferation policy goals.  
 
Second, state learning is contingent on high information turnover, problem decomposition, 
distributed decision-making and independent peer review. Information abundance and 
structured processing of that information within states, or for that matter in any 
organization, reduce the scope for heuristics and biases in decision-making. However, I 
expect that decision-makers’ in proliferating states will favor weakly developed information 
and corresponding knowledge markets. They will prefer to hoard knowledge concerning the 
nuclear weapons program, curtail information flows within the state and centralize decision-
making. I expect the net effect of such administrative behavior to be uncorrected cognitive 
biases among decision-makers and poorly optimized policy decisions.  
 
Third and finally, political leaders need well-developed information markets within the state 
to monitor agents who they task with proliferation projects. However, the process of covert 
proliferation fragments knowledge inside the state and diffuses it among various agents. 
Internal secrecy makes it extraordinarily hard for the decision-makers to accurately monitor 
and appraise the activities of their agents. Weakly developed information markets also raise 
the transfer costs of knowledge among the agents themselves. I therefore expect that 
political leaders, even in highly centralized settings, will lack the means to monitor their 
agents and the nuclear program’s progress effectively. It is also likely that lacunae in 
programs will go undetected.  
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Expectations of Standard Structural Theories 
In contrast, standard structural theories of international relations presume that proliferation 
decisions are primarily driven by raison d’Etat. As such their unfolding within the state will 
follow the path of supreme rationality. Due to the growing legal obstacles and moral norms 
against the acquisition of nuclear arms, the program will no doubt deviate from standard 
armament development projects. The project will likely grow within a walled-off secret 
enclave within the state. The epistemic actors mobilized to enact it will be highly select. 
However, the actors will draw from a diverse set, which includes nuclear scientists and 
engineers, military specialists, bureaucrats and political decision-makers. The epistemic actors 
will enjoy close proximity and access to decision-makers. The latter will tend to proceed with 
caution given the international opprobrium their actions if discovered are likely to provoke. 
Nonetheless, given the state’s national security concerns and decision-makers commitment 
to securing them, epistemic actors will enjoy considerable freedom of action, both in terms 
of access to information and material resources, to bring the nuclear weapons program to 
fruition. Epistemic actors will also likely find it relatively easy to secure decision-makers’ 
commitments to program choices.  
 
A related assumption made is that the sequestered nature of decision-making within the 
enclave will not affect its quality negatively. Structural theorists assume instead that 
cocooned decision-makers make more rational choices when removed from bureaucratic 
infighting and political compromises that afflict most program choices. Within the state’s 
sequestered enclave, segments of the state’s scientific, engineering and military agencies will 
find the freedom to exchange information freely and cooperate to execute different but 
related elements of the project simultaneously. Thus fissile material production, bomb design 
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and delivery systems will all be parts of a boutique but highly coordinated effort. Further, as 
with conventional weapons, the nuclear hardware once developed will be subject to soft 
routines such as institutional oversight, strategic principles governing use, intra- and inter-
agency coordination. No doubt, secrecy and sequestering will render the weapons special 
and remove them from the standard administrative processes of the state. The latter 
institutional conditions however will not immobilize those processes altogether.  
 
Finally, structural theories do not expect that secrecy, reduced information inflows and the 
relative absence of agent competition are detrimental to efficiency. The unstated assumption 
is that highly centralized and coordinated state settings will enable political principals to 
exercise control over their agents with relative ease. High classification and internal opacity 
are not tantamount to the absence of oversight mechanisms in the state. Just that the state’s 
normal administrative apparatus is unlikely to perform those functions. Given the 
significance of nuclear weapons, the power likely to accrue to leaders and the state from 
possessing them, political principals’ will seek to retain tight scrutiny over the program’s 
direction and progress. 
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Table 2.1 
 
 
 
Secrecy and Indian Nuclear Decision-Making 
In the next three chapters, I examine Indian nuclear decision-making across three decades, 
beginning in the early 1980s until 2010. In the first two decades, 1980-1998 Indian nuclear 
decision-makers operated under a regime of severe internal opacity. Thereafter, the Indian 
government ended its policy of opacity, both internal and external, and made overt claims to 
nuclear power status. Between 1980 and 1989, successive Indian governments responded to 
 Secrecy-Induced 
Rationality Bending 
Effects 
Standard Structural 
Theories 
Epistemic Community’s 
Mobilization 
• Partial 
• Sequential 
• Highly Select 
•  Diverse 
Decision-Making Process • Informal  
• Based on Heuristics 
& Biases 
• Formal 
• Highly Rational & 
Optimized 
Agent Monitoring • Weak 
• Problematic 
• Strong 
• Unproblematic 
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an emerging nuclear threat from Pakistan by initiating a nuclear research and development 
program. From 1989 onward, the Indian government embarked on a course of 
weaponization and integrating weapon systems with delivery systems. Following nuclear 
tests in 1998, Indian decision-makers made an internal determination to deploy a nuclear 
triad with the organizational and institutional means to render the force operational. 
 
If structural theories were an accurate barometer of states’ internal response to external 
pressure, then Indian decision-makers would behave rationally. They would seek to mobilize 
a diverse but select epistemic community, institutionalize that community, establish walled-
off but structured process of decision-making and institute oversight mechanisms to 
monitor the nuclear weaponization program’s progress. The development of the weapon, 
the preparation of delivery systems and thinking on use principles would proceed 
simultaneously. There would exist restrictions on information sharing and communications 
within the secret enclave tasked with the program. But those restrictions would likely not 
severely constrict the flow of critical information. Decision-makers would have accurate 
assessments of the state of program’s progress within and the potential impact of 
adversaries’ actions without. Once the regime of secrecy ended, rational state actors would 
exploit the relative freedom rapidly to develop both hardware and the soft organizational 
and institutional routines to make the arsenal operationally responsive.  
 
On the other hand, if my framework were accurate, the regime of secrecy would distort the 
ability of Indian decision-makers to achieve optimal outcomes. The epistemic actors 
mobilized would lack diversity and would remain weakly institutionalized within the state. 
Information sharing within the secret enclave tasked with weapon development would be 
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highly restricted such that internal opacity would rival the state’s external opacity.  The 
decision-making process would remain informal and ad-hoc. Decision-makers would tend to 
proceed sequentially with parts of the program in a disjointed manner and gaps in 
capabilities would remain unaddressed due to their unawareness or non-optimized decision-
making processes. In theory, the political principals would exercise supreme control over 
their scientific and bureaucratic agents. But in practice, information asymmetries exacerbated 
by sluggish information flows due to secrecy would render their control nominal. Once the 
regime of opacity ended in 1998 the decision-making process would return to a relatively 
rational and optimal state, just as structural theories predict. Nonetheless, according to my 
theoretical framework, the path dependency effects engendered by two decades of 
institutional practices would create drag in the optimization process.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DISAGGREGATED NUCLEAR OPTION (1980-1989) 
Introduction 
In May 1974 India exploded a nuclear device and dubbed it a peaceful nuclear explosion 
(PNE). But in its wake, India did not declare itself a nuclear weapon state. Nor did it seek 
such legal recognition internationally. Bucking the trend of other nuclear weapon powers 
until then, and somewhat paradoxically, India did not follow up this lone test with other 
tests. Neither did it seek to incorporate nuclear explosives into its military planning. Indian 
government representatives publicly insisted that the PNE was modeled after the US 
Ploughshares program,183 which was an experimental attempt to leverage nuclear explosives 
in support of large engineering projects. These claims were plausible. However, they were 
never backed up any Indian follow-up to use nuclear explosives for civil engineering 
programs. To policy practitioners schooled in realpolitik who thought the nomenclature of 
PNE a political cover for a weapons program,184 there was also no accompanying evidence 
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in the form of delivery systems, command control or organizational changes in the Indian 
military that would signify India’s quest for an operational nuclear capability.185  
 
India’s lone nuclear test spawned the security legend that it was not motivated by national 
security concerns.186 However, the very likely answer to the riddle of India’s lone 1974 test 
was the manageable risk of Chinese nuclear blackmail in the short-term due,187 India’s 
resource constraints, the lack of a diversified industrial infrastructure188 and Western 
nonproliferation pressures.189 By the late 1970s, the balance of threat in the region began to 
change for the worse as clear indicators emerged of Pakistan’s nuclear quest. In the case of 
Pakistan, the Himalayas did not present a geographic barrier as they did in the north vis-à-vis 
China. India’s struggle against Pakistan was also an ideological and existential one. Pakistan’s 
revanchism became evident after India helped catalyze its break up on ideological grounds in 
the Bangladesh War. Pakistan, similarly hoped to re-open the disputed Kashmir conflict with 
India after it developed a nuclear capability.190  
 
In a classic internal balancing act, India revived its nuclear weapons program after Indira 
Gandhi’s was re-elected to power in 1980.191 Gandhi’s government also instituted a ballistic 
missile program in 1983. The Indian Air Force made purchases of dual-use combat aircraft 
                                                
185 Perkovich, “India Explodes a ‘Peaceful’ Nuclear Device,” India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 170-
189. 
186 Ibid. 
187 L.K. Jha, “Nuclear Policy,” Prime Minister’s Secretariat, May 3, 1967 (P.N. Haksar Files, Sub. 
F. – 111, Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi). 
188 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 121, 173-174.  
 
 
189 Ibid., pp. 173-174. 
190 “The Nuclear Backdrop,” From Surprise to Reckoning: Kargil Review Committee Report, pp. 185-
187. 
191 Ibid., pp. 199-206. 
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capable of performing nuclear missions. These programs were ostensibly part of a balancing 
response against Pakistan’s nuclear developments. India’s “option” strategy as it became 
subsequently known, was interpreted from the outside as an attempt to assemble all the 
components of a working nuclear arsenal; a threshold capability that would give New Delhi 
the technical means to develop and deploy an arsenal rapidly. The option strategy was also 
thought more economically manageable and far less likely to attract international “negative” 
balancing efforts in the form of sanctions.  
 
The baseline assumption among most analysts was that India’s response fit neatly into the 
standard rational-actor model.  The trouble with this assumption as the subsequent evidence 
makes clear is that Indian decision-makers’ notions of rationality were more imagined than 
real. The nuclear weapons development program was never clearly tied to the development 
of delivery systems. The weapons built in the nuclear lab did not fit onto dual-use combat 
aircraft. The ballistic missiles proved unsuitable for nuclear delivery. Further, prime ministers 
and their top advisors had unrealistic assumptions about the time it would take Pakistan to 
build nuclear weapons and the time by which India could counter an operational Pakistani 
nuclear threat. Whereas Pakistan acquired the ability to enrich uranium to weapons-grade in 
1985, India did not obtain an uninterrupted supply of weapons-grade plutonium until 1988. 
Whereas Pakistan acquired nuclear devices sometime in 1987, a comparable Indian capability 
emerged only in 1990. For at least three years, India was vulnerable to a Pakistani nuclear 
threat.  
 
How did India, a country with a proven nuclear weapons capability and a much larger 
nuclear estate and scientific-industrial infrastructure end up in a position of weakness against 
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Pakistan, its much smaller and less materially endowed neighbor? In this chapter I answer 
that question by showing that the institution of secrecy disrupted parallel coordination 
between India’s nuclear estate, its defense agencies and its military. I also present evidence to 
show that sequestered decision-making and the regime of information scarcity produced 
biases, which led Indian decision-makers into underestimating Pakistan’s nuclear potential 
while overestimating India’s own nuclear breakout capabilities. Finally, I show that the 
compartmentalization of information and the lack of institutional scrutiny due to secrecy 
severely complicated the task of managing the nuclear weaponization program successfully. 
 
Secrecy, Compartmentalization and the Disaggregated Nuclear Knowledge Market 
India revived its nuclear weapons program in 1980-81. However, the program operated 
under a regime of severe internal opacity, which disrupted parallel coordination within the 
state. Between 1980 and 1989 less than a dozen individuals had knowledge of the program.  
Initiation of the nuclear weapons (1981) and missile development programs (1983) occurred 
in sequential order. However, tasking requirements for the two programs proceeded on 
parallel tracks and were weakly coordinated. Strong internal firewalls also disrupted 
cooperation between the high-tech civilian space agency, the Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO), and the missile development agency, Defense Research & 
Development Laboratory (DRDL). Within the armed services, the air force continued with 
routine equipment acquisition and modernization programs without accounting for the 
challenges of potential nuclearization fully. Similarly, limited feedback loops between the 
agencies tasked with weapons development and the central executive coordinating arm of 
the government, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), restricted the latter’s independent 
scrutiny of the inputs it received from the former on the likelihood and potential effects of 
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external sanctions, the state of Pakistan’s nuclear progress or the speed at which India could 
resolve its own weaponization challenges. 
 
That fear stemmed from the belief among India’s top decision-makers that discovery of the 
program would trigger technological and economic sanctions from the US and its western 
alliance partners. The resulting sanctions would cripple India’s nuclear power sector and 
other high-tech sectors; and that economic sanctions would cause severe dislocations in the 
Indian economy. Such fears forced the program underground. The secrecy and sequential 
planning had three effects. First, Indian leaders approached the nuclear weaponization 
program in increments. For the most part, they did not actively mobilize a nuclear epistemic 
community beyond the handful of nuclear scientists involved in the weapons development 
program. The latter condition constricted the process of learning among decision-makers. 
Second, even among actors with knowledge of the program, restrictions on the free flow of 
information became an institutional roadblock for coordinating action between them. Third, 
the principals in the PMO sought to safeguard the secrecy of the program as well as their 
own autonomy by keeping the process of policy planning and decision-making weakly 
institutionalized. As a result, the epistemic actors with stakes in the program never acquired 
the institutional means to extract policy commitments from the principals. This last 
condition not only affected their morale negatively, but it also prevented them from 
monitoring the performance of the decision-makers effectively. 
 
This regime of internal opacity itself was substantially the child of fear born in the aftermath 
of India’s 1974 nuclear test explosion. In its wake, the US led its alliance partners to deny 
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies and equipment to states that did not accept full-
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scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on their nuclear facilities. 
Nonproliferation pressures built up slowly: first through the Zangger Committee192 and then 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group.193 Further pressure came after the US Congress passed the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978. The NNPA changed US domestic law and 
forbade the supply of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to countries, which did 
not accept full-scope IAEA safeguards.194 As international collaboration dried up, India’s 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was unable to meet the planned power generation 
target of 4,500MW in the period 1970-1985. In 1985, a decade after the 1974 test, Indian 
nuclear reactors produced a mere 1,500MW of power, one-third the original target. And the 
figure in 2000 was only 2,800MW.195  
 
Although the nuclear sector was the sole target of western technology-denial policies, yet the 
tightening of equipment, spares and nuclear material had a sobering effect on Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi and her close policy advisors. Within India’s space agency, for example, there 
was great concern that the fate of the nuclear sector would befall it as well. Vikram Sarabhai, 
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the founder of the agency had opposed the nuclear explosives program on normative 
grounds. He had also argued against nuclear testing on grounds that building nuclear 
explosives was premature in the absence of supporting infrastructure that would enable 
India to field a nuclear force.196 His successor Satish Dhawan, similarly opposed any 
militarization of the civilian space agency.197 When Prime Minister Indira Gandhi authorized 
a secret medium-range ballistic missile program (Valiant) in 1972 using INR 60 million from 
the prime minister’s “apex fund,”198 Dhawan ensured that firewalls were erected between 
India’s space and missile development agency.  In the mid-1970s, engineers from the civilian 
space agency, ISRO and the Indian Institute of Science (Bangalore) conducted a peer review 
of the missile’s liquid rocket engine.199 However, Dhavan and his team avoided incorporating 
the engine developed for the Valiant rocket into the polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) 
program during the 1980s. For the latter, ISRO contracted to purchase the French Viking 
liquid fuel engine from Ariane, the French aerospace agency. As Indira Gandhi’s scientific 
advisor at the time saw it, the missile development agency, the Defense Research & 
Development Laboratory (DRDL), became a victim of its own success. The prime minister, 
despite her wishes to the contrary, hesitated from forcing coordination and cooperation 
between the civilian ISRO and military DRDL.200  
 
In 1977, Indira Gandhi lost elections to Morarji Desai, a Gandhian who was morally 
opposed to the 1974 test and the nuclear weapons program in general. During his two-year 
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tenure, the nuclear test team almost disintegrated due to his inattention and vocal opposition 
to the program. Despite the mounting threat from Pakistan, Desai removed the leader of the 
test team, Dr. Raja Ramanna out of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC)201 to the 
position of scientific advisor to the defense minister.202 In a public display of displeasure with 
the nuclear weapons establishment, the prime minister mocked the achievement of Indian 
nuclear weaponeers and publicly claimed he was uncertain whether the 1974 test was caused 
by a nuclear device or by conventional explosives.203 Nuclear scientists at BARC complained 
that they worked very hard during Desai’s tenure to keep the 1974 nuclear engineering and 
physics team intact.204 
 
Between 1977-1979 evidence mounted of Pakistan’s nuclear quest. In 1979, India’s Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) chaired by K. Subrahmanyam conducted its first thorough 
review of this development and concluded that Pakistan was pursuing a weapons programs 
through the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment technique. US officials informed the Indian 
foreign minister A.B. Vajpayee during his visit to Washington they believed that Pakistan 
could conduct a nuclear explosion within two or three years.205 But Desai’s government did 
not act on the JIC’s report.206 However, Indira Gandhi, who was re-elected to power in 1980, 
did not share Desai’s moral aversion to nuclear weapons. Confronted by nuclear 
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developments in Pakistan and warnings from the nuclear establishment and India’s 
intelligence agencies, she revived the nuclear weapons program and re-appointed Ramanna 
as director of BARC.207 However, in doing so, she continued a pattern of secrecy and 
sequential decision-making. This method had a precedent in the 1974 test. But its urgency 
was even greater in light of US nonproliferation pressures, the reality of technology denials 
in India’s civilian nuclear power sector and the potential threat of economic sanctions.  
 
In reviving the nuclear weapons program, Gandhi ensured that goals were static and loosely 
coupled. To avoid attracting international attention, the principal challenges of the program 
– fissile material production, device development, delivery system modification, force 
planning, command and control -- were all divvied up and dealt with sequentially. In the 
absence of a holistic approach to finding solutions to the challenge posed by the emerging 
Pakistani threat, the PMO deliberately mobilized only those epistemic actors that were 
absolutely essential for the program’s early stages – the nuclear physicists at BARC. The 
DRDO and a few of its labs were gradually brought into play. But high firewalls were left 
standing between them. The government also did not consider it prudent to coordinate 
action between the weapon development team, the team working on potential delivery 
systems and their actual users. All information was hived off in compartments with little 
interflow between them. The net result of this approach was a regime of severe internal 
opacity, which rivaled and eclipsed the cloak of external invisibility.  
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For secrecy reasons, the weapon program’s objectives were never debated seriously in the 
cabinet, parliament, the committee of government secretaries (cabinet secretariat), or by the 
chiefs of staff. Nothing was committed to paper and all sensitive questions concerning the 
program were decided between the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) and the director of BARC. The chief of DRDO, who also doubled up 
as Science Advisor to the Defense Minister, was part of the technical circle of advisors 
because the agency was tasked with developing the non-fissile triggers for the experimental 
devices under development. However, the DRDO chief’s political overlord, defense minister 
R. Venkataraman, had only occasional knowledge of nuclear developments such as an 
impending nuclear test.208 Other decision-makers included the members of the prime 
minister’s inner circle such as the cabinet secretary, her principal secretary and occasionally 
her economic advisor.209 The prime minister’s Principal Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary 
also represented the PMO on the board of the AEC. However, given their non-technical 
status, the degree to which both were aware of the scope of the covert nuclear weapons 
program is debatable.210 For the most part, the director of BARC and the chairman of the 
AEC were the two individuals privy to details of the program.211  
 
In 1985, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s son and successor experimented with a weakly 
institutionalized system of nuclear decision-making for a six-month period. Gandhi’s 
informal ‘Policy Planning Group’ consisted of two political leaders, the Cabinet Secretary, 
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the Chairman, CoSC, the chiefs of the AEC and intelligence agencies, the Chief Economic 
Advisor and director of the defense ministry’s think tank, the Institute of Defense Studies & 
Analyses (IDSA). However, Gandhi ended the experiment within six months and returned 
to the precedent of making decisions on the basis of consultations with his scientific and 
technical advisors.212 The available evidence suggests that the PMO did not make any 
deductive assessment of the type of weapons the Indian military might require in the 
Pakistan and China theaters. Such assessments could only have been possible through joint 
consultations between the PMO, the military and the scientists. However, the three 
cooperated only briefly to prepare a potential nuclear force sizing and cost estimate for the 
PMO in 1986.213  Dr. A.N. Prasad who years later served as the director of BARC 
complained “…the government set the Department of Atomic Energy no tasks, oversaw no 
military developments.”214 Nuclear scientists therefore proceeded with weapon designs 
without consulting the user services such as the air force from which combat aircraft would 
most likely be drawn for nuclear missions; or the DRDL that would supply rockets for 
delivering nuclear warheads.215  
 
SEE SCHEMATICS 1 & 2 FOR VISUALIZATION OF OPTIMAL VERSUS ACTUAL INDIAN 
NUCLEAR DECISION-MAKING 
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The revived nuclear weapons program centered on the reduction in the size and weight of 
the 1974 fission device. It also very likely involved the design of a new device on the 
principle of fission boosting. Nuclear tests were planned in 1982-83 and new shafts were 
sunk at Pokhran for the purpose.216 However, the revived program was considered 
experimental; not one that would produce weaponized devices immediately. Thus there was 
no broad coordination among the nuclear and defense R&D agencies to make the weapons 
rugged and deliverable. There was also no open debate on a viable long-term strategy for the 
nuclear weapons program. In fact, the AEC was divided on the overall direction of India’s 
civilian nuclear power program and how that might parlay into the production of fissile 
material for a weapons program. AEC Chairman Sethna and BARC Director Ramanna led 
the dominant faction within the AEC, which favored sticking with India’s originally planned 
path of atomic energy development: the three-stage program with natural uranium heavy 
water reactors, fast breeder reactors and thorium reactors.217 This approach would also 
produce weapons-grade plutonium for a weapons program in the long-term. However, a 
second school favored the light-water reactor (LWR) route using LEU. The Soviet Union 
offered to build LWRs for India under conditions that such reactors be placed under 
international safeguards. The Soviet Union was also prepared to relax the condition of full-
scope safeguards to build such reactors in India. The latter route was favored by the M.R. 
Srinivasan faction and viewed as the means for reviving the nuclear power program, which 
had stalled in the wake of the 1974 test explosion.218 However, the latter approach implied 
bifurcating the power and fissile material production programs. But there was no debate 
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outside the AEC and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did not come down in favor of either. 
Her successor Rajiv Gandhi favored the LWR plan as a means of reviving the nuclear power 
sector. However, the new prime minister’s inclination caused serious fissures between the 
AEC leadership, especially between Ramanna and the prime minister,219 further dampening 
the drive toward information cooperation between the agencies.  
 
Even as India revived an experimental nuclear weapons program in 1981, decisions on 
potential delivery systems for those weapons were pushed further down the road. In 1983, 
the Indian government launched the Integrated Guided Missile Program (IGMDP)220 under 
DRDO’s direction. This was a continuation of the ballistic missile programs from the1970s. 
However, the IGMDP envisaged the development of a diverse array of missile systems: anti-
tank, air defense and two ballistic missile programs. The ballistic missile programs, the short 
range Prithvi221 and the medium-range Agni222 had strategic implications as potential carriers 
of nuclear munitions. However, in the absence of strategic direction from the government, 
DRDO sold the short-range Prithvi to the services as a version of long-range artillery.223 On 
the other hand, the Agni, with its longer range, actually held greater promise as a potential 
nuclear delivery system. But it was conceived as a “technology demonstrator,” a proving 
ground for technologies and sub-systems.  
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Table 3 
 
Indian Ballistic Missile Programs (1970-1990) 
Year Name Type Range 
1973 Valiant Liquid Fuel Medium-Range 
1983 Prithvi Liquid Fuel Short-Range 
1983 Agni Technology 
Demonstrator 
Solid Fuel Medium-Range 
 
The compartmentalization between the missile and nuclear agencies, the DRDO and BARC, 
is evident indirectly from the weight and size of India’s fission warhead design in the 1980s. 
DRDO’s missiles were designed to carry a generic one-ton payload, the presumed weight of 
a first-generation nuclear warhead. However, warheads designed for missiles place greater 
demands on design and shape requirements compared to aircraft.224 Such warheads must of 
necessity fit into the narrow cone of the missile’s warhead casing; and they must be 
sufficiently rugged to withstand the shock of vibrations and the heat of re-entry during 
flight. According to a senior air force officer with some knowledge of the program, the 
weight of the first nuclear bomb was between 1,000-1,500kg.225 Had missile carriage been the 
intent, BARC would have designed a lighter warhead. Further, the DRDO’s missile 
development and BARCs’ warhead design schedules proceeded independently of each other. 
For example, India commenced weaponization in the spring of 1989. However, the Prithvi’s 
testing and certification schedule continued until 1994-1995. It was not until the late 1990s, 
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most likely around 1996-1997 that nuclear warhead trials commenced for the Prithvi.226 On 
the other hand, the testing of the Agni technology demonstrator began in 1989 and ended in 
1994 after which the government authorized DRDO to begin development of a follow-on 
all solid-rocket motor ballistic for operational deployment.227  
 
The first weapon was designed with the air force’s Jaguar in mind. However, high internal 
firewalls and information compartmentalization precluded information sharing between the 
BARC and the air force. The weapon that emerged out of BARC had a diameter that was 
too large for carriage beneath the aircraft as it left very little ground clearance. Of the early 
trials in the 1980s that DRDO conducted to test the potential for the Jaguar to serve as a 
potential delivery system, a test pilot on the team had this to say:  
 
“we were groping in the dark. We had no interaction with the scientists who were 
actually making the bombs. They had never flown an aircraft and we were not involved 
in the bomb’s development…we argued that unless we knew what the left hand is 
doing how can the right hand bring it together.”228  
 
Between 1987-1990, DRDO borrowed a Mirage 2000 from the air force to test its feasibility 
to perform nuclear missions.229 However, DRDO circumscribed the test pilot and squadron 
base commander’s communications with Air Headquarters in Delhi. Outside India it was  
presumed was that India’s Jaguar and Mirage 2000 aircraft purchased from Britain and 
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France were nuclear-capable, providing India with a rapid nuclear breakout capability. 
According to senior air force officers closely associated with negotiating the Jaguar and 
Mirage deals during in the 1970s and the early 1980s, there was only a generic query from the 
government about nuclear feasibility. The air force was not tasked to perform detailed 
feasibility studies on conversion of the aircraft for nuclear missions.  
 
The disaggregation within India’s strategic technical estate was not an exception. India’s 
policy knowledge market was equally fragmented. For example, the Indian military’s inputs 
on the security implications of the impending Pakistani nuclear revolution did not receive a 
full hearing within government until the latter half of the 1980s. Despite remaining on the 
policy sidelines, the army instituted an ‘Experts Committee’ in 1975 to plan for 
modernization in the 21st century. One section of the report that came out of that process 
dealt with India’s nuclear response to regional threats.230 Although the army submitted its 
report to the civilian ministry of defense in 1976, the latter did not pass on the plan to the 
PMO for consideration. It wasn’t until 1982 that then army chief Krishna Rao who was also 
Chairman, CoSC, brought the army’s recommendations to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s 
attention and briefed her on its sensitive nuclear contents.231 
 
Beginning in the early 1980s the Indian army began experimenting with a mobile defense 
and offense-in-depth conventional war strategy based on mechanization that was supposed 
to be conducive to conducting conventional operations under nuclear, biological and 
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chemical warfare conditions against Pakistan. In the Army’s College of Combat at Mhow, Lt. 
General Sundarji kicked off a series of seminars on conventional operations under 
conditions of nuclear asymmetry, which became the basis of the famous Mhow (Combat) 
Papers and the core of his subsequent nuclear advocacy and strategy for India.232 Sundarji’s 
central argument was that India’s conventional superiority would cease to matter under 
conditions of nuclear asymmetry as the army would be unable to concentrate in mass for 
fear of nuclear annihilation. Scattering forces to reduce the army’s vulnerability to a potential 
nuclear attack would allow the enemy (Pakistan) to chew up Indian forces piecemeal.233 
However, Sundarji’s was a private effort driven by his own academic interest in nuclear 
weapons and warfare. Due to the lack of any strategic direction from the government there 
was no institutional attempt to provide military officers with training on the subject at staff 
colleges.234 Sundarji’s arguments only received full attention after he became army chief in 
1986 and came to enjoy the backing of the Minister of State for Defense Arun Singh who 
ran the ministry on behalf of the prime minister who nominally held the cabinet post for 
defense.235 However, the military chiefs had no formal means of bringing their concerns 
before the cabinet. Nor did the PMO solicit their opinion. 
 
The disaggregation of the state’s nuclear epistemic communities apart, those elements of it 
that were mobilized on occasion were weakly institutionalized within the state. They had no 
administrative, legal or institutional means to extract political commitments from the 
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political leadership. Commitments, as argued earlier in Chapter Two, are “time lengthening” 
mechanisms, which signal the strength of decision-makers’ commitment to resolving 
problems. Epistemic actors, as knowledge brokers and specialists, are the ones most 
committed to holistic solution sets and suffer loss of morale when they find such 
commitments lacking. This is evident from the Indian case as well. Two episodes highlight 
these dynamics during the 1980s. In late 1982 for example, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
approved a program of nuclear tests. However, she retracted her decision within a day of 
making it. The DRDO chief, V.S. Arunachalam who was privy to that episode recalls the 
emotional impact of that decision on him and other members of the nuclear epistemic 
community. In his words:  
 
“Once we were to ready to test for the first time…myself, Dr. Ramanna…in 1982. 
Ramanna who pressurized it insisted that I follow it up with Mrs. Gandhi, why we 
should test it…it is important and so forth…reduction in size, increased efficiency etc. 
etc. I don’t want to mention who all else were sitting in that meeting. Mrs. Gandhi said 
yes and Ramanna rushed to Bombay to get things organized. And I went to another 
location to organize a few other things. In the evening my defense minister 
Venkataraman called me. He called me and said: It’s off. I asked: what is off sir? He 
said the testing is off. I said that the PM gave her yes during the meeting. He said but 
now she has changed her mind. So I rang Dr. Ramanna. He just was so furious. He 
said: No! Go seek an immediate appointment with the prime minister and talk to her. 
He was in Bombay and trying to come by the next flight. So I went to my minister and 
said: is it alright sir if…can I meet the prime minister. He said: the prime minister 
doesn’t want to see you…very clearly. And I told Ramanna: I couldn’t get an 
appointment…it is up to you. The next morning he [Ramanna] comes to my house and 
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after breakfast says: this is not right…I am going to see…I have asked for an 
appointment…I think it was…the prime minister’s secretary was there. But the 
appointment never came. It was over. I saw the prime minister many times after that. I 
decided that I will not ask her. If she doesn’t want to see me on this…I have my own 
pride and I am not going to ask her why did she said no.”236 
 
K. Subrahmanyam, who participated in Rajiv Gandhi’s ‘Policy Planning Group’ for a short 
six-month period in 1985, similarly recalled the emotionally enervating effect of weak 
institutions on epistemic actors. In Subrahmanyam’s recollections of those meetings:  
 
“…the person who was opposed to it [India going nuclear] was the economic 
advisor…Jalan. Most of the people kept silent. Ramanna [Chairman, AEC] didn’t say 
anything. But everyone knew Ramanna’s views that he was in favor of development. I 
know Arun Singh [Minister of State for Defense] was in favor of development…but I 
don’t remember his saying anything in public. The Cabinet Secretary was against it and 
the intelligence chief didn’t say anything openly. But I know that he, Gary Saxena, was 
for it. And I think the Intelligence Bureau chief also should have been for it.   
 
The main problem is that in a meeting like this with the prime minister presiding over 
the meeting, you don’t find many people talking very freely. Of course I was the 
exception. Most people weren’t sure what the prime minister’s opinion was. And I have 
a feeling…guess…they didn’t want to…if they hadn’t already taken a stand like 
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Ramanna and myself…they didn’t want to take a stand in contradiction of the prime 
minister’s opinion. They wanted to play safe…”237 
 
 
The Downside of Sequestered Decision-Making and Inferences Drawn From Value 
Judgments 
The fundamental challenge before Indian decision-makers in the 1980s was one of 
uncertainty. The uncertainty stemmed from imperfect information concerning: (a) how the 
United States would respond to an Indian nuclear weapons program; and (b) the progress 
and state of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Cybernetic decision-making models suggest that 
decision-makers in isolated settings routinely attempt uncertainty control by simplifying the 
ambiguity that surrounds them. They do this by using highly selective channels to screen 
incoming information in order to ensure consistency of their belief systems. Cognitive 
psychology also informs us that in conditions of ambiguity, decision-makers resort to 
heuristics and biases and substitute knowledge gaps with value-based judgments.  
 
In India, the regime of severe internal opacity limited the extent to which decision-makers 
could seek feedback from within and outside the state. Further, given the dilemmas of 
incomplete information, the decision-makers essentially substituted factual assessments with 
value judgments based on anchoring and availability heuristics. The latter were based on 
memories anchored in India’s 1974 nuclear test and the very real threat of US technological 
sanctions, proven by the ruin of India’s civilian nuclear power sector. Equally significant, the 
decision-makers’ beliefs were also anchored in India’s vast nuclear and rocket technological 
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estate, which could have produced nuclear weapons and rockets to deliver them with relative 
ease and the relatively thin Pakistani nuclear and missile infrastructure by comparison.  
 
This brute material reality had three bias effects. First, it produced over-caution in the minds 
of Indian decision-makers about what might or might not the United States do.238 Second, it 
led them to overestimate India’s indigenous nuclear breakout capability. And third, it 
produced a bias train, which led them to underestimate Pakistan’s capacity to produce 
nuclear weapons. The net result of this approach was that despite India’s vast technological 
and resource advantage over Pakistan, it found itself without nuclear weapons when 
confronted with Pakistani nuclearization in 1987. As the doyen of Indian strategic analysts 
K. Subrahmanyam subsequently disclosed: “in the period between 1987-1990 India was 
totally vulnerable to a Pakistani nuclear threat.”239  
 
From the late-1970s, the threat of US sanctions was very real. For example, international 
collaborators, who prior to the 1974 nuclear test had participated eagerly to help India build 
up the complete nuclear fuel cycle, train its scientists and engineers and set up a vast ancillary 
infrastructure, withdrew their cooperation as India became the exemplar of the dangers of 
the dual-use ‘Atoms for Peace’ program. Although Indian nuclear scientists and political 
leadership had aspired to make the nuclear program self-sufficient, they were almost entirely 
dependent on foreign, particularly western assistance. India’s first swimming pool-type 
reactor was built almost entirely with British assistance.240 Canada built the 40MW CIRUS 
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research reactor at Trombay, which later provided the plutonium for India’s 1974 test.241 
General Electric from the United States built the first power generation reactors at Tarapur 
on a “turnkey” basis.242 All the reactor’s components including the supporting equipment 
and machinery was imported. Similarly, the first unit of the heavy water reactor in Rajasthan 
was a Canadian import. Indian engineers worked under Canadian supervision. But India did 
not gain design competencies or outfit the plant with any indigenous machinery or 
equipment.243 
 
This heavy dependence on foreign suppliers, design and engineering expertise caused the 
entire program to sputter once external assistance ceased. There was another reason that 
compounded the nuclear power sector’s weak performance. Indian nuclear scientists starting 
with Homi Bhabha had oversold the benefits of cheap nuclear power to their political 
overlords in the 1950s and 1960s.244 In their eagerness to prove nuclear energy’s viability 
against alternatives they embraced relatively untried and untested technologies. According to 
Ashok Parthasarathi who advised the PMO on scientific issues, there was no “operational 
feedback” on the reactor India bought from the Canadians. Thus serious engineering 
problems cropped up in the wake of operating this “premature Canadian technology.” 245 
Examples of these problems included the cracking of the reactor’s end shield and the poor 
performance of the “zero leak” pumps and valves used to circulate the reactor’s heavy 
water.246 Leaky valves and the discharge of highly radioactive waste caused serious 
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operational problems in the Tarapur reactors as well.247 Resolution of these design and 
operational problems took over a decade of trial and error. Further, it took India’s DAE 12 
years to build a heavy water reactor indigenously after Canada withdrew assistance in 1976248. 
Similarly, India’s heavy water plants and the plutonium reprocessing facility at Trombay also 
performed below par.249  
 
However, western technology denials in the wake of the 1974 test were a mixed bag. 
Western collaborators did not immediately end civil nuclear cooperation with India. 
Although Canada ended cooperation on the second phase of the Rajasthan atomic power 
project, the United States continued supplying low-enriched uranium (LEU) for the Tarapur 
reactors.  In the early 1980s as the supply of LEU became increasingly contested in the 
United States due to congressional pressure, the Reagan administration allowed India to 
negotiate a substitute nuclear supply agreement with France. Further, the technology export 
control regime the United States instituted to deny the sale of sensitive technologies was not 
watertight. For example, a CIA report from the early 1980s concluded that India was 
relatively immune to US supplier disruptions due to the existence of an international “grey 
market.” As the report put it:  
 
“Largely through the use of the international ‘grey market’, India has been able to 
maintain a nuclear weapons capability…India’s purchasing activities challenges US 
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efforts to work with other nuclear supplier states for tighter export controls and 
demonstrate that the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines have serious weaknesses.  
 
India has evaded Western supplier-state export and nonproliferation controls by 
avoiding government-to-government agreements and not importing complete nuclear 
facilities. Instead, India has established direct relations with foreign vendor firms, used 
intermediaries to disguise the end use of its purchases, and bought many components 
piecemeal.” 250 
 
The report further stated:  
 
“…we expect the European exporting countries and Japan to continue to resist US 
efforts to curb their nuclear exports by arguing that they will be replaced by the Soviets 
in the Indian market if they are curtailed.”251 
 
In a “grey market” the acquirer states violate the spirit if not the letter of the supplier state’s 
export control laws. Equipment is purchased from private vendors piece-by-piece, 
subsystem-by-subsystem or component-by-component. Export controls that would 
normally apply to the sale of a complete nuclear reactor or reprocessing plant do not apply 
to individual components such as pressure valves, vessels, control instruments that could be 
incorporated into such plants.252 Indeed, starting in 1976, Pakistan systematically imported an 
entire gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant piece-by-piece from Western Europe based 
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on vendor lists pilfered by A.Q. Khan out of the Netherlands.253 Equally significant, India’s 
missile agency learnt lessons from the case of sanctions applied to the nuclear sector. 
Anticipating technology denials for India’s ballistic missile program in the 1980s, the DRDO 
set up a ‘Special Purchase Team’, which stocked up on gyros, accelerometers, hydraulic 
actuators, computers, motion simulators and three-axis measuring machines from Sweden, 
France, United States and West Germany.254 For the critical carbon-carbon heat shield on 
the long-range Agni’s re-entry vehicle, the team purchased a special six-axis filament-winding 
machine with computer controllers in the United States. In order to escape scrutiny from US 
export control authorities, the machine was routed through an Indian textile manufacturer.255  
 
Indian nuclear and missile entities were aware of the complexities of the international 
technology market and the manner in which export controls could be circumvented. The 
scientists had far greater confidence that India could proceed with a nuclear weapons 
program and overcome the retarding effects of technology sanctions.256 However, the 
debilitating effects of technology denials anchored the PMO’s view that scientists had 
oversold the nuclear power program. Despite promises that they could resolve technological 
problems, they had proved unsuccessful. Similarly, the PMO’s nuclear hesitancy was 
anchored in the threat of the potential denial of World Bank loans and the IMF’s 
restructuring package by the United States. These, the PMO believed,  could damage the 
Indian economy seriously.257 Reflecting these fears, the prime minister remarked rhetorically 
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to Ramanna during a private meeting: “do you want our skulls cracked?”258 In this clash 
between the PMO and the scientists, the PMO’s view prevailed. However, for secrecy 
reasons, the prime minister and her top advisors did not consult widely within the 
government about the potential disruptive effects of sanctions. Likewise, the scientists’ had 
few institutional means to force decisions on the prime minister and her privy council.  
 
As India verged on nuclear tests in 1982-1983, US spy satellites discovered renewed activity 
at the Pokhran test site. In May 1982, Lawrence Eagleburger, the US Undersecretary of State 
for Political Affairs confronted India’s Foreign Secretary Rasgotra about the impending tests 
during the latter’s trip to Washington.259 The cat was thus out of the bag. And yet, top Indian 
leaders continued to believe the program’s existence could be denied by keeping weapons 
development compartmentalized, a condition that stymied coordination across the state’s 
various agencies. Equally significant, the progress of Pakistan’s clandestine procurement 
efforts was visible to Indian intelligence agencies and the political leadership. As was the 
US’s handling of Pakistan with kid gloves.260 To be sure, Pakistan was a special case during 
the 1980s because it rented strategic space to the United States and became a frontline state 
in the struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In the hierarchy of US foreign policy 
and national security interests, this struggle superseded the struggle against nuclear 
proliferation.261 
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During the 1980s the US also discovered a program of substantial Chinese material 
assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons effort. This included the supply of an actual 
weapon design based on China’s fourth nuclear test among other things.262 However, the 
Reagan administration proved unwilling or helpless to stem this tide of cooperation. 
Undoubtedly, US treatment of India was different, especially given New Delhi’s close ties 
with the Soviet Union and its thinly veiled anti-US positions. And yet, the US handling of 
Pakistani proliferation provides a rough indicator of potential US flexibility in handling 
proliferation challenges. However, Indian prime ministers in the 1980s took the sequestered 
view that the US would apply blanket economic and technological sanctions on India, which 
could in principle cripple India’s economy and high-tech sectors. And despite initiating 
nuclear explosives and ballistic missile programs known to the United States, they kept the 
programs isolated, their assumption being that opacity and secrecy were equal to deniability.  
 
In any situation of uncertainty, there are what the former US Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld identified as the know knowns, the known unknowns and the unknown 
unknowns. In assessing the Pakistani nuclear threat, Indian prime ministers’ decisions were 
substantially driven by the known knowns. Among the latter was the very real disparity 
between the nuclear estates of the two countries. India was the competitor with the greater 
resource and the greater technological manpower advantage. Its nuclear sector had deep 
roots and was relatively self-sufficient in the plutonium fuel cycle. India’s nuclear estate 
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included uranium mining, milling and fuel rod fabrication facilities, heavy water plants, 
research and power reactors, and plutonium reprocessing.263 By this scale of comparison, 
Pakistan’s nuclear estate was miniscule. It possessed only lab-sale spent-fuel reprocessing 
capabilities to extract weapons-grade plutonium264 Above all, India had a proven nuclear 
device, which it had already exploded. Further, with the revival of the nuclear weapons 
research and development program in 1980s, India was working on advanced boosted-
fission designs and miniaturized versions of the fission design tested in 1974.265 This extant 
materiality anchored their belief of India’s superiority in any nuclear competition vis-à-vis 
Pakistan. V. S. Arunachalam, the chief of DRDO and scientific advisor to India’s defense 
minister, who became the informal points person for the nuclear project between 1983-1992, 
summed up the decision-makers point of view to the author:  
 
“…there was no reason to panic…the panic will come if we didn’t know what is a 
nuclear weapon, if we didn’t know how to make it, if we didn’t know how to deploy 
it…what can the panicking do…there is no reason to panic…”266 
 
The key challenge in producing a nuclear device is mastering the nuclear fuel cycle to obtain 
fissile material. Within the nuclear physics and engineering community, the design of a first-
generation nuclear device is considered a relatively simpler task. By this measure, India 
possessed the fissile material. Pakistan did not. Pakistan’s original attempt at obtaining 
plutonium through plans to build natural uranium reactors and import a French plutonium 
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reprocessing plant were blocked by the United States in 1976-1977.267 In response, Pakistan 
switched to the uranium enrichment route. Under A.Q. Khan, Pakistan elected for gas 
centrifuge technology, an extremely difficult process to master. Centrifuges spin at 
extraordinarily high speeds. They require special materials, precision design and exquisite 
engineering. They also require well-trained scientific and engineering teams with the formal 
and tacit knowledge to operate them.268 Indian beliefs about the state of Pakistan’s advances 
were anchored in their own experience with centrifuge enrichment technology. India began 
building its own centrifuge enrichment facilities in the early 1970s. However, it only 
succeeded in enriching uranium on a pilot scale at BARC by 1985. Construction of a larger 
plant to enrich uranium started in the mid-1980s at Rattehalli in Karnataka and the plant 
came online in 1990. The Indian enrichment program had significant operational problems 
due to “…corrosion and failure of parts” and was beset by delays.269 The difficulties of 
getting this complex technology to work became a cause of skepticism in the minds of top 
scientists within India’s nuclear establishment about the ability of their Pakistani 
counterparts to get the technology to work.  
 
Top Indian civil bureaucrats and their scientific counterparts in the AEC were 
contemptuous of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. For example, in response to Pakistani Prime 
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s famous statement after India’s 1974 test that Pakistan would 
acquire a matching capability even if Pakistanis had to eat grass, P.N. Haksar who was 
formerly Indira Gandhi’s Principal Secretary remarked sarcastically:   
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“If by eating grass one can produce atom bombs, then by now cows and horses would 
have produced them. But, of course, the people of Pakistan under the great and 
charismatic leadership to which they are now exposed might produce a bomb on a diet 
of grass.”270  
 
Top Indian nuclear scientists similarly expressed contempt towards their Pakistani 
counterparts. They harbored the biased belief that Pakistan was blustering. A former AEC 
chairman in the mid-1980s claimed: “We did not take A.Q. Khan seriously. He was a 
metallurgist. They would not be capable of doing these things.”271 Similarly, Arunachalam, 
then scientific advisor to India’s defense minister, volunteered to the author that he would 
not have hired A.Q. Khan for any of his labs.272 Likewise, former AEC Chairman P.K. 
Iyengar, a central figure in India’s 1974 test and the thermonuclear weapon design, informed 
the author: “I didn’t believe it…they could [Pakistan] probably…perhaps build one or more 
bomb at most…but not more.”273 Dr. M.R. Srinivasan, who served as the Chairman of 
India’s AEC between 1987-1990 while admitting to Pakistani advances in uranium 
enrichment, summed up the Indian atomic establishment’s view of Pakistan’s nuclear 
capacity in the following words:  
 
“Although there are certainly competent scientists and technologists in Pakistan, its 
nuclear technological base is rather limited, so its scientists have apparently gathered 
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parts from various international sources…although Pakistan claims parity with India in 
nuclear capabilities, there is an order of magnitude difference in the overall capabilities, 
not the least in terms of trained personnel and industrial capability.”274 
 
The Indian nuclear establishment in making assessments of Pakistan’s advances lacked 
perfect information about its actual state of progress. The known knowns in this case were 
that Pakistan had succeeded in acquiring blueprints for a centrifuge-based uranium 
enrichment plant from Urenco in the Netherlands; that A. Q. Khan had succeeded in 
procuring an entire uranium hexafluoride gas plant from W. Germany; that Pakistani agents 
in Europe had purchased special steel known as maraging steel to manufacture centrifuge 
cylinders; and that Pakistan had also obtained high-frequency power units to drive the 
centrifuges from Western Europe.275 However, the known unknowns were whether 
Pakistani nuclear scientists and engineers had the ‘tacit’ skills to get the complex technology 
up and running.276 In scientific-industrial processes, tacit hurdles are the hardest ones to 
scale. There are limits to the degree to which foreign consultants, suppliers and technology 
transfers can bridge the gap between the formal and tacit means of doing things.277 In the 
absence of precise knowledge of the state of Pakistan’s tacit skills and knowledge, the Indian 
nuclear establishment relied on its own operating experience with centrifuge enrichment to 
make inferences about Pakistan. In addition, Indian nuclear scientists at the highest levels 
retained connections with their Pakistani counterparts such as the former Chairman of the 
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Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan. The latter had a 
bitter falling out with A.Q. Khan whose Engineering Research Labs sidelined PAEC’s 
pursuit of fissile material through the plutonium route.278 The likes of Munir Ahmed Khan 
spoke “disparagingly” of A.Q. Khan to their Indian counterparts whom they routinely met 
on the sidelines of annual IAEA meetings in Vienna.279 In the process the PAEC 
inadvertently undermined A.Q. Khan’s reputation and underscored the Indian nuclear 
establishment’s skepticism of Pakistani claims.  
 
In comparison, Indian intelligence agencies dutifully reported the advances in the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons program to the PMO. In early 1981 for example, Indian intelligence 
informed the PMO that Pakistan would have sufficient weapons-grade uranium by July-
November that year; and that Islamabad had initiated preparations for an underground test 
explosion in the Rashkoh mountains in Baluchistan.280 In 1982, Indian intelligence agencies 
estimated that Pakistan very likely possessed weapons-grade fissile material for a bomb “core 
or two.”281 Indian intelligence reports duly reported Pakistan’s purchase of krytron switches 
used to deliver pulsed electric charges in a nuclear device. They also tracked Pakistan’s 
purchase of X-ray machines used for high-speed flash photography. The latter is used for 
testing the non-nuclear trigger assembly of a nuclear device. The also noted Pakistan’s 
purchase of software for simulated implosion test analysis on computers.282 By the mid-
1980s, all signals suggested that Pakistan was developing a nuclear device. Based on these 
inputs, Indian intelligence chiefs in the mid-1980s recommended a counter Indian 
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weaponization program to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.283 However, Gandhi was 
“skeptical,” according to K. Subrahmanyam, who sat in on the ‘Policy Planning Group’ in 
1985. The prime minister “…asked a lot of questions.”284 Similarly, former AEC chairman 
P.K. Iyengar affirmed Gandhi’s skepticism with the raw intelligence. Gandhi, according to 
Iyengar, was more confident about what was told him by the nuclear establishment. “He 
asked me how I could or could not be confident that the Pakistanis were enriching 
uranium…I explained him how. And he then believed me.”285 
 
Like their intelligence counterparts, India’s top military leaders also urged the prime 
ministers nuclear haste. In the early 1980s, the army chief General Rao led that charge 
circumventing the civil-military divide and the defense ministry’s normal channels of 
communications with the PMO.286 His successor, General Sundarji, lobbied for nuclear 
weapons even more vociferously, both in his official capacity as army chief and through his 
close personal relationship with Arun Singh, who was Rajiv Gandhi’s confidante and 
managed the defense ministry for the prime minister as minister of state.287 The Indian air 
force did not lobby for nuclear weapons directly. However, after Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s 
Osiraq reactor in 1981, its operations staff prepared an internal study on similar options 
against Pakistan’s Kahuta uranium enrichment plant.288 The latter were allegedly discussed 
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and rejected by the PMO.289 Concerns also grew within India’s military that Pakistan had 
begun supporting insurgents in India’s Punjab confident in the belief that its emerging 
nuclear arsenal had immunized it against a potential Indian conventional counter response. 
In 1986, the Indian army conducted Operation Brasstacks, its largest war games in history to 
test Sundarji’s technical and organizational reforms for mechanized maneuver warfare in the 
Pakistan theater.290 The exercise almost spun out of control and triggered war as nervous 
Pakistani leaders counter-mobilized and threatened undefended Indian territory in the 
Punjab.291 The bulk of the evidence suggests that pre-emptive war was not India’s intent. 
However, the exercise was certainly regarded as a show of force; a means to coerce Pakistan 
into terminating support for the insurgency in the Punjab.292 At the height of the crisis, when 
Rajiv Gandhi toyed with the idea of initiating war against Pakistan, General Sundarji 
counseled the prime minister to do just that in what he urged was India’s last realistic chance 
to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in the bud.293  
 
The above evidence shows that there was a diversity of opinions within the Indian 
government during the1980s about the state of Pakistan’s nuclear progress and what India 
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ought to do about it. Decision-makers in the PMO were aware of nuclear developments 
across the border but uncertain of the precise nature of the Pakistani threat. They were over-
cautious in determining an Indian counter response because of their biased view of the 
extreme reaction it might induce from the United States. The PMO’s extreme caution was 
also reinforced by its almost exclusive reliance on the atomic energy establishment for 
assessments of Pakistan’s nuclear progress. Although leading Indian nuclear scientists 
favored faster progress on nuclear weapons development, they also harbored deep 
skepticism about Pakistan’s claims to achieving nuclear weapons capability. Their skepticism 
was not based on incontrovertible data. It drew on the wellsprings of biases fed by India’s 
difficulties with mastering the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment process. In contrast, 
Indian intelligence and military chiefs held more alarmist views of Pakistan’s nuclear quest 
and its consequences for India. Once again, their views did not rest on certainty. However, 
as James Surowiecki explains in the Wisdom of Crowds, crowds have a lower tendency for 
judgment errors in the face of uncertainty because their independent errors cancel each other 
out, a phenomenon less likely in decisions by individuals and closed groups. The key to 
better prediction amidst imperfect information is independence, diversity of opinion and a 
way of aggregating diverse opinions.294 In India, however, secrecy and the sequestered 
process of decision-making cut off the oxygen of crowd sourcing from within the 
government, which amplified the biases of the decision-makers. 
 
The big unknown unknown before India in the 1980s was whether Pakistani nuclear 
scientists had acquired the tacit knowledge to work the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant 
and build nuclear weapons. Unbeknownst to the Indian nuclear weapons establishment and 
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its intelligence agencies was the extent of the secret nuclear cooperation between Pakistan 
and China. For example, Indian prime ministers were briefed on reports in the early and 
mid-1980s that China had likely shared a nuclear weapon design with Pakistan. However, 
Indian intelligence agencies were only able to confirm that only in 1988.295 New evidence 
from US intelligence sources and US nuclear scientists with extensive contacts within the 
Chinese nuclear weapons complex suggest that China cooperated with Pakistan extensively 
during the 1980s. The nature of that cooperation included: training Pakistani scientists in 
nuclear weapons design starting in 1982-83; the transfer of the CHIC-4 implosion type 
enriched uranium warhead; assistance in the design of explosive lenses for an implosion 
device; the transfer of a neutron initiator for the device; and ultimately the conducting of an 
actual nuclear test (Event 35) for Pakistan at China’s Lop Nur test site on May 26, 1990.296 
Throughout the 1980s, US intelligence sources tracked the presence of Chinese nuclear 
scientists and engineers at the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant as well as the Wah 
Cantonment complex near Islamabad. Similarly, Pakistani nuclear scientists and technicians 
were constant fixtures in sensitive nuclear weapons related facilities in China.297 Thomas 
Reed and Danny Stillman298 believe that Event 35 in 1990 was:  
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“…a fairly crude but reliable enriched uranium design, unboosted but using a Chinese 
neutron initiator scheme, all in a configuration that had been successfully cold tested 
within Pakistan during the 1980s.”299 
 
Historians of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program such as Feroz Khan have downplayed the 
scope of Chinese cooperation.300 However, unlike the US nuclear labs and intelligence 
agencies, Khan has provided no hard evidence to back this claim. However, even Khan 
admits that China transferred enriched uranium sufficient for two nuclear bombs to Pakistan 
in 1981.301  
 
Clearly, Pakistan was much further ahead on the nuclear learning curve than the Indian 
nuclear establishment and PMO knew or had imagined.302  
 
Secrecy, Weak Inter-Agent Competition and Principal-Agent Problems 
Bias in sequestered institutional settings, as the evidence above shows, expands the scope for 
decision-making errors. The other negative consequence of sequestration and low 
information turnover is the very real constraint on political leaders’ ability to police the 
activity of their subordinates (agents) within the state. In proliferating states, external opacity 
is not only useful to protect the state’s autonomy for action from pressure by adversarial 
states. Equally significant, domestic opacity also serves to protect decision-makers’ 
autonomy of action within the state, lest they be pushed to take up agendas advanced by 
their agents, which might not be in their best interests and by extension that of the state’s. 
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Leaders do this by compartmentalizing programs and information concerning them and 
limiting cooperation between agencies and their agents. However, in any organizational 
setting, transparency, high-information exchange and inter-agent competition are the keys to 
leaders’ obtaining credible information about programmatic choices. The downside of a 
regime of information scarcity is poor agent management and leaders commitment to public 
policy choices without fully understanding the risks involved in making them.  
 
In the rest of this chapter, I demonstrate the logic of this argument by comparing principal-
agent problems in India’s nuclear power sector in the late 1960s under conditions of 
information monopoly and their subsequent mitigation through inter-agent competition. I 
compare the course correction in India’s nuclear power program with the 1974 nuclear test. I 
present evidence to show that there was a serious dispute about the yield of the 1974 fission 
device within BARC. However, that information never percolated up to the PMO due to the 
lack of inter-agent /agency competition. Next, I show that during the 1980s internal opacity 
and lack of alternative sources of information led prime ministers to harbor an unduly 
optimistic assessment of India’s capacity for nuclear breakout, both in the context of the 
steady supply of fissile material as well as the potential of transforming lab-stage nuclear 
devices into deliverable weapon. Equally significant, information asymmetries between 
political leaders and their technical advisors produced less than optimal choices in India’s 
ballistic missile program in this period. The net consequence was that the missiles developed 
represented the  missile development agency’s organizational interests and not those of 
users’ potential for deployment and use. Finally, the absence of agent monitoring between 
the nuclear and air force teams had highly negative consequences for resolving the 
challenges of air delivery. 
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The history of India’s civilian nuclear power sector provides a clear example of how low 
information turnover and the lack of inter-agent competition produces adverse selection. It 
also serves as an example of how the introduction of internal policing through agent 
competition produces palliative effects. The institutional legacy of India’s nuclear estate is 
one of secrecy for reasons that have a lot to do with its defense implications, the desire to 
place atomic energy outside the calcified purview of India’s bureaucracy, and the close 
personal friendship between Prime Minister Nehru and the founding chairman of the DAE, 
Dr. Homi Bhabha.303 The AEC board exercised oversight over the entire atomic energy 
sector and made all the critical programmatic choices. On the board sat two “technical” 
members, both representatives of the DAE. They alone had the competence to appraise the 
technical quality of programmatic choices. Other members on the board included the prime 
minister’s principal secretary, the cabinet secretary and the finance member. These non-
DAE members had no technical competence and they concerned themselves with 
procedural, financial and organizational matters and generally approved decisions that were 
subsequently rubber stamped by the PMO and approved by the cabinet.304  
 
Critical examples of programmatic choices included the decision to purchase different 
reactor types from the United States and Canada when commercial reactor operations were 
largely unproven. Other prominent and controversial examples include the famous Sarabhai 
Profile (1970), which planned on quintupling India’s nuclear power-generation capacity from 
600MW in the early 1970s to 2800MW by 1980. The Sarabhai Profile also outlined ambitious 
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plans to double the capacity of power reactors from 200-230MW to 500MW without 
accounting for India’s industrial capacity for reactor construction, natural uranium mining 
and fuel fabrication, heavy water production, or the ability of the electrical grid to uptake the 
power generated.305 The DAE also artificially lowered the cost of nuclear generation to make 
it competitive with alternative sources of energy. It achieved this by accounting sleights of 
hand: by deliberately not factoring for the cost of heavy water , waste disposal, or the price 
of dismantling the reactors at the end of their life cycle. More alarmingly, the DAE hid the 
problems of reactor operations such as heavy water leaks, radioactive contamination, reactor 
damage, and fuel-rod damage. The DAE also did not appraise the PMO about other 
problems afflicting the nuclear estate including the poor performance of the sensitive 
plutonium reprocessing plant.306  
 
By the early 1970s, as Indira Gandhi consolidated power, the PMO expanded its institutional 
reach and acquired personnel to monitor the DAE. Ashok Parathasarathi who served as 
scientific advisor to prime minister narrates the saga of agent competition between him and 
the AEC chairman Vikram Sarabhai.  As a consequence of the independent inputs from 
Parthasarathi, the PMO rejected the Sarabhai Profile after first having approved it, split the 
DAE and space department into two separate agencies, gave Sarabhai charge of the latter 
and removed him as head of the atomic energy department. Plans for generating nuclear 
power were subsequently revised downward. The plan for building 500MW reactors was also 
dropped. Due to Parthasarathi’s independent monitoring, the PMO was also made cognizant 
that the costing estimates for nuclear power were rigged.307 However, the prime minister’s 
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principal secretary at the time, P.N. Haksar, decided to ignore these rigged estimates, because  
he felt “…there were larger objectives to our [India’s] nuclear program than nuclear power 
and those objectives cannot be compromised at any cost.”308  
 
In the case of case of the 1974 nuclear test, however, there was no inter-agent competition. 
There were only three points of contact between the PMO and the nuclear team at BARC: 
Homi Sethna,  Raja Ramanna and P.K. Iyengar. During Mrs. Gandhi’s visit to Trombay in 
1972 when the decision to build the device was approved, the four agreed not to commit 
anything to paper, especially from the PMO. 309 After the test, AEC Chairman Homi Sethna 
publicly announced the yield of the device between 10-15kt. Initial analyses of the device’s 
yield were based on seismic measurements and not on post-shot analysis of the yield debris 
from the explosion crater. Indian scientists Raja Ramanna and P. Chidambaram 
subsequently presented a scientific paper at the IAEA in Vienna, in which they claimed the 
implosion device had a yield at 12kt. However, their estimate too was calculated on the basis 
of seismic verification, not on post-shot analysis of the crater’s debris. BARC subsequently 
did undertake a post-shot analysis.310 And the internal findings of its radiochemistry division 
placed the yield far lower at 5kt.311 
 
A senior official who served in BARC’s radiochemistry division at the time and participated 
in that analysis revealed to the author in 2010:   
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“Now R. Chidambaram was there at Pokhran I…I established mass spectrometry as a 
method of measurement and analysis. And I did all the isotopic measurements. And I 
did isotopic measurements on the Pokhran debris. And my yield was… much 
lower…and they threw the book at me…and classified my report… so I questioned 
that. I became unacceptable after that. They started looking at me with suspicion. I 
didn’t say anything. I didn’t tell anybody. I didn’t go to the newspaper. I gave an 
internal report saying that your calculated values are not correct; it is higher than what I 
am getting.”312  
 
However, former AEC Chairman P. K. Iyengar discounted the radiochemistry division’s 
report on grounds that the method of sampling the debris had a 40-50 percent chance of 
error. Iyengar reported to Ramanna that the yield was in the ballpark of 10-12kt.313 
Subsequently, Iyengar lowered his estimate of the yield to 8-10kt.314 However, Ramanna, 
who served as Chairman of the AEC during 1983-1986 continued to insist even as late as 
1991, when he published his autobiography, that the yield of the Pokhran I device was 
between 12-15kt.315 The scientific controversy on the Pokhran I yield remained buried inside 
BARC. It resurfaced after 1998 when rumors arose that the thermonuclear device and its 
boosted fission primary, which the DAE claimed were the highlight of the second round of 
tests,  had underperformed. Indirect evidence of the Pokhran I device’s failure is available in 
a recently declassified State Department cable drafted by Steve Ghitelman in January 1996. 
Written in the context of impending Indian nuclear tests, the cable states:  
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“Technicians want to test…the activity brings the site [Pokhran test site] to a 
heightened state of readiness in the event Rao [Prime Minister Narasimha Rao] makes a 
decision to test, but it says nothing about his decision to do so. Rao’s scientists may be 
pushing for one or more tests of India’s unproven nuclear designs, which need 
significant reworking after the near-failure of the 1974 test.”316 
 
In 1996, former AEC Chairman Sethna admitted to George Perkovich that the 
radiochemical analysis, the gold standard for assessing yield in the nuclear test business, had 
shown a yield lower than the one publicly announced. When Perkovich questioned Iyengar 
why the results of the radiochemical analysis had never been published, the latter responded: 
“what does it matter if it was 8 or 12kt?”317  
 
The significance of this controversy is not about the sociology of settling scientific 
controversies and method. It has real-world implications for the political and military 
leadership. In the absence of any oversight authority and inter-agent/agency competition 
and only one-way channels of information on sensitive nuclear weapon related secrets, the 
prime ministers and the Indian government were in the dark that the Pokhran I device, the 
basis of subsequent assumptions for India’s nuclear breakout capability, had underperformed 
and was technically unreliable.  
 
Through the 1980s and 1990s, succeeding AEC chairmen and BARC had a monopoly on 
nuclear weapons-related inputs to the PMO, with literally no outside scrutiny. Former AEC 
Chairman M.R. Srinivasan admitted as much to the author in an interview with the caveat 
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that prime ministers on occasion also consulted some of their close bureaucratic advisors 
and senior cabinet colleagues on political decisions surrounding nuclearization.318 Another 
AEC Chairman, P.K. Iyengar downplayed concerns about the lack of agent competition in 
questions of science and technical expertise and argued that:  
 
“…we should stop looking at the issue from an American point of view. During the 
Manhattan project, the government [US] trusted the scientists.  In one instance, 
General Groves attempting oversight by pointing out a mathematical error during a 
meeting with scientists. However, the scientists told Groves that they were concerned 
with the physics of the issue and not necessarily strict mathematical accuracy. In the 
case of Manhattan project, the US governments had no proof that the Hiroshima 
device would work…but the president trusted the scientists.  
 
Most political systems at inception of great scientific and technical projects rely on 
trust. Institutions follow at later stages when projects mature. In the Apollo 
program…Kennedy had no credible means for assessing if the mission to place man on 
the moon was indeed possible. However, he and his aides proceeded on the basis of 
trust.  
 
In India’s case as well…there is a great tradition of trust between prime ministers and 
senior scientists….embodied in the rapport shared by Nehru and Bhabha…and 
thereafter by leaders of the DAE…American notions of institutions, laws, and 
regulations are misplaced…largely because such mechanisms are a weak substitute for 
trust…and actually indicate the absence of trust in society. 
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It was…trust which operated between Indira Gandhi and the top BARC hierarchy 
during the 1974 test…and also throughout the decades of the 1980s and 1990s when 
nuclear weapons development at BARC was kept secret from the prying eyes of foreign 
powers.” 
 
Indeed, based on private assurances from the scientists, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
claimed publicly in 1985 that if India were to decide on becoming a nuclear weapons power 
it would only take a few weeks or a few months to do so. Or as the scientists put it to the 
prime minister, “…if the government should ever want this capability you shall have it.”319 
These assurances were based on the work on the weapon program in the lab and not the real 
world of production, deployment and use. For example, until 1985 India had no consistent 
source of weapons-grade plutonium. In the past, India had used the Canadian supplied 
CIRUS reactor for generating spent fuel, which was then reprocessed to extract weapons-
grade plutonium. Prior to the 1974 test, the reactor used US-supplied heavy water, which is 
one reason why India dubbed the 1974 test a PNE. India could not have legally conducted 
nuclear weapon explosions using plutonium fuel from CIRUS because of the peaceful 
assurances it had made to the US and Canada.320 What India needed was an indigenous 
research reactor dedicated to the production of weapons-grade plutonium. The construction 
of a scaled-up indigenous version of the CIRUS reactor was made a top priority starting 
1981. This reactor, the 100MW R-5 or Dhruva, went critical in 1985.321 However, the reactor 
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shut down as soon as it started. A fuel leak caused radioactive contamination in the coolant 
system. The problem was ultimately traced to vibrations generated from the coolant system, 
which resonated with the frequency of the core, causing the fuel rod damage and leaks. The 
reactor was restarted in December 1986 and operated at one fourth of its rated capacity until 
1988 when it achieved full power.322 What this means is that compared to Pakistan, which 
achieved the capacity to enrich uranium to weapons grade in 1985,323 India’s capacity for a 
sustained weaponization program was severely constrained until 1988. 
 
Further, in the absence of multiple agent inputs, particularly from the military, Gandhi was 
unaware of the challenges of fitting the lab weapon into a pod for air delivery. Attempts to 
sling the first generation weapon under the air force’s Jaguar had already failed because of 
problems emanating from the weapon’s large diameter and low ground clearance of the 
aircraft.324 The Jaguar, according to senior air force officers involved with the aircraft, could 
in theory have served as an ideal delivery platform. In the case of the Jaguar, the air force 
had succeeded in rewriting the software code for the aircraft’s electronic warfare and 
navigational attack systems. That process took about “500 flights to clear…and five to six 
years,” according to a senior air force officer involved in the program.325 This was not the 
case with Dassault’s Mirage 2000, which the Indian Air Force acquired from France in the 
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mid-1980s. However, due to the lack of inter-agency sharing, the weapon that came out of 
the lab was unfit for delivery by the Jaguar.  
 
The design of a subsequent delivery casing for the Mirage proceeded in secrecy at the 
Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory and Armament Research & Development 
Establishment without any timelines. As one of the members in the design team put it: 
“…our bosses seemed satisfied with whatever pace we set,” until the weaponization decision 
in 1989 when the tenor changed to: “…the house is on fire. All this should have been ready 
yesterday. Now rush, rush!”326 Another senior air fore officer complained about the 
DRDO’s “amateurish” way of designing the weapon without interaction with the user 
service. As he put it, “…DRDO underestimates the intellectual, technological, and 
managerial challenge of building complex systems, or deliberately underplays the challenge 
of the tasks to game the system…knowing full well that the weapon system would never be 
delivered on time…but that the system could be gamed indefinitely.”327  Recalling his 
interaction with Arunachalam, he went on: “…Arunachalam had the habit of proposing 
accelerated time lines for weapon development that were divorced from reality.” In the case 
of air delivered nuclear bombs, “the design of reliable height burst fuses is extraordinarily 
difficult…and such fuses are critical for accurate airburst.” Recalling the DRDO’s failures in 
the design of conventional runway denial and cluster bombs, the air force officer disclosed 
that he ordered DRDO to “halt tests and stop wasting the air force’s money.”328 In the 
absence of institutional representation from the air force, decision-makers in the PMO were 
unaware of the potential of such technical and organizational minutiae to delay the program.  
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The final exhibit of the consequences of weak inter-agent/agency competition comes from 
the case of India’s ballistic missile program in the 1980s. The short-range Prithvi missile that 
emerged out of it, and which alone could conceivably have served as a nuclear delivery 
vehicle, was explicitly designed around the DRDO’s organizational legacy, which was an 
attempt to reverse engineer the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile’s liquid fuel engine.329 
Classified as the ‘Devil’ program in the 1970s, no operational weapon system had emerged 
out of it, leaving the agency demoralized. The DRDO therefore tried to rebuild its missile 
lab’s morale by resuscitating the Devil program in the form of the short-range Prithvi. The 
political leadership signed off on the program without understanding its operational 
viability.330 The missile that emerged out of the program flew successfully. However, its toxic 
fuel, corrosion problems associated with fuel-storage, long fueling routine before launch, 
short-range and large logistics train made it unsuitable as a nuclear weapon carrier of 
choice.331  
 
 
Conclusion 
The central focus of this chapter is the political management of national security risk. Its key 
arguments are that leaders require epistemic actors and well-developed knowledge markets 
to arrive at sophisticated understandings of the state’s internal and external realities. 
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Likewise, processes are important because they serve as “time lengthening” mechanisms. 
The latter are necessary to subject raw information to the scrutiny of multiple eyes; to cancel 
out biases and errors and produce more accurate forecasts in environments characterized by 
imperfect information. Secrecy and stove-piping information through one-way channels are 
poor means for political principals to manage their bureaucratic agents. Evidence presented 
in this chapter supports the claim that India’s nuclear restraint during the 1980s in the face 
of a looming Pakistani threat was not the consequence of the normative beliefs of decision-
makers in Gandhian-Nehruvian moralism. Nor was it a cultural bias stemming from beliefs 
in the symbolic aspects of nuclear weaponry. The restraint was a subjective decision rooted 
in the decision-makers’ understanding of risk, exaggerated at one end and underestimated at 
the other. Weak institutional processes and secrecy also attenuated Indian leaders’ capacity to 
actualize instituted options into a viable strategy. The end result was a strategy of muddling 
through, one that became perceived on the outside as a deliberate and rational strategy of 
normative restraint.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 131 
CHAPTER FOUR 
OF NUCLEAR POSSESSOR STATES & NUCLEAR WEAPON 
POWERS: LIFTING INDIA’S VEIL OF NUCLEAR AMBIGUITY (1989-
1998) 
 
In the spring of 1989, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi finally decided to follow 
Pakistan’s lead and authorized the building of air deliverable nuclear weapons. Although this 
decision was a highly classified secret, by the early 1990s it was generally assumed that India 
and Pakistan were de facto nuclear weapon powers, by which is meant the technical capability 
to assemble and deploy nuclear weapons and the organizational capacity to use them 
instrumentally.  
 
In his history of the Indian nuclear weapons program, George Perkovich cited evidence that 
during 1988-1990, India readied at least “at least two dozen nuclear weapons for quick 
assembly and dispersal to airbases for delivery by aircraft for retaliatory attacks against 
Pakistan.”332 Writing in 1992, George Quester downplayed the challenges of 
“weaponization” and declared the issue of nuclear delivery a minor one.333 Both Perkovich 
and Quester claimed that whatever nuclear weapons India possessed at the time were readily 
deliverable via its fleet of Mirage, Jaguar and MiG combat aircraft.334 Carnegie Endowment’s 
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Leonard Spector similarly echoed these claims independently.335 Summing up the prevailing 
view of the state of Indian nuclear capabilities at the time, Steve Coll of the Washington Post 
reported in 1991 that, “while the exact status of the military nuclear programs in India and 
Pakistan is being kept secret, US officials believe both countries have acquired the ability to 
produce and deploy quickly a small number of nuclear weapons…both countries possess 
sophisticated fighter aircraft that could conceivably penetrate air defenses while carrying one 
or more nuclear bombs.”336 
 
These prevailing views were reinforced by US government officials who never tired in public 
of pointing to the immediacy and severity of the proliferation threat in South Asia. For 
example, during the 1989-90 Indo-Pakistani crisis over Kashmir,337 a senior US defense 
official suggested that “If readiness is measured on a scale of one to 10 and the Indians are 
normally at six, they have now moved to nine.''338 US intelligence sources estimated that 
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India was capable of building nuclear weapons within a matter of days and that weapons 
could be delivered by combat aircraft, a point reinforced by Lynn Davis, the US 
Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs.339 In a February 1993 hearing on 
proliferation threats before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, then CIA 
Director R. James Woolsey stated: “The arms race between India and Pakistan poses 
perhaps the most probable prospect for the future use of weapons mass destruction, 
including nuclear weapons. Both nations have nuclear weapons development programs and 
could, on short notice, assemble nuclear weapons…advanced aircraft are often the delivery 
system of choice for weapons of mass destruction, and they are now commonplace among 
proliferating countries…the aircraft available to these countries are fully capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons…”340  
 
However, there was a broad consensus among both US officials and non-governmental 
experts that neither India nor Pakistan maintained assembled weapons that were immediately 
employable. Between 1988-1998, the two common conceptual frames used to describe 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear postures were “non-weaponized” and “recessed” deterrence.  
Although these frames of reference were  often used interchangeably, they pack different 
meanings. This is why it is important to distinguish between them. George Perkovich 
popularized the term “non-weaponized deterrence” in 1993 and advanced it as a policy 
alternative that India and Pakistan could conceivably use as a bridge between the two 
extremes of fully deployed nuclear arsenals and nuclear rollback. Perkovich’s “third” way 
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drew the line at building nuclear weapons and deploying ballistic missiles.341 Under it, 
deterrence would stem from the mere existence of nuclear capability and the ability of either 
country to build nuclear weapons quickly. It would allow both countries to reap the security 
benefits of nuclear weapons without running afoul of the US-led international 
nonproliferation community.342  
 
However, Perkovich conceded that “only a small minority of tight knit elites” in both 
countries had knowledge of the actual nuclear state of affairs and their views on “non-
weaponized deterrence” were “difficult to ascertain.”343 Furthermore, Perkovich’s non-
weaponized deterrence proposal was exploratory and largely aspirational. However, by 1996-
1997, scholars such as Rosalind Reynolds baldly asserted, with little evidence, that emerging 
nuclear weapon powers were tacit adherents to the regime of non-weaponized deterrence.344 
India, Reynolds claimed, abided by the regime out of normative concerns in order to 
safeguard its reputation as a disarmament advocate and remain a good international citizen. 
Reynolds also expanded Perkovich’s non-weaponized schema to include the absence of 
strategic planning involving nuclear weapons and their integration into the military. She 
viewed the lack of operational planning as evidence that emerging nuclear powers such as 
India and Pakistan regarded nuclear weapons as diplomatic and not military assets.  
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In contrast, Singh’s notion of “recessed deterrence” assumed that India possessed all the 
elements of a working nuclear arsenal: warheads, delivery systems and operational routines. 
However, all the working elements of the arsenal were withheld from operational readiness. 
Hence, the characterization “recessed.” More important, in his conceptual frame, this lack of 
operational readiness was not the consequence of India’s normative commitment to 
nonproliferation. Rather, it stemmed from Indian decision-makers’ concerns for strategic 
stability. That said, the condition of the arsenal, from its normally unconstituted state to an 
operationally deployed form, was contingent on threat assessments.  In other words, the 
arsenal’s operational readiness would parallel the rise in threat levels.345 However, the crucial 
difference between “recessed” and “non-weaponized” deterrence frameworks was their 
presumed causal driver. In non-weaponized deterrence, the driver was deference to 
nonproliferation norms. In recessed deterrence, the driver was strategic stability.346  
 
In this chapter, I present evidence to show that most assumptions about the state of India’s 
nuclear capabilities in the decade prior to the 1998 nuclear tests were wrong. India did not 
possess deliverable nuclear weapons until at least 1994-1995. 347 Although India elected to 
build weaponized nuclear devices in 1989, the process of integrating them with aircraft-
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based delivery systems stretched out for nearly seven years, until 1994-1995.348 Similarly, 
warhead integration on the short-range Prithvi ballistic missiles did not reach fruition until 
1996-1997.349 In other words, for the greater part of the decade, the default non-weaponized 
state of the Indian arsenal stemmed from technical and managerial bottlenecks and not from 
any conscious or rational choice to abide by nonproliferation principles.  
 
After weapons became available in the mid-1990s, Indian leaders consciously decided to 
maintain them in a disassembled form out of concerns for safety and strategic stability. 
However, they elected against developing the soft institutional and organizational routines to 
manage those weapons operationally. Once again, the evidence shows that cognitive biases 
stemming from secrecy and heuristic decision-making, not arms control norms or cultural 
understandings of nuclear weapons as political weapons shaped this choice. Likewise, 
assumptions of an extant recessed operational capability turned out to be a vast over-
estimation. The earliest Indian operational routines, by which is meant the civil-military 
chain of command, standard operating procedures, practice drills and ground rehearsals to 
coordinate action within and across various agencies tasked with responding to a nuclear 
emergency, were devised during the Kargil War350 in the summer of 1999,351 a year after 
India conducted nuclear tests and formally claimed nuclear power status.  
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With the help of new evidence based on interviews with senior Indian civilian and military 
officials involved in the weaponization program during 1988-1999, I highlight some of the 
challenges India faced in developing operational nuclear forces under the gaze of a hostile 
nonproliferation regime. I show that in covertly proliferating states, political leaders fear 
pressures for nuclear rollback from nonproliferation watchdogs in the international system. 
These pressures force the proliferation process underground, deep into the bowels of the 
state. To ensure secrecy, sensitive nuclear weapons-related information is usually tightly 
compartmentalized and hived off within small and informal social networks. Decision-
makers only partially mobilize epistemic actors and approach programmatic decisions 
sequentially. Secrecy concerns also create disincentives against decomposing problems and 
parceling them out for resolution to multiple bureaucratic actors.  
 
Institutional secrecy thus creates management roadblocks in the path of hardware 
development and operational planning. Secrecy also generates demands for highly 
centralized and monopolist decision-making, a condition that accentuates cognitive biases 
among policy planners and prevents operational optimization. Finally, secrecy short-circuits 
the state’s normal institutional oversight and control mechanisms. This last condition creates 
huge information asymmetries between decision-makers and their agents and compounds 
the challenges of management. The low information turnover and absence of the ‘wisdom of 
the crowds’ scrutiny by multiple individuals and agencies leaves many problems unidentified 
and unaddressed. Under these circumstances, most learning that occurs in the political 
system follows external shocks and crises. However, the severe regime of internal opacity 
and the unstructured nature of decision-making militate against policy optimization.  
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Secrecy Induced ‘Seat-Of-The-Pants’ Nuclear Learning 
By 1987-1988 there were multiple signs that Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons or was 
on the verge of acquiring the capability to build them. There was some uncertainty within 
India’s nuclear establishment and its external intelligence agency, the Research & Analysis 
Wing, about the precise state of Pakistani nuclear advances.352 However, Indian leaders had 
few doubts about Pakistan’s direction. Triangulating through Indian intelligence sources, US 
government leaks and open source publications, they concluded that Pakistan was rapidly 
proceeding down the nuclear weaponization road.353 By late 1988 it also became evident that 
there were no takers for Prime Minister’s Rajiv Gandhi’s global nuclear disarmament plan. 
Internally, pressure mounted on the prime minister from the defense and nuclear scientific 
agency heads (DRDO and BARC) as well as his principal secretary to act and ultimately in 
March 1989 Rajiv Gandhi authorized a program to commence weaponization.354  
 
However, the weaponization program had a narrow technical focus. Between 1989-1994, it 
exclusively concerned the production of a small number of miniaturized and ruggedized 
fission weapons capable of safe and reliable delivery by means of combat aircraft. The 
weaponization process involved taking the weapon beyond its basic “physics package.” This 
involved a reduction in the size and weight of the weapon, the use of metallurgically 
stabilized nuclear material, non-degradable high-explosive lenses and anti-corrosive materials 
within the weapon to ensure easier storage, maintenance and longer shelf life. It also 
involved the development of reliable electronic sub-systems such as high-voltage capacitors, 
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354 B.G. Deshmukh, “Economic and Defense Matters,” From Poona To The Prime Minister’s 
Office, pp. 170-171. 
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electronic safety and arming systems and barometric fuses to ensure accurate height burst 
for the weapon.355  
 
For successful air carriage, in this case the Mirage 2000, weaponization involved a reduction 
in the size, weight and casing of the weapon to avoid upsetting the aerodynamics and center 
of gravity of the aircraft.356 It entailed redesign of the Mirage’s wiring system to enable the 
bomb’s electrical connectivity. Other tasks concerned the reconfiguring of the aircraft’s 
electronic interface to enable the sighting, arming and safe release of the weapon; the 
rewriting of the aircraft’s electronic interface to feed the bomb’s ballistics into computers; 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) protection and the strengthening of the suspension points for 
the weapon on the aircraft along with the “airframe along certain high stress zones and 
joints.”357 The third component of the weaponization program was the training of pilots in 
the arming, fusing and delivery of nuclear munitions.  
 
The focus on the technical aspects of weaponization did not mean that India’s national 
security managers had no appreciation for the accompanying institutional and organizational 
routines to embed those weapons. In the late-1980s for example, Prime Minister Gandhi 
directed DRDO chief Arunachalam to undertake precautionary routines to reduce some of 
the worst vulnerabilities of the fledgling Indian nuclear weapon program to a surprise 
attack.358 Subsequently, with the weaponization decision behind him, Gandhi also felt an 
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imperative need to expand the circle of officials with knowledge of the program.359 V.P. 
Singh, who succeeded Gandhi, shared this concern and complained to his principal secretary 
about the lack of shared institutional knowledge and planning.360 Nonetheless, neither prime 
minister undertook serious institutional measures to resolve their concerns.  
 
Hence the weaponizaton program remained isolated from the institutional and 
organizational demands of operational use. Even as knowledge of the weaponization 
program expanded vertically within the scientific and engineering enclave tasked with its 
various sub-projects, horizontal networks within the state privy to knowledge of the 
program shrank. To oversee the effort, Gandhi appointed defense secretary Naresh Chandra 
as coordinator.361 However, because the program was treated as technical, relatively static 
and sequential, there was no corresponding attempt to expand the planning and decision-
making circle to include cabinet members, a larger group of civil servants in the foreign 
ministry or the military. B.G. Deshmukh, who served as both cabinet and principal secretary 
to prime ministers Gandhi and Singh subsequently disclosed that although he closely 
participated in the weaponization decision in 1988-89, his involvement in monitoring the 
program’s progress thereafter declined.362 The prime ministers henceforth dealt directly with 
Chandra and the heads of DRDO and BARC. Arunachalam himself complained in an 
interview with the author about the “loneliness” and the “burden” of being  one of the sole 
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institutional repositories of India’s nuclear secrets in this period; without the luxury of being 
able to share them with anyone.363  
 
Central to this lack of institutionalization and the horizontal expansion in the decision-
making circle were concerns about potential breaches in secrecy. As Naresh Chandra, put it 
to the author, “…because of the fundamental inefficiency and sloppy approach of the 
bureaucracy…the latter could not be relied upon to keep matters secret. Hence the smaller 
the numbers [in the know] the better.”364 Chandra recalled an episode in the mid-1980s when 
foreign spies penetrated the office of P.C. Alexander, who served as principal secretary to 
prime ministers Indira and Rajiv Gandhi.365 Secrecy, Chandra insisted, also enabled 
deniability to domestic constitutional authorities such as parliament and the office of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General.366 However, the cause of Indian decision-makers acute 
desire for secrecy did not lie in domestic factors. It stemmed from their perceptions of 
India’s economic vulnerability to US nonproliferation pressures. Three contingent factors in 
the early 1990s compounded their sense of vulnerability: the collapse of the Soviet Union 
which had been India’s long-standing superpower ally, an acute balance of payments crisis 
and the resort to an IMF bailout package.367 As a result, decision-makers shielded the 
weaponization program behind ever-higher walls of secrecy.  
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Ironically, in 1985-86, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made a feeble attempt at 
institutionalizing national security planning and nuclear decision-making through a national 
security council. That attempt ended dismally within six months.368 Next, he invited the 
service chiefs and the heads of the nuclear and defense research agencies to provide the 
government with preliminary numbers and cost estimates for a small nuclear force.369 
However, he allegedly “pigeonholed” that report.370 During these years, service chiefs such 
as Generals Rao and Sundarji also took advantage of their excellent social ties with Prime 
Ministers Indira and Rajiv Gandhi to lobby them personally in favor of nuclear weapons.371 
For a short while, Rajiv Gandhi also was in charge of the defense portfolio in the cabinet. 
This gave then army chief General Sundarji, who was also by then the military’s foremost 
expert on nuclear matters, unprecedented direct access to the prime minister.372 Sundarji 
lobbied the prime minister in favor of the bomb with such alacrity that it aroused the ire of 
then Cabinet Secretary B.G. Deshmukh.373  
 
However, once weaponization got underway, the program was cordoned off almost entirely. 
All information sharing was restricted to the heads of the AEC and DRDO, the incumbent 
prime minister and the president. Cabinet ministers, the group of department secretaries and 
the military chiefs were kept in the dark. According to Arunachalam, it was easy to exclude 
the army and navy chiefs because their services were not involved in the delivery program.374 
The “air force chiefs,” special coordinator Chandra maintained, “only found out about it 
                                                
368 Chengappa, “The Reluctant Believer,” Weapons of Peace, pp. 294-295. 
369 Ibid., 299-302; Perkovich, “Nuclear Capabilities Grow,” India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 273-276. 
370 Ibid., p. 275. 
371 Chengappa, “Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked?” Weapons of Peace, pp. 253-255. 
372 Deshmukh, “Economic And Defense Matters, From Poona to the Prime Minister’s Office, pp. 
164-167. 
373 Ibid. 
374 Arunachalam, interview with author.  
 143 
[the weaponization program] because the air force was tasked with nuclear delivery.”375 To 
avoid unnecessary attention from foreign intelligence agencies, government officials and 
offices, which were normally the sites for specific programmatic decisions were also 
excluded. In contrast, the small group of officials with critical knowledge of the program 
remained involved in it regardless of career moves within government. Furthermore, these 
officials retained their involvement without the knowledge of their political or bureaucratic 
overlords.376 This small and informal network of individuals did not emerge by design. As 
Chandra put it, “it emerged from necessity...almost to the extent that it became self-
constituted…a minimal response by relevant individuals within the state who responded to a 
critical national security challenge.”377 
 
This fractional mobilization of India’s nuclear epistemic communities effectively decoupled 
scientific-technical developments from the military’s operational planning. The net effect of 
such excessive compartmentalization was that when the Kashmir Crisis suddenly erupted in 
1990 with the very real possibility of nuclear use, the air force was in the dark about the 
parameters of the weapon then under development.378 Because India had no suitable nuclear 
delivery system at the time there is some evidence to suggest that the air force autonomously 
and internally debated kamikaze missions as a possible nuclear delivery method in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.379 During the decade of the 1990s, its interaction with DRDO was 
primarily technical - restricted to modification of the Mirage 2000 for nuclear missions and 
the training of a handful of pilots to deliver nuclear weapons using dummy bombs. Until 
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1996 when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao privately confided to Air Chief Marshal Sareen 
that India possessed nuclear weapons, no air chief had official knowledge of the program.380 
The air force’s role, in the memorable words of another air chief who served in the 1990s, 
was simply that of a “delivery boy.”381  
 
Thus in the pre-1998 era, the institutional link between the scientific agencies that designed 
and built nuclear weapons and the services was severely restricted.382 The data on nuclear 
weapons effects, meteorology and demographics, the army used for preliminary estimates 
example, were derived from open-source literature such as foreign military training manuals 
or from military training courses that individual service members attended abroad.383 A select 
few air force test pilots were trained in the mechanics of air delivery.384 However, procedural 
plans for operational deployment and use were not developed with the user service. Nor did 
the government task the services with developing an epistemic community in the realm of 
nuclear strategic thought and warfare. To the contrary, senior cabinet ministers such as 
Narasimha Rao rejected suggestions from the defense ministry’s Institute of Defense Studies 
and Analysis to educate the military on nuclear issues due to concerns that it would suggest 
to the outside world that “we are developing nuclear weapons.”385 India’s schools where staff 
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officers trained for higher command duties therefore offered no training or courses on 
nuclear subjects.386  
 
Beginning in the early 1990s, a small number of civilian officials working with the scientific 
agencies drew up “paper plans” for an assured retaliation posture. But they did not give teeth 
to this posture by developing operational plans with Air Headquarters to move those 
weapons from the ‘stockpile-to-target’.387 A secret committee, the Arun Singh Committee, 
sat in the summer of 1990, in the aftermath of the Kashmir crisis with Pakistan, the subcontinent’s 
first serious nuclear crisis, to plan India’s nuclear emergency response measures.388 The 
committee’s “only specific recommendation,” recalled the late K. Subrahmanyam who 
participated in its deliberations, was to “… to create separate storage for missiles and 
warheads…what should be the drill for them being brought together…and then…the 
communications from command and control.”389  
 
As George Perkovich reports in his history of the Indian nuclear weapons program, “…the 
group called for designating air force units to receive nuclear devices and deliver them 
according to previously prepared orders that base commanders would possess under seal.”390 
The piecemeal nature of decision-making can be inferred from the fact that the committee’s 
key recommendation was not implemented until certification of the air delivery platform in 
1994-95. Only subsequently in 1995 did Prime Minister Rao approve the enactment of 
dispersal and concealment routines planned for safeguarding fissile cores and non-fissile 
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trigger assemblies from a pre-emptive attack.391 Meanwhile, wartime operations planning to 
coordinate action between the air force and scientific agencies and to enable the air force 
plan nuclear missions was delayed still further.392 
 
Partial mobilization apart, the epistemic community’s weak state of institutionalization 
further minimized its capacity for policy learning, especially in so far it concerned integration 
and coordination issues. Without doubt, many of the scientists and technologists in the 
DAE and DRDO had long careers that spanned successive governments; sometimes as long 
as three decades. Nuclear scientists such as Ramanna, Iyengar, Chidambaram, Kakodkar, 
Sikka and their DRDO counterparts such as Nagchaudhuri, Arunachalam, Santhanam and 
Kalam enjoyed long stints in government. Dr. Ramanna, the leader of the 1974 explosion 
team for example, went on to become the chief scientific advisor to the defense minister, the 
head of AEC, member of parliament and minister of state for defense. Arunachalam 
continued for a decade as the scientific advisor to the defense minister and the lead advisor 
on the weaponization program to five prime ministers. K. Santhanam who became involved 
in the weaponization program in the mid-1980s, served as the coordinator between DRDO 
and the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in his position as chief technology advisor 
to the defense minister’s scientific advisor at the time of the 1998 tests.393  
 
Their individually powerful positions notwithstanding, as a group the scientists were not 
institutionalized within any agency such as a national security council or a secretariat that 
could provide them a structured platform to advance their views. As members of an 
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epistemic community, the scientists and technologists existed as an informal social network. 
There were no established legal or even quasi-legal administrative rules of business to guide 
their interaction. Neither did they have independent access to other government agencies 
such as the military or power centers such as the cabinet or parliament. In the absence of 
legal and administrative authority, entrée and continued participation in the network 
depended on either a personal relationship with prime ministerial incumbents or with their 
coordinating agents.  
 
These institutional weaknesses left the scientific-technological epistemic community in a 
weak position to extract “credible commitments” from political principals. From 1974 until 
1998, the nuclear scientists were mostly unable to get successive prime ministers to authorize 
any further testing. Even after Rajiv Gandhi approved weaponization in the spring of 1989, 
the program was reduced to “bar charts” detailing “when the (bomb) trigger would be ready, 
what type of platform would carry the bomb, how the bomb was to be mated to a delivery 
vehicle, the type of electronic checks…” with the prime minister retaining veto over the 
passage of every technical threshold.394 The armed services were never part of the network 
except at its very fringes.  
 
A retired air chief who served in this period brutally summed up the institutional constraints 
of his office when he stated “…no air chief wants to approach the prime minister about 
nuclear issues only to be told to go mind his own business!”395 Indeed as the air force’s 
nuclear air delivery system came online by the end of 1995, some bureaucrats within DRDO 
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such as Santhanam supported operational planning with the air force. However, this was not 
the consensus view among the senior scientists and civilian bureaucrats responsible for 
policy planning. Senior air force officials who interfaced with them concluded that the 
scientists were only cogs in the wheel. They lacked the political clout to force operational 
planning on the political leadership.396As India’s longtime weaponization manager 
Arunachalam put it, “Our task was to see, can we have an efficient and successful system? 
That is what I was involved in…I was not involved in saying…what would be…how many 
squadrons will be involved in this…what will be the pattern of the squadrons…and who 
will…and that particular part of it…we were not involved in those kind of 
discussions…force synthesis…the integration of technical, organizational, and ideational 
elements is a political decision, which must be coordinated from the top. Scientific 
bureaucracies working on the technical parts of a weapon system cannot on their own 
undertake such decisions.” 397 
 
Compartmentalization, Cognitive Biases and Constrained Optimizing 
The organizational dysfunction associated with the regime of internal opacity had the 
cumulative effect of stymieing India’s operational nuclear capabilities during the entire 
decade of the 1990s. The compartmentalization of information meant that policy planners 
and their decision-making counterparts approached problems sequentially. Secrecy concerns 
similarly prevented problem decomposition and parallel planning by multiple agencies within 
government. Many technical bottlenecks therefore remained unidentified by planners until 
pressed by the force of circumstances. Secrecy concerns similarly led to weak intra-and inter-
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agency coordination and planning, especially in so far as command and control and 
operational planning went. Above all, institutional secrecy and the absence of multiple actors 
and agencies review contributed to policy based on false analogies and biases.  
 
When thinking of nuclear operationalization, it is generally useful to draw distinctions 
between a “device” and a “weapon.” A device, as Chuck Hansen defines it, can commonly 
be understood as “…fission and fusion materials, together with their arming, fusing, firing, 
chemical high explosive, and effects-measuring components, that have not yet reached the 
development status of an operational weapon…system designed to produce a nuclear 
explosion for purposes of testing the design, for verifying nuclear theory, or for gathering 
information on system performance.”398 But a weapon system is considerably different. It 
involves “the conversion or modification of a nuclear test device into a combat-ready 
warhead,” which “includes the design and production of a ballistic casing (and any required 
retardation and impact-absorption or shock-mitigation devices) as well as special fuses, 
power sources, and arming and safing systems or equipment.”399   
 
If we use the above definitions as the base for measurement then India did not possess a 
nuclear weapon until at least 1990. To be sure Indian nuclear scientists were working on 
advanced boosted-fission and perhaps even thermonuclear weapon designs by the late 
1980s. As early as 1982-83, they may have planned to test a lighter and more sophisticated 
version of the 1974 device. But the sequential nature of planning ensured that it wasn’t until 
1985-86 that Rajiv Gandhi’s government put in motion a plan to develop a weapon system 
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of reduced weight and size that was safe, reliable and deliverable. India did not possess such 
a weapon system in 1986-87 when the Brasstacks crisis erupted with Pakistan. Nor did it 
possess such a weapon at the time of the Kashmir Crisis in 1989-90.  Indeed, the doyen of 
Indian strategists and nuclear consultant to nearly all prime ministers since the late 1970s, K. 
Subrahmanyam subsequently disclosed that “in the period between 1987-1990 India was 
totally vulnerable to a Pakistani nuclear threat.”400  
 
Further, until the prime minster reached a decision in the late 1980s to commence 
weaponization, the scientific agencies did not seriously engage the air force to resolve the 
technics of nuclear delivery. Many observers in the 1990s assumed that India’s Jaguar and 
Mirage combat aircraft were capable of performing nuclear missions from the late 1980s. 
However, the grounds for such claims are suppositions not facts. In India’s case, Prime 
Minister V.P. Singh recalls DRDO chief Arunachalam briefing him in 1989 that “India could 
then only assemble nuclear weapons but not deliver them.”401 As he put it, “we could 
laboratory test everything…but the bomb delivery was still in progress.”402 More evidence of 
the lack of a delivery capability comes from then Chief of Air Staff S. Mehra who used the 
occasion of the 1989-90 Kashmir Crisis and the prime minister’s concerns about a potential 
Pakistani nuclear strike to lobby for the removal of internal firewalls between the civilian 
development and military user agencies.403 The prototype Indian nuclear device under 
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development had until then not been shown to the air force.404 However, because no 
positive response was forthcoming, he and the two other service chiefs concluded that India 
did not possess a ready arsenal at the time.  
 
The modification of aircraft for nuclear delivery reliably and safely turned out to be a huge 
technical and managerial challenge that consumed the DRDO’s attention for six years and 
perhaps more. It is a telling reminder of the hurdles proliferating countries face when 
transforming crude capabilities into operable systems. But it is an even more pointed 
reminder of the pitfalls of weak inter-agency planning and coordination. There was a major 
problem interfacing the nuclear weapon with the Mirage. Senior Indian air force officials 
recall that DRDO’s original intent may have been to arm ballistic missiles with nuclear 
warheads and circumvent the air force entirely. However, the warhead developed was too 
large and heavy for ballistic missile carriage at the time.405  
 
Resolution of these technical bottlenecks took between 1989-1994 to resolve. However, the 
problem as senior Indian air force officials at the highest levels viewed it was not one of 
technical challenges alone but of the compartmentalized system of information flows, 
planning and management. The government did not issue specific nuclear tasking for the 
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Mirages when they were acquired from France in the mid-1980s. Likewise, the air force was 
neither given nor asked for inputs on the size, weight, and dimensions of the proposed 
nuclear weapon. A senior individual with insider knowledge of the program volunteered to 
the author that one should assume that “India could have acquired an air delivery capability 
by 1996.” Prior to that date the deterrent was a “paper tiger.” To be sure nuclear weapons 
existed. However, he emphasized, “…capability is a function not just of the weapon but 
what you can actually do with that weapon.” If a nuclear emergency had arisen in 1994-1995, 
the air force “may have been forced to do something.” However, “given the large number of 
unresolved issues…the so many imponderables,” it was difficult to estimate the likelihood of 
success.406  
 
Further, optimizing decision-makers, after electing to weaponize India’s nuclear capability in 
the spring of 1989, would have ordered policy planners to simultaneously think through 
command, control procedures and operational planning. However, due to the 
compartmentalized and sequential nature of planning, political leaders did not think it 
necessary to think through these institutions and procedures. During the Kashmir Crisis with 
Pakistan in 1989-90, for example, the Indian government found itself without a nuclear 
command and control system. Worse, it found itself without guidelines and procedures to 
respond to a nuclear emergency.407 At the time, command and control just consisted of the 
prime minister, his principal secretary and the scientific advisor to the defense minister.408 
The ruffled prime minister conveyed his concerns to his principal secretary saying, “…this is 
scary. This matter cannot just be between the prime minister and the scientific advisor. 
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Supposing someone attacks Delhi, there is no formal procedure as to who then decides what 
to do. We have to institutionalize it.”409  
 
Arun Singh the former Minister of State of Defense who the prime minister appointed in the 
wake of the crisis to review India’s nuclear preparedness and make recommendations for a 
command control system found himself aghast at the bureaucratic chaos inside government. 
He thought “it…crazy that BARC410 didn’t know where DRDO stood or vice versa. 
Nothing had been worked out as to who was to control the weapons and under what 
circumstances and time frame we would strike back.”411 The Arun Singh Committee 
subsequently prepared emergency response procedures and command and control 
mechanisms. But it did not delve into operational planning.412 Further, neither the armed 
services in general nor more specifically the air force found representation on the committee. 
Retired army chief General Sundarji served on the committee as a token representative of 
the services.413 However, the sitting service chiefs knew neither of the committee’s existence 
nor the specific nature of the general’s inputs.  
 
Indian decision-makers’ obsessive desire for secrecy therefore resulted in a skeletal and 
tenuously institutionalized command and control system and the near total absence of 
operational planning between the scientific and military agencies. What this meant was that 
although India possessed nuclear weapons, its institutional and organizational capacity to 
press them into military operations was far from assured. A senior official who served at the 
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highest levels of the Indian government at the time claims that it would be reasonable to 
assume that the government had prepared emergency action and coordination protocols by 
the mid-1990s. If a nuclear explosion occurred it would be the Department of Atomic 
Energy’s (DAE) task to make an assessment. The DAE, which held custody of the fissile 
cores would then pass them on to DRDO, which would in turn assemble nuclear weapons 
and turn them over to the air force. The planners believed 72 hours would be a reasonable 
time to constitute a nuclear force and launch retaliation.  
 
In the event of the prime minister’s incapacitation, power would devolve upon the Cabinet 
Committee on Security (CCS).414 But the likelihood of that event happening was thought 
low. A Pakistani nuclear attack, the officials believed, would be limited and symbolic and 
leave the functioning of the federal government relatively undisturbed. However, in the 
worst-case ‘bolt-out-of-the blue’ scenario that Delhi did indeed go up in a mushroom cloud, 
power would devolve upon a hierarchy of state governors and principals in the state civil 
service who would assume responsibilities of the federal government. And the military 
would function under a reconstituted civilian authority. India, the leaders of the nuclear 
network believed, was a “…big country. It would survive!”415 But how, they could not tell.  
 
The trouble with the above protocols was that they remained a secret even within the loose 
network of scientists who constituted India’s principal policy planners during that time.  
Above all, they remained “paper exercises.”416 There were no written documents or standard 
operating procedures, a Red Book, for individuals to follow. Barring one or two officials at 
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the very top who knew of them in their entirety, other members of the nuclear network, 
never more than a dozen senior officials in any case, knew only fragments of them. Because 
little was committed to paper the institutional memory of the state beyond this network of 
officials remained a blank state.417 Furthermore, the DAE and DRDO did not practice any 
emergency drills on the ground to test their coordination and emergency response.418 From 
the mid-1990s onwards, air chiefs inferred that such protocols likely existed.419 But they were 
told nothing of their content.  
 
The president as the constitutional head of state was privy to some of this nuclear 
knowledge.420 Similarly, a spare oral brief was made to new holders of the prime minister’s 
office. However, if they were deemed disinterested, and at least three incumbents in the 
1990s were,421 their principal secretaries were briefed instead.422 Beyond the prime minister 
and his secretary, no information was shared with ministers on the CCS or with federal 
governors and provincial civil service chiefs who might be called to assume responsibilities 
of government. The military leadership was equally clueless about how it was to function 
under a new civilian dispensation. As the senior government official with the God’s eye view 
of the program at the time put it to the author: “command and control essentially meant 
gathering all the members of the group (nuclear network) under one roof as quickly as 
possible.”423 
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The accounts of senior Indian policy planners from this period also reveal how secrecy, 
compartmentalization and monopolist decision-making freight policy with faulty analogies 
and cognitive biases. According to India’s coordinator for nuclear planning, Ambassador 
Naresh Chandra, decision-makers’ fear of compromised secrecy was the greatest factor that 
prevented them from institutionalizing the nuclear program and developing operational 
plans and procedures. They believed the “government was porous” and given the 
“fundamental inefficiency and sloppy approach of the bureaucracy…the latter could not be 
relied upon to keep matters secret.”424  
 
In their minds, the consequence of that discovery would be a US-led sanctions regime, 
analogous to the one Washington imposed on India’s civil nuclear power sector in the wake 
of the 1974 nuclear test. But this second time around the “sanctions regime would be 
harsher” and “India’s relative capacity in the 1990s to withstand sanctions…much lower.”425 
Hence the “emphasis was on developing weapons” As Chandra put it, “…operations would 
follow at some later point.”426 The former Indian Deputy National Security Advisor Satish 
Chandra justified Indian decision-makers’ actions similarly: “Remember, India was already 
under sanctions…technology denial regimes…and threat of further sanctions was always 
there. If the military were involved in a more substantial way, the game would be 
up…external powers would pick up the scent of India’s nuclear weaponization at once…and 
sanctions would have followed.”427 
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The evidence therefore suggests that decision-makers’ fear about the repercussions of their 
actions and not optimization was the key determinant that shaped the scope of India’s 
operational posture in the 1990s. The statements above are also revelatory of the cognitive 
biases that pervaded their operating assumptions. Consider the belief of Indian decision-
makers that weaponization could be held a secret if most information concerning it was left 
disaggregated within the state. This belief belies common sense as the direction in which 
India’s weaponization program was headed, if not its scale and scope, was an open secret. 
From the early 1990s on, India and Pakistan were presumed de facto nuclear weapon powers. 
Scholars428 and US government officials429 believed both countries capable of assembling and 
exploding nuclear weapons. A 1993 US National Security Council report to Congress for 
example clearly states, “we believe India maintains a nuclear weapons development effort 
along with its active program to develop delivery systems for those weapons.”430 A 1996 US 
Department of Defense report was similarly blunt in its assessment: “India is believed to 
have a stockpile of fissile material sufficient for fabricating several nuclear weapons and 
could probably assemble at least some of these weapons within a short time of deciding to 
do so.”431   
 
Following on the heels of such assessments, the idea that a regime of “tacit” nuclear 
deterrence had come into existence in South Asia after the 1990 Kashmir Crisis became the 
                                                
428 Perkovich, “A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia,” pp. 85-104. 
429 For examples see speech by John M. Deutch, Director CIA, “Proliferation is Key Security 
Challenge for US and Allies, December 14, 1995; retrieved from Federation of American 
Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/951027_dci.htm, (May 2012). 
430 National Security Council (1993), Report to Congress on Status of China, India and Pakistan 
Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, (F94-1392), (Washington, DC); retrieved from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/930728-wmd.htm (May 2012). 
431 Office of the Secretary of Defense (April 1996), Proliferation Threat and Response, 
(Washington, DC); retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif96/ (May 2012). 
 158 
received wisdom.432 Many US government entities and private think tanks in the early 1990 
turned their entrepreneurial attention to promoting arms control and nuclear best practices 
drawn from US-Soviet Cold War experiences to prevent a potential nuclear war in South 
Asia, the region described as the “most dangerous place on earth.” In light of all the 
attention Indian and Pakistani proliferation received at the time, the belief among Indian 
decision-makers’ that the phenomenon could still be denied bespeaks of cognitive 
dissonance, the psychological condition in which individuals mitigate the dissonant aspects 
of their belief systems by altering them or adding new elements to make them more 
harmonious.  
 
Their further belief that foreign discovery of the weaponization program would trigger 
consequences far worse than those that emerged in the wake of the 1974 nuclear test is also 
an example of erroneous analogizing. It follows the bias train of the “availability” heuristic, a 
condition in which decision-makers make judgments of the probability of an event occurring 
and imagining its consequences not on the basis of any systematic thought process but on 
the vividness of a prior event or events lodged in their memory.433 In India’s case, that event 
was the 1974 nuclear test. Its consequence was US-orchestrated international sanctions 
against India’s nuclear power sector.434 As a consequence of those sanctions, India’s nuclear 
power sector stalled. Electricity generation from nuclear power never exceeded 3 percent of 
India’s total power generation right until the last decade.435 It was this memory and the 
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presumed viability of the threat of economic and technological sanctions, which deterred 
successive Indian prime ministers from conducting further nuclear tests until 1998. 
However, the analogy they drew between the 1974 test and weaponization and 
weaponization-related operational planning was biased on three counts.  
 
First, the consensus in the US policy community by the early 1990s was that India was 
capable of building and deploying nuclear weapons even if it had not done so already; and 
that a recessed capability probably existed in the bowels of the state. Second, examples of 
triggering events under US sanction laws at the time particularly the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act, were nuclear testing, the violation of IAEA safeguards agreements 
and cooperation agreements with the US.436 Doctrine, procedures and operational plans, all 
intangibles, did not qualify as triggering events.437 No doubt, existing laws could be read 
more expansively to fit the situation. However, compared to stark events such as nuclear 
testing, the development of doctrines, procedures and operational plans are a relatively 
ambiguous phenomenon. These are relatively harder to detect and it is generally more 
difficult to make determinations concerning them. Third and perhaps more significantly, 
since 1974, Indian nuclear, space and missile entities were already the target of US nuclear 
and other high-tech technology denial regimes.438 The further threatened denial of Eximbank 
financing and loans from international financial institutions was indicative of limited and not 
blanket economic sanctions.  
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When questioned by the author, former India’s former Deputy National Security Advisor 
Chandra rationalized the analogizing between the 1974 test and weaponization-related 
operational plans and procedures on grounds that “…there are laws on the books and then 
there are informal sanctions. The US has considerable discretionary power regarding 
sanctions…such as denial of aid, multinational loans, funds and so forth. India had to keep 
that in mind, when deciding how to deal with its covert nuclear status.”439 However, it 
remains doubtful if these rationalizations were ever subject to optimizing “truth tests” within 
India’s secretive and monopolistic decision-making institutions at the time. The Indian 
decision-makers’ belief in the credibility of US sanctions threats is further evidence that their 
judgments were clouded by the “representative” heuristic to the extent those threats were 
deemed representative of Washington’s general population of proliferation-related 
sanctioning acts. The venerable K. Subrahmanyam pointed out the logical fallacy of Indian 
economists and policy planners when he said, “…the perception was mostly based on what 
they heard from their American counterparts, and not comprehensive analysis of US 
behavior pattern when their interests clashed with their declaratory nuclear policies.”440  
 
Indeed, had Indian decision-makers investigated the universe of US proliferation-related 
sanctioning behavior they would have discovered a history of US opposition and then 
grudging acceptance of most proliferating countries. The list of states included Britain, 
France, China and Israel.441 During the 1980s and 1990s Washington turned a blind eye to 
Pakistan’s nuclear program and proved helpless in stanching Chinese-Pakistani nuclear and 
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missile cooperation.442 Indian decision-makers would have also discovered that US decision-
makers used sanctions selectively, applied them narrowly to specific entities, often issued 
waivers and at other times declined to make determinations at all.443 Above all they would 
have found that US policy makers constantly weighted the restraining effects of sanctions 
against the loss of leverage on a targeted state.444 Indeed the limited US sanctioning of 
Pakistan under the Symington Amendment in the 1990s signaled the floor for punishment.  
 
In this regard, one of the most dramatic instances of unstructured decision-making comes 
from India’s former National Security Advisor (NSA) Brajesh Mishra. When asked by the 
author if the threat of sanctions weighed on his mind before the BJP government ordered 
tests in 1998, his response was: “I was never bothered…I didn’t even consult anyone. My 
gut feeling was that once you tested and you were clear about your economic reforms then 
you will begin to have dialogue with all the countries… I was quite clear that India being 
such a big country, if you only had the guts at the decision-making level, had that bent of 
mind…you could do it.”445 Most of the evidence therefore demonstrates that Indian 
decision-makers were not rational optimizers. If anything, they were cognitive misers. 
 
The Impact of Limited Agent Competition and Weak Monitoring on Operations 
Secrecy, compartmentalization and low information turnover also had the combined effect 
of creating a weak nuclear weapons-related knowledge market within the state. The regime 
of opacity not only made the program less transparent within and without, but it also 
reduced the ability of Indian decision-makers to monitor its performance. Leaders in 
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organizations generally use three mechanisms to reduce the transfer cost of information 
pertaining to their subordinates and their performance. The first is visibility, which renders 
actions easily legible. The second is agent competition, a process that allows information to 
percolate up the management chain. And the third is the institution of bodies of epistemic 
actors to vet the quality of programs and their progress. All three conditions were absent 
from the weaponization project with deleterious consequences for both hardware 
development and operational aspects of policy.  
 
Historically,  India’s nuclear, space and defense research and development agencies have 
enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Due to the pursuit of “strategic autonomy” Indian 
leaders have institutionally exempted then from the normal oversight of the state’s auditory 
authorities. The heads of agencies such as DRDO, BARC and ISRO typically interact with 
prime ministerial incumbents directly, circumventing existing constitutional and 
administrative channels of authority. The state extends generous budgetary support and fast 
tracks most projects pursued by these agencies. Although prime ministerial representatives 
such as the cabinet secretary and the principal secretary sit on the governing boards of these 
agencies, yet in the absence of independently instituted monitoring bodies and the vast 
information asymmetries that prevail in technical settings, political oversight is limited. This 
remarkable degree of autonomy in India’s otherwise over-regulated state has earned this 
clutch of agencies the title of “strategic enclave.”446 
 
Most observers of the “strategic enclave” agree that this unique set of institutional 
circumstances is responsible for many management-related project failures in the past. The 
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DRDO in particular has acquired a reputation for being high on promises and low on 
delivery. High costs, time overruns and shoddy workmanship characterizes many of its 
ambitious defense projects among others such as the main battle tank (MBT) and the light 
combat aircraft (LCA) among others.447 Political and civilian bureaucratic oversight of the 
DRDO is weak. As a senior defense official put it to the author, “the civilian defense R&D 
bureaucracy prioritizes ideological goals when conceptualizing and planning projects – they 
favor indigenization and self sufficiency and this is what the politicians love to hear… a 
situation made worse because the politicians largely rely on inputs from their civilian 
advisors and lack independent means to appraise programs.”448  
 
Nonetheless, the armed services as the end users typically play the role of the external 
monitoring agents. The services critique projects at the conception stage, issue general 
services quality requirements (GSQR) requirements, depute representatives to the labs, 
conduct field trials and ultimately resist accepting weapon systems until kinks are resolved. 
Prominent among examples of such successful interventions is the case of the navy’s 
technical audit in the 1980s, which persuaded two prime ministers to kill three reactor 
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designs prepared by BARC for the top-secret nuclear submarine project.449 Thereafter, India 
sought Russian assistance in the design and integration of the submarine’s nuclear power 
plant.450 Similarly, the services’ critique of the short-range air defense missile project, first 
launched as part of the Integrated Guided Missile Defense Program (IGMDP) in the 1980s, 
led to its subsequent cancellation451 and procurement from Israel instead.452 Technical audits 
by the armed services have also forced DRDO to markedly improve its MBT and LCA 
prototypes. 
  
However, secrecy and compartmentalized planning on nuclear weaponization precluded 
agent competition between DRDO and the air force. Between 1987-1990, as a senior air 
force official disclosed to the author, the DRDO did not share details concerning the 
“hardware” or “drawings” with the air force’s testing establishment.453 As a  result, the 
“boffins” who developed the weapon, recalls another senior air force officer who served at 
the time, “developed it independently without reference to the delivery platform.454 There 
was a problem with carriage because the weapon was too long.”455 This was cause for 
concern especially during the “rotation maneuver during take off stage. A skilled Mirage 
pilot could have pulled it off…but not just any pilot,” a senior air force officer with a 
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ringside view of the program told the author.456 The “…size of the weapon itself, its length 
and weight upset the aerodynamics and center of gravity of the aircraft.”457  
 
After 1990, recalled another air force official, “the only details shared concerned the size and 
dimensions of the weapon container and its weight in general…so that DRDO would be 
assured that the bomb could be slung beneath the aircraft and there would be sufficient 
ground clearance. But no additional information was shared with the air force at this 
stage.”458  However, there were other aspects that needed resolution such as the aircraft’s 
electronic interface and sighting systems to enable the arming and release of the weapon.459 
The electronic interface could not be reconfigured without what one air force officer 
described as access to the “manufacturer’s database” and computer source codes. The 
aircraft also required extensive rewiring for electrical connectivity to enable the bomb’s 
functions.460 The Mirages India had acquired from France in the mid-1980s were not 
nuclear-certified. There were thus concerns that a post-detonation electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) could interfere with the aircraft’s computer-controlled fly-by-wire, communications 
and other electronic systems. According to one senior air force official, “…in the early 
1990s, the air force was thinking of one-way missions…it was unlikely that the pilot 
deployed on a nuclear attack mission would have made it back.”461  
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Prior to 1990, an air force officer explained, “DRDO thought they could do the project all 
by themselves...except that they needed an aircraft. But when DRDO couldn’t manage or 
understand things, they came to the air force.”462 Eventually a team from the air force was 
roped into the project. Another air force officer from Air Headquarters disclosed that “the 
air force core team likely included a “flight test engineer and three or four assistants, an air 
frame man, an electrical and electronics man, and a mechanical engineer…besides the test 
pilot. The DRDO would have had its own team… there are some tasks that DRDO could 
not have done without the air force.” 463 Nevertheless, despite partial cooperation between 
the two agencies, the air force’s test establishment was excluded from the certification 
process. As a result, the air force did not know the methodology DRDO used to certify the 
integration of the weapon with the delivery platform.  
 
A senior air force officer who debriefed the test pilot involved in the certification trials 
emphasized that the air force has a clear system for designing, developing and accepting 
weapon systems. It maintains a vast and varied test establishment with highly specialized and 
experienced personnel to integrate weapon systems with various platforms. However, in the 
case of the weaponization program, the air force could not adhere to its organizational rules.  
It was forced to “break rules” which from an end-user perspective is unacceptable. As he put 
it, “the need for secrecy is understandable as long nuclear weapons are treated as symbolic… 
but once requirements shift to operations, it is absurd to keep the user service on the 
sidelines.” In his words,  
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“when I say I have a test establishment…it starts with a project engineer of a particular 
project, and this project engineer will work under a chief project officer who is a senior test 
engineer…so every project that this project engineer is doing, there is a project engineer on 
top…there is a parallel branch comprising of flight test engineers…each involved in the 
project... and everything they do is overseen by senior flight-test engineers…and there are 
test pilots doing projects working with these engineers. Senior test pilots and so forth 
oversee the test pilots themselves. So it is a team effort…and it is the experience of the 
entire system that is bearing down on the team. So you can certainly pick out individuals 
from these institutions…but you will not get the institutional backing…the institutional 
strength. I as a test pilot can do nothing unless I have access to the test establishment’s 
computer databanks and engineers.”464 
 
Until 1994, DRDO conducted experimental modifications on just one Mirage 2000 with a single test pilot. 
There was no back up.465 But even after that date the internal feedback Air Headquarters 
received from its “boys” was that the plane’s modified systems had not achieved the degree 
of reliability considered de rigueur for performing sensitive nuclear missions.466 The whole 
project, senior air force officers claim, would have been better executed if the service had 
been involved in the planning from the beginning to the end. A participant in the 
certification of the air platform observed that there was a “hand hammered quality” to the 
aircraft that were modified for nuclear missions. There were several failures. But with 
passage of time and some introspection, the system was further refined. However, there 
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were “limitations” in the final product. It was “less capable, less reliable, and generated less 
confidence.”467  
 
This same individual with insider knowledge of the program volunteered to the author that 
“…the conceptualization of any weapon system must be based on ground reality 
requirements…you don’t create weapons and platforms in isolation…[they] must be based 
on quality requirements of the user service. The political climate must also be very 
clear…can the weapon that is being developed be used? And if not…why was it developed? 
The scientists and weapons development agency might have a good idea…but to transform 
it into a usable weapon…the user must be in the loop…must have a total picture.”468  
Politicians, he continued, “get carried away by stories of India’s apparent progress…stories 
that make banner headlines...but they lack the expertise and time” to appraise technical 
details.469 Hence the appraisal process devolves upon senior civil servants. In the case of 
weaponization however, even that process was “hijacked” by DRDO and BARC.  The 
politicians relied on the civilian nuclear coordinator to keep a tab on the scientific agencies. 
However, in the absence of independent scientific review boards and auditing processes, 
civilians received no independent feedback. Only the “end-users can provide independent 
feedback…but their inputs were not sought.”470  
 
The lack of agent competition between the scientific agencies and the military also stymied 
the process of operational planning once weapons became available. Without doubt, the 
irrational fear of US sanctions was the major cause for the political paralysis on this front. 
                                                
467 Ibid. 
468 Ibid.  
469 Ibid.  
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However, senior military leaders who spoke to the author were unanimous that neither the 
scientists nor the political decision-makers understood the complexities of operational 
planning. In the case of conventional war planning, for example, the military has acquired 
almost exclusive monopoly over operational plans due to the lack of civilian bureaucratic 
expertise. Civilians tend to set political goals and leave it to the services to work out the 
logistics of operations.471 However, in the nuclear domain, the military’s direct lack of access 
to political decision-makers and limited technical knowledge of the nuclear weaponization 
project created institutional bottlenecks where it was unable to disabuse them of the 
simplistic belief that the technical capacity to deliver weapons was tantamount to  an 
operational capacity.  
 
Former DRDO Chief V.S. Arunachalam summed up the scientific agencies’ technical 
understanding of operational readiness to the author by arguing,  
 
“If you are saying that the air force didn’t have the aircrafts ready…then you are wrong. 
This is not a situation where we say: we are going to use a nuclear weapon…get an aircraft 
ready…so that it can carry it…make it ready so that it can withstand the EMPs…nothing 
of the kind. It’s ok…now I get ready…now it can take it on the wings or it can take it on 
the fuselage…nothing of the kind. I am sure that there was a reasonable amount of 
information that had been worked through…no pilot would have carried the weapon 
without knowing what he was carrying. No pilot would have gone there without knowing 
how to drop it…how to fuse it.”472 
 
                                                
471 Srinath Raghavan, “Soldiers, Statesmen and India’s Security Policy,” India Review, Vol. 11, 
Issue 2, (May, 2012), pp. 116-133. 
472 Arunachalam, interview with author.  
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For the air force planners however, weapon delivery and pilot training were only the tip of 
the fighting spear. To bring that fighting tip into action, the resolution of three other 
conditions was necessary. The first consisted of procedures to coordinate action among the 
scientific and user agencies. To this category belong timelines for the movement of aircraft, 
the identification of weapon storage sites, the training of ground crew in weapon storage, 
weapon movement and loading procedures. Other routines would concern safety and 
security checks on the aircraft and the weapon. As one senior air force planner explained to 
the author:  
 
“The pilot learns how to handle the weapon, and its impact on the platform during 
flight…vibration characteristics etc. It’s fine to give the air force dummy weapons to train 
with. We are now talking about pilots being trained to handle the weapon system in flight, 
the ground crew being fully trained to handle the weapon on the ground…the safety 
standards have to be very high. All instructions have to be written down precisely. Where 
do you arm the aircraft? You have to arm the aircraft in relative isolation…because if you 
have an accidental explosion, you don’t just lose one aircraft, but you lose 20 
aircraft…these are all practices that have evolved over the years…especially on how to 
handle weapon systems…”473 
 
In the second category would come target identification and mission planning. Geography, 
meteorology, demography and cultural factors all go into target selection, a political decision. 
Among other things, the air force would have to identify air bases for potential deployments, 
and experiment with combinations of electronic jamming and escort aircraft for different 
mission targets. It would also have to plan decoy missions to divert attention and increase 
                                                
473 Senior Indian air force officer ‘M’, non-attributable interview (2) with author.  
 171 
the chances of penetrating a heavily defended airspace in a country on high alert in 
anticipation of a second strike. For example, an Indian Air Force study conducted in the 
early 2000s highlighted the logistical challenges of planning nuclear missions against 
Pakistan. It showed that a single mission alone could tie up as many as 60 aircraft to assist 
the penetrating nuclear vector.474  
 
In the third category are pilot communication protocols to abort missions due to 
geostrategic changes, technical emergencies as well as procedures for weapon jettisoning and 
retrieval in the event of an accident or flight diversion. Included in this category would be 
protocols to fuse and arm the weapon in the time just before release over a target to 
minimize the risk of explosion over friendly territory or off-target.475 Senior Indian air force 
officers point to three major challenges of nuclear mission planning that were left 
unaddressed prior to 1999. First, a nuclear mission would have involved a ‘nap-of-the-earth’ 
flight profile. During such missions attacking aircraft typically hug the ground to escape 
detection by enemy radar. But the Indian Mirages were not equipped with terrain clearance 
radars.476 Hence targets and mission routes would need careful identification and mapping in 
advance. However, no target lists were provided to the air force.477 Second, real-time 
communications are difficult when combat aircraft execute ‘nap-of-the-earth’ flight profiles 
because the earth’s curvature renders the aircraft invisible to both enemy and friendly radar. 
Advanced air forces typically overcome the problem of command and control by 
                                                
474 For example, a typical nuclear task force would include two nuclear-armed aircraft, three 
to four electronic counter measures escort aircraft, three to four aircraft for air defense and a 
similar number to suppress enemy ground defenses. A single mission would comprise 15-20 
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communicating with pilots via satellite or airborne surveillance and command posts perched 
at high altitudes. Since India lacked both at the time, it would have had to rely on relay 
aircraft to keep the political leadership in constant touch with the pilot during the length of a 
nuclear mission. However, the use of relay aircraft complicates logistics and mission 
planning.  
 
More problematic however, the process would require written procedures to enable all 
parties share a common understanding of what those procedures are. If such procedures 
existed at all prior to 1999, the air force did not know of them.478 Third, prior to 1999, the air 
force did not know who possessed the codes for arming nuclear weapons and how those 
codes were to be deployed during a mission. Indian weapons at this time did not incorporate 
permissive action links that would permit arming the weapons at will. The assumption in the 
air force was that the task of arming the weapon would fall on the pilot at a designated time 
during flight. However, the air force and the scientific agencies did not conduct practice 
drills to test the communication and weapon arming protocols during a potential nuclear 
mission.479  
 
A number of senior air force officials, including those who served at the highest levels, are 
unanimous in their account that operational plans and procedures to execute nuclear 
missions are a post-1998 phenomenon. They concede that civilian officials and the scientific 
agencies had likely thought some of these issues through prior, but did not share them with 
the air force. For example, Arunachalam insisted to the author:  
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“…yes…yes…call it the ‘Red’ book or ‘Blue’ book…or something…they were clear…at 
no time a weapon was orphaned out…the weapon systems came with detailed 
instructions…when to use it, where to use it, how to use it…and all this would have been 
determined at the prime ministerial level…”480 
 
However, a senior air force official who served during the 1990s recalls querying Naresh 
Chandra, the government’s coordinator on nuclear planning since 1989, on some of the 
mission planning procedures. But Chandra, claims the official, “behaved like the typical 
bureaucrat…he sat like a frog…maintained silence…remaining in an information denial 
mode.”481 Nor was the air force given tasking orders to prepare internal procedures to 
program its own response to a nuclear emergency. Arunachalam’s view was “…the numbers 
are so small…the system could be beautifully worked out…”482 But a principal staff officer 
at Air Headquarters estimated the chances of mission success in the first half of the decade 
“at less than 50 percent.”483 Another senior air force officer from the 1990s who participated 
in the air delivery platform’s certification trials and demitted office in the latter half of the 
1990s, demurred from even speculating on the probability of mission success. According to 
him, nuclear missions were the “nightmare scenario” because so little was “…shown to the 
air force on the ground.”484 
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Conclusion 
What all this data tells us is that India’s capacity to explode a nuclear weapon during the 
1990s was not in doubt. However, its institutional capacity to explode nuclear weapons 
instrumentally over a target in pursuit of political goals remained very much so. Between 
1989 and 1999, Indian decision-makers responded to structural pressures and ordered the 
building of nuclear weapons.  But they did not seek to embed those weapons inside 
organizational and procedural frameworks that would give them operational significance. In 
the process they opened a vast operational gap, which left the Indian state vulnerable. 
 
India’s case provides us a window to observe some of the technical, institutional, 
organizational and procedural challenges of developing operational capabilities in secrecy. Its 
take away point is that a state may be generally good at adapting to environmental pressures. 
But it may be simultaneously weak at organizational learning. Adaptation means tactical 
adjustments to environmental pressures without an overarching alignment between means 
and ends. Learning implies strategic changes in the ways states apply themselves to problems 
and seek solutions. We should therefore not assume that revolutions in institutional and 
organizational thinking automatically follow in the wake of technological breakthroughs.  
 
The take away point of this chapter is that rational decisions are empirically impossible in 
highly restricted and monopolistic decision-making environments. Problem decomposition, 
parallel processing and institutional oversight are the precursors for optimization. But this is 
precisely what decision-makers in the executive cone of proliferating states strive to avoid. 
Their primary reason for this avoidance behavior is to escape the hostile scrutiny of the 
nonproliferation regime. However, the price of secrecy is sub-optimality. As with firms in 
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the marketplace, decision-makers and states cannot learn in the absence of rapid information 
turnover, “truth tests,” the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ logic of multiple agency scrutiny and 
structured thinking. Indeed, the Indian decision-makers’ un-systemized nuclear decision-
making, as this chapter process traces at considerable length, is a testimonial to these 
theoretical findings.  
 
In the next chapter I show that the negative path dependent effects of such institutional 
legacies can linger even after states give up their cloak of secrecy. For example, even after 
India formally claimed nuclear power status in 1998, until at least 2003-2004 Indian decision-
makers retained many of the institutions and practices of the past: weakly institutionalized 
epistemic networks, compartmentalized information, the absence of review processes and a 
disaggregated process of policy planning. For these reasons, until at least 2003-2004, there 
was a considerable lag in the operationalization of the Indian nuclear force. Some of India’s 
defense reforms take aim at these institutional weaknesses. However, the successful 
resolution of intra- and inter-agency coordination problems remains the central challenge in 
the operational management of India’s nuclear forces.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INDIAN STATE’S POST-1998 NUCLEAR AGENCY: THE 
EFFECTS OF SLOW INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
REFORMS ON NUCLEAR LEARNING 
 
Post-1998, Indian decision-makers have become more socialized into the operational logic 
and practices of nuclear deterrence. The reasons for this have to do with: (a) the strength of 
the epistemic community’s institutionalization within the state; and (b) the openness of the 
state’s decision-making structure. Both developments are related to decision-makers’ formal 
commitments to taking Indian nuclear capabilities beyond technological symbolism and 
transforming them into realizable forces on the ground. The latter goal, the commitment to 
transform symbolic into operable forces, has forced political decision-makers’ to expand the 
mobilization of India’s nuclear epistemic community as well as to institutionalize a new 
epistemic community in the form of the military’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC) to 
manage nuclear forces.  
 
The end of the internal regime of nuclear opacity has also begun to transform the pre-1998 
organizational pattern of nuclear decision-making within the state. The earlier pattern prized 
compartmentalization and disaggregation of information, organizational conditions that  
aggravated the scope for heuristics and cognitive biases in decision-making. The new 
structure rests on information sharing and institutionalized review processes. Also visible are 
the first hints of independent referee institutions capable of overseeing “truth tests” by rival 
claimants of knowledge. These latter processes have partially injected a semi-‘wisdom of the 
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crowds’ logic into the decision-making process producing outcomes that are more rational 
and optimal.  
 
The process of formal socialization and institutionalization, however, only began to take 
shape from the middle of the last decade. Between 1998 and 2004, Indian decision-makers 
retained the legacy institutions and practices of the past: weakly institutionalized epistemic 
networks, compartmentalized information, the absence of review processes and a 
disaggregated process of policy planning. For these reasons, until at least 2003-2004, there 
was a considerable lag in the operationalization of the Indian nuclear force. Many informal 
decisions made in the first half of the decade stemmed from the absence of structured and 
deductive planning. These decisions, in so far as force lethality is concerned, have produced 
a negative path dependent lock down effect.  No further optimization is possible on the 
latter end short of completely overturning the status quo.  
 
Since mid-decade, the military’s institutionalization within the nuclear policy planning 
process and more structured decision-making in the PMO, have partially streamlined intra- 
and inter-agency cooperation. Standard operating procedures and operational routines to 
manage the nuclear force have taken institutional root. However, many intra-agency and 
inter-agency institutional anomalies remain unresolved. The late institutionalization of the 
SFC has meant that it has to compete against legacy institutions such as the scientific 
agencies, which have historically controlled the nuclear weapons program.  The military’s 
feeble technical epistemic base, itself an institutional legacy of the past, limits the degree of 
independent oversight that it can exercise over its scientific counterparts. However, the 
military has partially succeeded through persistently lobbying civilian decision-makers and 
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institutional layering, to effect the beginnings of a shift from “negative” command and 
control institutions toward more “positive” procedure-based institutional practices. As in the 
pre-1998 era, the fundamental conflict between India’s civilians and the military remains the 
logistical management of India’s nuclear forces.  
 
In this chapter I compare the process of an operationally centric nuclear epistemic 
community’s institutionalization within the state between the first and latter halves of the last 
decade. I  present evidence to show that weak institutions and monopolistic decision-making 
organizational processes in the first half of the decade produced sub-optimal outcomes, 
whose effects are now almost irreversible. However, changes in the state’s institutional and 
organizational practices from the latter half of the decade have produced outcomes that 
bespeak of nuclear learning. Finally, I conclude by offering an assessment of the state of 
India’s post-1998 operational nuclear posture.  
 
Weak Institutionalization of Epistemic Actors and Delayed Learning 
India’s stepping out of the nuclear closet in 1998 was a game changer. The end of external 
nuclear ambiguity paved the way for the collapse of the regime of internal ambiguity as well. 
It helped relocate the nuclear weapons program from its narrow technical confines and 
embed it into a broader template of ideas, institutions and organizations, a process that has 
given meaning to the idea of force development. The “expanding” and “interconnected” 
nature of the goals in turn created demands for wider mobilization of the epistemic 
community: the strategic analysts, the civilian bureaucrats, and the military. More 
significantly, it forced political decision-makers to institutionalize the military’s role in the 
policy planning process.  
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India’s national security-related institutional developments in the post-1998 decade make 
comparisons to the Cambrian age apt when complex life forms exploded in frenzy across 
earth. Institutional reforms in India too exploded in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War 
and the Kargil Committee Report,485 which channeled nearly four decades of the defense 
epistemic community’s angst with national security institutional stasis within the state. The 
movement for institutional reforms, which had begun gaining strength from the late-1980s 
and early 1990s, received full expression in the 2000 Group of Ministers (GoM) report on 
national security reforms.486 Reforms touched every aspect of decision-making: long-term 
national security planning, intelligence collection and aggregation,  “jointness” among the 
three armed services, and the recasting of civil-military relations.487 The operational 
management of the nuclear force too was part of the reform process.488 However, political 
decision-makers accorded it low priority. It wasn’t until 2003-04 that the military gained 
institutional authority in nuclear force planning and management alongside the scientific 
agencies.489 Further, the nature of the military’s institutionalization in force management, as 
the evidence presented below shows, was weak.  
                                                
485 The Indian government appointed the Kargil Review Committee in the aftermath of 
Pakistan’s aggression against India in Kargil in the summer of 1999. The committee’s brief 
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488 Admiral (retd.) Arun Prakash, “India’s Higher Defence Organization: Implications for 
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In the immediate aftermath of the 1998 nuclear test-series India’s national security managers 
were primarily concerned with addressing the question of New Delhi’s role in the post-Cold 
War world order. As India’s then national security advisor (NSA) Brajesh Mishra recalls, he 
was most affected by the Soviet Union’s collapse in the early 1990s, the absence of any 
specific role for India in the new US-led global order and the Indian economy’s structural 
weaknesses in staking India’s nuclear claims. As he put it, the “the new world order…India’s 
defense and economic security…these were the three things on my mind…the justification 
for the tests, whatever you want to call it…is this.”490 It is therefore no surprise that Mishra 
and foreign minister Jaswant Singh devoted most of their attention to managing the fallout 
of the nuclear tests, India’s relationship with the United States and other great powers and 
seeking an end to the sanctions regime.491  
 
This precedence of political over operational goals became evident from their general 
disinterest in addressing weapons-related technical and organizational challenges during 
1998-2003. Within six months of the 1998 tests, the DRDO issued an internal report to the 
government confirming what many outsiders suspected, that the thermonuclear device had 
indeed been a fizzle.492 However, instead of appointing an internal scientific commission to 
investigate those claims, advise the government independently, and resume nuclear testing to 
validate the weapon design, the NSA quashed the controversy by accepting assurances from 
                                                
490 Mishra, interview with author.  
491 See Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh’s account in, In Service of Emergent India: Call to 
Honor, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), pp. 231-306. 
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BARC’s hierarchy that test data matched the government’s public claims of success, thereby 
obviating the need for any further tests and a political confrontation with the US.493  
 
Between 1998 and the outbreak of Kargil War in 1999, the NSA and his team in the PMO 
did not apply themselves to addressing the challenges of operational planning either.  
They brought with them a political understanding of nuclear weapons and disdained the 
military’s attempts to jumpstart the operational process.  That latter process, in their mind, 
would be sequential. It would follow the resolution of political problems on the table that 
consumed the decision-makers immediate attention. Within months of India declaring itself 
a nuclear weapon state in 1998 for example, the Chairman, CoSC, General Ved Malik 
proposed the creation of a tri-service command, the National Strategic Nuclear Command, 
to centralize the “custodial, maintenance and training responsibilities” of India’s nuclear 
forces.494 However, the government chose to ignore the proposal. Mishra later explained: “It 
is always in every country…that the armed forces want to get involved in decision-making 
etc. etc., even on matters that are strictly political…as far as decision-making is 
concerned…even there they want to participate… we were very clear about a strict 
division…that they won’t interfere in this process.”495 Nuclear planning therefore remained 
in the pre-1998 groove, confined to small network of scientists and bureaucrats.  
 
Which is why when the Kargil War broke out in the summer of 1999, and the spotlight 
turned to the nuclear issue, the government found itself scrambling to get tactical operational 
planning with the air force off the ground. A senior Indian defense official privy to this 
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effort disclosed to the author that until then, the air force had no idea: (a) what types of 
weapons were available; (b) in how many numbers; and (c) what it was expected to do with 
the weapons. All the air force had was delivery capability in the form of a few modified 
Mirage 2000s. At that point, only the air chief, the vice air chief and two other individuals at 
Air Headquarters had knowledge of the program.496 The official went on:  
 
“My educated guess is that a directive to bring the military in the loop may have been 
issued by the prime minister’s office. However, given that nuclear decision making until 
then was confined to the prime minister and a small set of officials in BARC and 
DRDO, the directive may have languished. Or alternatively, the prime minister and his 
top aides may have been told that the air force was in the know…without their 
understanding that tactical operational planning requires information sharing, 
coordination, and planning on an entirely different level. Politicians sometimes focus on 
the big picture and don’t pay sufficient attention to details…”497 
 
But neither the Kargil episode nor the near war with Pakistan in 2001-02 prodded senior 
policy planners into rushing institutional decisions. For example, the Arun Singh task force 
on higher defense management, ‘Task Force on Management of Defense’, completed its 
report in September 2000. It was submitted to the government as part of the final GoM 
recommendations on ‘Reforming the National Security System’ in February 2001.498 It 
proposed reforms in the context of the revolution in military affairs and India’s status as a 
nuclear weapon state. The heart of its recommendations concerned replacing the existing 
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Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) system with an Integrated Defense Staff (IDS) led by a 
Chief of Defense Staff (CDS). Prior to the reforms, joint planning between the services was 
the province of the CoSC, which consisted of the three serving service chiefs. The 
chairmanship of the CoSC devolved by rotation on the most senior serving chief. But 
chairmanship of the CoSC did not signify the principle of ‘first among equals’. Nor did the 
three service chiefs and their services coordinate hardware acquisitions, doctrine 
development and operational plans with each other.  
 
The net result of such institutional practices was the near absence of hardware and 
operational synergy between the services. Nuclearization created an even more acute 
operational dilemma because of India’s institutional legacy of maintaining a de-mated force. 
In India, the control of nuclear warheads is divided between two civilian scientific agencies: 
BARC and the DRDO, which control the fissile cores and non-nuclear firing assemblies 
respectively. However, the air force, the army and navy each retain separate control of 
nuclear-capable combat aircraft, ships and ballistic missiles. The protagonists of military 
reform therefore sought to recast military institutions to instill greater coordination and joint 
planning between the services.  
 
Compared to the past where the Chairman, CoSC was only a nominal head, the Arun Singh 
Task Force conceived the CDS as the ‘first among equals’. With assistance from a Vice Chief 
of Defense Staff (VCDS) and the IDS acting as his secretariat for staffing functions, the 
CDS would “administer the strategic forces” and “provide single point military advice to the 
government.”499 Pursuant to the Singh task force’s recommendations, the government 
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instituted the IDS in 2001. A tri-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC) to coordinate and 
manage nuclear forces was subsequently instituted within the IDS in May 2002. However, it 
wasn’t until 2003-04 that the military actually gained institutional authority in nuclear force 
planning and management alongside the scientific agencies.500 
 
SEE SCHEMATIC 3 FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF INDIA’S HIGHER DEFENSE 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Learning in any system depends on the incorporation of new knowledge into existing 
institutional practices.  The incorporation of new knowledge in turn requires input from 
professionals who staff organizations. In the nuclear as in the conventional sphere, the 
military’s staffing role is absolutely essential in creating strategic and operational 
knowledge.501 In the strategic sphere fall numbers, weapon types, targeting and planned use 
of weapons, command control, and standard operating procedures. In the operational sphere 
fall logistics, the physical infrastructure needed for support, security, staff requirements, 
personnel training and exercises to test the force’s response in the field. Personnel training 
and actual field exercises under simulated attack conditions are vital to generate data to 
assess the viability of existing SOPs and the agencies’ response under stress conditions. Such 
exercises are also the means for generating critical data on the user-machine interface, a 
process that helps identify and eliminate technical and operator errors.502  
 
                                                
500 Sawhney, “Bombed,” p. 10; and Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, pp. 94–95.    
501 Rear Admiral (retd.) Raja Menon, interview with author, New Delhi, March 2009, New 
Delhi, India.  
502 Koithara, “Hardware to Forces,” Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, pp. 154-155. 
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However, India’s case suggests that many strategic decisions preceded the SFC’s 
institutionalization. “By that time (the SFC’s formation),” the former NSA Brajesh Mishra 
informed the author, “we had decided how much we were going to do…we had 
decided…not exactly…but somewhat…approximately…the mix of the two kinds of 
weapons…nuclear (fission)…thermonuclear…having done that at the political level…then 
we began to think of a nuclear command authority.”503 In February 2004, the unusually well 
informed editor of the Delhi-based Force magazine, Pravin Sawhney, reported on the basis of 
interviews with Air Marshal Asthana, then C-in-C, SFC, that the SFC had been unable to 
“find a location for its headquarters and role in the employment of nuclear weapons.”504 
Asthana also complained that the SFC’s staffing requirements were generally unmet and that 
the government had not made budgetary provisions for technical infrastructure projects such 
as hardened facilities and bunkers, secure communications, and secure sites for nuclear 
delivery vehicles. Among the unknowns at the time was how long it would take India to 
transition from a peacetime recessed to a force employment mode because the agencies 
involved - the SFC, the air force, BARC and DRDO – had not practiced drills together. 
Even as late as 2004, the government had not institutionalized the division of authority and 
responsibilities among the agencies on general release procedures for the deployment, 
arming and firing of nuclear weapons.505 As Mishra put it to the author: “…of course, they 
(the military) were also very keen about who will give the orders…how will the orders be 
communicated etc. etc. But…we did not have the time to do anything because we lost the 
elections and we left.”506  
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Since the middle of the last decade, however, the SFC’s organizational presence within 
India’s nuclear planning has grown substantially. Former C-in-C, SFC, Rear Admiral (retd.) 
Shankar volunteered to the author that the SFC’s staff strength was a “little below 100.” This 
is a “large staff for a command, especially when compared to other conventional operational 
commands, where staff strength does not exceed 50-60,” he explained. With organizational 
expansion, the SFC now has departments that cover logistics, a works department for 
building infrastructure, a technical section that has representation from all three services, a 
department of land, air, and sea vectors responsible for generating SOPs for the various 
stages of operational readiness in peacetime and war, an electronics department that focuses 
on general release codes for nuclear weapons, general computing and communications 
requirements for the NCA, an independent intelligence analysis group that processes raw 
data from various government agencies, and its own specialized medical staff.507  
 
The SFC’s sustained institutional presence over a decade signifies the formal 
institutionalization and expansion of a military-centered nuclear epistemic community within 
the state. However, institutionalization alone says nothing about an organization’s strength 
or effectiveness. In the case of the SFC, two factors undermine its institutional strength. 
First, in the absence of a CDS, the SFC lacks effective command. In the CDS’s absence, the 
chairman, CoSC is responsible for all command and staff functions. However, the position 
of chairman, CoSC devolves by rotation on the senior most serving service chief at any given 
time. The Chairman, CoSC’s term can last a year or more or simply a few months. For 
example, India had a succession of four Chairmen, CoSCs between August/September 2004 
and February 2005. Similarly, during 2006-2007 there was a succession of three Chairmen, 
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CoSC within a span of 10 months.508 Such rapid rotation brings enormous discontinuity to 
the task of governing the nuclear force.  
 
Further, the Chairman, CoSC is first and foremost a service chief. He is responsible for 
command and staff functions in his own service (army, navy, air force). According to 
Admiral (retd.) Arun Prakash, who served as Chairman, CoSC for an unusually long 20 
months during 2005-06, the Chairman, CoSC is barely able to devote “10-15 percent of his 
time” to the SFC.509 Further, despite his seniority, the Chairman, CoSC is only nominally the 
head of the CoSC. The CoSC works by consensus and abides by an informal institutional 
rule that no service chief will interfere in the functioning of another service.510 This has 
created a huge coordination bottleneck for the SFC because the air force, army, and navy 
each have independent control over the nuclear delivery vehicles. The SFC’s C-in-C is a 
three star officer and junior in rank to the four star service chiefs. He therefore cannot 
command them or their service to do his bidding. He must of necessity operate through the 
Chairman, CoSC, who in the first instance is unable to devote full time attention to the SFC 
and in the second is bound by informal institutional rules that favor consensus and non-
interference in each service’s affairs.511  
 
Other problems arise because of the SFC’s isolation within the tri-service IDS, the agency in 
which it is institutionally situated.  The IDS serves as the secretariat for the CoSC. It houses 
all joint commands and is the agency responsible for all inter-services planning and 
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coordination functions. In theory, senior Indian military leaders grouse, the IDS should 
perform all the SFC’s staffing and infrastructure development functions and leave its 
commander with only strategic planning and command duties. However, although the SFC 
is formally a part of the IDS, “there is no link between the two,” according to a former SFC, 
C-in-C. “The SFC reports to the Chairman, CoSC.”512 As a result, the IDS is unable to 
synergize tasks with the SFC. Similarly, conventional and nuclear operations under the 
current dispensation are the independent responsibilities of the three services and the SFC. 
Coordination is only possible through the CoSC or the IDS.513 The first is weak. The latter is 
questionable. Planning and operational problems at the CoSC-level concerning the SFC 
therefore require resolution by the NSA or his deputy in the PMO, a process that 
marginalizes the defense minister. The SFC essentially directly functions under the PMO 
through the NSA, bypassing the defense ministry and the military’s normal chain of 
command.514 Its command system, as two former C-in-Cs, SFC and Chairmen, CoSC 
reiterated to the author, “is broken!”515 
 
Not only is the SFC’s institutional position weak, other limitations also truncate its ability to 
induce fresh nuclear learning within the state. As argued earlier in the dissertation, 
institutional effectiveness depends on an epistemic community’s ability to generate new 
consensual knowledge. As a second step, the epistemic community must have the 
institutional power to inject that consensual knowledge into the state’s existing habits to 
change them. The development of new consensual knowledge depends first and foremost 
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on information turnover and exchange. Information is the fundamental means that 
professionals use for performing “truth tests” and growing a society’s knowledge banks. 
Prior to 1998, this was impossible because information was hived off in a tiny social network 
consisting of scientists and bureaucrats who even today boast that they will “carry India’s 
nuclear secrets to their grave.”516 But in the post-1998 decade, the Indian military has access 
to sensitive information about the hardware and operational issues. This has provided it the 
means to challenge both the scientific “strategic enclave” as well as political decision-
makers.517 However, as the next two sections show, the military’s ability to extract credible 
commitments from both is seriously limited. This latter condition places bounds on the 
nuclear force’s operational effectiveness.518  
 
The Shift From Heuristics to Structured Decisions and Planning 
Non-institutionalized decision-making and planning in the first half of last decade and the 
weak institutionalization thereafter, once again show why operational outcomes in India 
exhibit signs of uneven optimization. Without doubt, Indian leaders in the last decade 
committed themselves to ‘expanding’ and ‘interconnected’ goals. However, they did not 
immediately match those goal commitments with a simultaneous resolve to building strong 
institutional capacities. In the latter’s absence, their decisions from the first half of the 
decade corroborate many of the fundamental insights of the Cybernetic and Cognitive 
approaches: sequentialism, loose coupling, and the use of simple heuristics. Instead of 
drawing on blueprints to guide policy, they followed their gut instincts to make 
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determinations. Often, their measures of optimality were not consensually determined 
scientific or management benchmarks but internally held values and belief systems.  
 
Many early decisions, especially those concerning nuclear warhead lethality for example, have 
had a path dependent lock down effect that rule out optimization. This has had a negative 
impact on strategic force planning. Barring the complete upending of the status quo, 
optimization is now only possible at the margins through improvements in the reliability of 
delivery systems. However, the military’s gradual institutionalization in nuclear policy 
planning has created the organizational foundation for problem decomposition, parallel 
processing, and the substitution of simple heuristics-based assumptions with strategic 
judgments based on operations research. Thus some optimization has followed in the 
operational management of the nuclear force. There is now greater emphasis on inter-agency 
planning. Actions are more coordinated between them thanks to new common operating 
procedures. Military exercises have also revealed logistical vulnerabilities in the transition 
from peacetime to wartime alert. Some procedural modifications have been instituted to 
address them. The military is also using the logistical demands of the sea leg of the triad to 
push civilian decision-makers to substitute institutional (negative) for the operationally more 
efficient procedural (positive) controls, with some success. However, India’s higher defense 
management problems have dichotomized conventional and nuclear operations. This raises 
questions about the degree of optimization possible at the aggregate level of warfare.  
 
When designing a nuclear force, planners think in terms of damage expectancy (DE) to 
enemy targets. Numerical estimates of nuclear warheads and delivery systems flow from this 
fundamental calculation. DE is the product of the probability of target kill, air defense 
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penetravity, pre-launch survivability of the weapon system and its reliability. Among these 
probabilities, target kill and reliability of the weapon system form the core concerns of 
professional planners. Target kill substantially depends on the nuclear warhead’s yield 
(lethality) and it reliably producing that yield every time it is exploded.519 However, evidence 
from India’s 1998 nuclear tests has raised serious concerns about the upper yield limits and 
reliability of its warhead designs.520 Further, the political management of the technical 
controversy that arose in the wake of those tests compellingly shows that simple heuristics 
and not rational optimization drove decision-making.  
 
It is now apparent that pre-1998 nuclear weapons design in India was almost the exclusive 
enterprise of its nuclear enclave with minimal direction from the political leadership and 
none whatsoever from the military. The political leadership approved the development of 
advanced nuclear weapon designs such as boosted-fission and thermonuclear warheads 
without understanding the technical implications of what those weapons might mean for any 
future force design.521 Similarly, like with many principal-agent dilemmas that arise from 
conditions of “information asymmetry,” the political decision-makers had little 
understanding of the technical parameters and demands of a field-testing program to validate 
designs that BARC had on its shelf. To be sure, the nuclear test window in 1998 was 
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determined on the advice the political decision-makers received from their scientific 
advisors.522 However, the nuclear scientists, who after 1974 were frustrated by their inability 
to persuade the political leadership to authorize hot-tests, offered their principals a 
compressed program of rushed tests to minimize political exposure.523 The political decision-
makers’ acceptance of this rapid test series itself rested on a heuristic understanding of the 
political risk they and India could bear in the ensuing confrontation with the United States. 
 
Among the nuclear weapon designs tested in May 1998 were that of a fission weapon and a 
two-stage thermonuclear device. The thermonuclear device had a boosted-fission trigger in 
the first stage, the scientists’ goal being to piggyback the boosted fission design on the 
thermonuclear device.524 In the immediate aftermath of the first round of nuclear tests on 
May 11, 1998 itself, the coordinator of the test program K. Santhanam concluded on the 
basis of preliminary observations of instrumental test data and the crater morphology at the 
test site that the thermonuclear design had “underperformed.”525 However, the BARC team 
rejected DRDO’s assessments on grounds that the latter’s “instrumentation was faulty.”526 
BARC, India’s principal nuclear design agency, reported to the government after the second 
round of tests on May 13 that it had achieved all its design and data objectives from the 
tests.527 Following this advice, Vajpayee’s BJP government declared a moratorium on further 
testing.  
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Both these episodes, the scientific and its follow up political act, exemplify how the absence 
of strong institutions and structured decision-making produces sub-optimal policy outcomes 
with deleterious consequences. With no institution or agency to monitor the scientific 
agencies, the principals (political decision-makers) had few means to monitor their agents 
(scientists) performance. The disputing scientific agencies themselves, DRDO and BARC, 
lacked institutional mechanisms to subject members of the nuclear cohort to “truth tests” 
before making consensual claims. The consequence was faulty reporting on one of the most 
sensitive national security matters to the government.  Absent any institutional processes to 
weigh down decision-making, Prime Minister Vajpayee similarly claimed the tests a success 
and declared a test moratorium almost immediately after without awaiting further 
triangulation of seismic data and crater morphology observations with post-shot radioactivity 
measurements. The prime minister, as Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh later revealed, 
“…was by instinct placatory…had from the beginning in his public stance been in support 
of disarmament…there was no bouncing off of ideas with his confidantes…It [the testing 
moratorium] was an instinctive reaction. It shows up Vajpayee in bad light. But the fact of 
the matter is the Indian political leadership does not have the tradition of either great study 
or reflection…”528  
 
Within six months of the May 1998 tests, the DRDO issued a classified report to the 
government, which raised doubts about the reliability of the thermonuclear design. In 
response, then NSA Brajesh Mishra summoned a meeting of the DRDO and BARC 
representatives to discuss the report’s findings. But at the end of it, he squelched the debate 
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by saying the “government would stand by Dr. Chidambaram’s [BARC] opinion.” Mishra’s 
account of the episode is telling. As he put it to the author:  
 
“…the funny thing is the pressure to test came from these very scientists. So when 
finally in ‘98 we said: go ahead and do it…I asked them how long would it take to 
test…these scientists who had weaponized…they were the ones who were insisting that 
there must be tests…and we wanted to do it openly…and then declare ourselves as a 
nuclear weapon state.  
 
So…the scientists…and there must have been many involved…but the five I know are 
Dr. Chidambaram, Kakodkar…Sikka…from BARC and Kalam and Santhanam from 
DRDO…now when they went in for the tests they told me that they wanted to do six. 
We can’t do it one day…we need two days. First day they tested three; and then two 
days later they wanted to test another three. But after the fifth one, they telephoned me 
and said we don’t need another one. We have all the data that we wanted. They said the 
tests are successful…the weapon design is proved.  
 
…a couple of months later [after the May 1998 tests] Dr. Kalam and Dr. Santhanam 
came to see me…and it was Santhanam who said that they had doubts about this…and 
we need to do something about this. And I asked: we need to do what? We have 
declared a moratorium… So I said: you have doubts…I will call the people from 
Bombay…let’s sit down and discuss the matter. You raise the doubts and let them 
reply. So I called a meeting with the five of them …so Santhanam gave his 
reasoning...The three of them (BARC team) gave their replies. More particularly, Sikka 
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who was the man intimately involved with the design came out with a long 
explanation…giving this detail…that detail. I said ok…the meeting ended.”529 
 
When asked why he did not appoint a scientific commission comprising retired nuclear 
scientists and weapon designers to review the DRDO’s findings and render independent 
advice to the government, Mishra replied:  
 
“We tested five times…apart from 1974. In ‘74 when the test was done…nobody came 
out and said: we want a review…whether the test was successful or not successful…the 
point I am trying to make to you is: if we don’t trust those very same people who were 
insisting upon tests….I mean the political leadership never went to them and asked 
them to test…it was they…the scientists…who for years had been insisting on 
testing…at least for 10 years…so then you appoint a review committee to verify the 
results? I mean this is a strange logic….a review committee also means giving up your 
secrets…whatever you have.”530  
 
The above account, if accepted literally, is the clearest evidence of the triumph of “faith 
based politics” over any countervailing notions of rationality. In order to maintain the 
internal simplicity and consistency in their decision-making, Indian decision-makers chose 
pre-formed beliefs over institutionalized “truth tests” to resolve uncertainty in an issue area 
where they lacked credible knowledge. Their approach was, as Santhanam observed years 
later: “I have made up my mind, don’t confuse me with facts.”531 An alternative explanation 
is that the political decision-makers simply decided that it wasn’t worth the trouble to 
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validate the thermonuclear design through a program of further tests as the latter decision 
would further inflame the United States and burn more political capital. Perhaps the 
politicians decided the 20-30kt-fission weapon, which had “worked like a song”532 in 1998, 
would suffice for purposes of deterrence. In fact, during the thermonuclear weapon 
controversy, which erupted in 2009 when Santhanam went public with his claims, the former 
scientific advisor to the defense minister V. S. Arunachalam argued that deterrence “is…a 
mind game” and simple Hiroshima-type devices would be sufficient to kill people in the 
hundreds of thousands. It therefore would not matter if India lacked a reliable 
thermonuclear warhead with a scaled up yield of 150kt.533  
 
If this latter reasoning were the decision-makers’ private justification for foregoing any 
further testing, then it would once again point to the prevalence of satisficing over 
optimization in Indian policy planning. The 150kt thermonuclear design, or the boosted-
fission weapon, if part of the mix of warheads that make up India’s nuclear force, will always 
remain dogged by uncertainty.534 The yield reliability of the thermonuclear device’s boosted-
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fission trigger is also uncertain.535 Assigning these designs reliability probability estimates in 
the absence of full-scale ‘hot’ tests carries high risk. This essentially means that the 
foundation for determining the size of the nuclear force is arbitrary and unscientific because 
the reliability of the thermonuclear design and its boosted-fission trigger cannot be 
determined with accuracy. On the other hand, the alternative solution of building a nuclear 
force centered on 20-30kt fission weapons imposes significantly higher performance and 
reliability demands on weapon carrier systems such as ballistic missiles.536 The absence of 
this understanding early on suggests that Indian political decision-makers harbored a simple 
heuristics-based understanding of nuclear force planning; and that the lack of structured 
planning and oversight in India’s nuclear decision-making processes in the first half of the 
last decade has created negative path dependencies without the policy makers even 
comprehending the deductive consequences of their decision.  
 
Unlike the US, India until recently did not have the institutional equivalent of a JASON 
Committee537 to independently advise the government on the science and engineering of 
nuclear weapons. Senior members of India’s nuclear weapons design establishment such as 
former AEC Chairman Dr. P.K. Iyengar have admitted that in the past the federal 
government’s technical and non-technical proxies who sat on the AEC’s board lacked both 
information and knowledge to undertake any meaningful audit of BARC’s performance.538 
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Indeed, the 1998 test episode is evidence of the limits of even DRDO’s auditing capacity, 
the one government agency responsible for weaponization. Because the military was never 
part of the nuclear design effort and is a consumer, it remains a vehicle for transmitting 
scientific dissent and not independent oversight.539 There until the thermonuclear weapon 
test controversy exploded in public,  there were no guards who could exercise effective 
oversight over India’s nuclear guardians, a condition that imposed institutional limits to any 
nuclear learning in the system.540  
 
Force posture development in the first half of last decade also suffered from the cognitive 
dissonance among the handful of decision-makers who in 1998 proclaimed India’s nuclear 
status but then did not follow up their act by building state agency to leverage that capability. 
However, changes in operational procedures since 2004-05 suggest that some optimization 
has followed the intervention of the SFC and the higher military command. From 1998 until 
at least 2003, Indian leaders retained the institutional legacy of the pre-1998 era: the de-
mated and distributed posture, which Tellis summed up as “strategically active” but 
“operationally dormant” in peacetime.541 Control of the arsenal initially remained devolved 
upon the pre-1998 network of scientists from BARC and DRDO. This path dependent 
pattern partly stemmed from high-centralization, a condition which imposes limits on the 
human attention span. Absent the offsetting impact of institutionalized decision-making that 
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enables problem decomposition and parallel tasking, it nudged decision-makers into the 
state’s habitual mode of resolving problems in the sequence in which they presented 
themselves. But it also owed much to the decision-makers’ unchallenged heuristic 
conditioning drawn from the analogy of the superpowers’ Cold War nuclear competition, 
which equated operationalization with higher force alerting and the subsequently greater 
likelihood of nuclear use due to inadvertence or accident. Thus in the first five years after the 
1998 tests, decision makers remained focused on the first-order political problems stemming 
from India’s overt nuclear status, while inter-agency coordination problems pertaining to 
operational planning languished. As a consequence, the friction between operational 
dormancy and operational employment modes proved stickier than policy makers had 
imagined.542  
 
As Clausewitz famously observed, “everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is 
difficult.” Indeed, the 1999 Kargil War and then the 2001-02 military mobilization against 
Pakistan empirically demonstrated just how hugely complex the task of nuclear force 
reconstitution and employment readiness was in the absence of well-developed inter-agency 
management structures and protocols.543 In 1999, there was no “common knowledge base” 
to establish a “common operating base” between the scientific agencies and the air force.  
The scientific agencies had assumed for example that 72 hours was a reasonable time 
window within which the nuclear force could transition from recessed to employment mode. 
However, according to a senior participant in the planning process, it took “nearly a week” 
before the air force and the agencies were able to “make the weapons operational.”544 
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Members of the nuclear network had to orally ratify all actions in the absence of 
institutionalized standard operating procedures, a process that added to the logistical 
friction.545 The 2001-02 standoff with Pakistan similarly demonstrated that the de-mated 
operational posture while “politically correct” was “operationally hazardous.”546 Due to the 
SFC’s delayed institutionalization, inter-agency operational procedures remained inchoate. 
The absence of joint drill and training exercises involving all agencies on the ground meant 
that the alerting procedures and timelines were still paper exercises. The military also found 
the alerting and readiness procedures put together by BARC and DRDO to be cumbersome 
and overly optimistic.547  
 
Among the military’s first tasks post-2002 was to formalize SOPs and institutionalize 
operational planning with the civilian bureaucratic and scientific agencies. In December 
2002, the government adopted the ‘Red Book’, a highly classified document that  “contains 
the nuclear doctrine plus certain additional standard operating procedures…various chains 
of command, succession lists…and deals with various contingencies…”548 After its 
formation in 2003, the SFC institutionalized meetings with the scientific agencies to 
coordinate nuclear planning at regular “two month intervals.”549 By 2004, the SFC submitted 
for government approval operational plans pertaining to nuclear release codes.550 It similarly 
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prepared the ‘Blue Book’, a lower order set of classified instructions that detail procedures at 
the unit level of the armed forces with regards to nuclear weapons.551  
 
Subsequent SFC-led military exercises revealed the difficulties of transitioning from 
peacetime to a readiness posture. A major logistics challenge was the simple movement of 
missiles and nuclear warhead components to pre-designated mating and launch locations 
because of India’s urban congestion and poor road and rail infrastructure. The military 
concluded that the logistical drag on the force, especially in the aftermath of a nuclear strike, 
could reach a tipping point sufficient to disrupt any retaliatory response.552 It also discovered 
that many of the de-mated force’s components were stored in conditions that left them 
vulnerable to pre-emptive attacks.553 The SFC drew on these lessons along with those from 
the 1999 and 2001-02 military mobilizations to vacate missiles and nuclear ordnance out of 
urban bases to the rural hinterland.554 It also prevailed upon the government to streamline 
nuclear alerting protocols and reduce the procedural steps to deploy the arsenal in an 
operational mode from six to four. Under the new protocol, the first stage of nuclear force 
alerting will begin simultaneously with any conventional mobilization. Nuclear weapons will 
be armed in the first stage itself. In the second stage, the weapons will be dispersed. The 
third stage will involve mating the weapons with delivery systems. The role of the scientific 
agencies will end at the third stage and firing authority will devolve upon the military in the 
fourth and final stage.555  
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Beginning from the middle of the last decade, there is clear demarcation of dual-use delivery 
systems and their crews in the armed services to deal with the problem of crosscutting 
authorities. Under the new procedures, these assets are “quarantined” and placed under the 
SFC’s command during training exercises and wartime alerting. 556  In peacetime, the arsenal 
still retains its de-mated form. But underneath that broad institutional tent, smaller 
procedural changes have begun to erode some of the earlier civilian reticence concerning 
positive controls. As the C-in-C, SFC, Air Marshal (retd.) Bhavnani put it to Bharath 
Karnad, “it has been time consuming for political bosses to understand what’s a de-mated 
situation, what’s a mated situation, why we should have a mated situation. But once they 
were made to understand, we are now in a good situation.”557 Thus for example, some types 
of nuclear ordnance is now co-located with delivery vectors at air and naval bases.558 In the 
navy’s case, the separation is more apparent than real. Thus, the two naval warships, which 
constitute the sea-leg of the triad, will sail with ballistic missiles and nuclear ordnance on 
board during operational alert.559 The political leadership retains institutional separation and 
control through representatives of the scientific agencies on board the ships. However, for 
all practical purposes the navy has command of the nuclear force.  
 
Affirming that political decision-makers had indeed begun to appraise operational postures 
on land and sea differently on the basis of their logistical and operational demands, the 
former NSA Brajesh Mishra candidly explained to the author:  
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“You have to make a difference between the navy, the air force, and the missiles on 
land. When the admiral…is out…hundreds of miles away, he must have those weapons 
with him…but there must be a way of communication between the submarine or the 
ship and the decision-makers in Delhi whether to fire or not to fire. But in the case of 
[the] air force, unless they are on an aircraft carrier…that’s a different matter. But with 
land based missiles that is not the same question…”560 
 
In a similar vein, technology and not the overall tenor of civil-military relations has 
become the critical driver behind the trend favoring delegated or positive command 
and control in at least the naval leg of the Indian military. The “concept of a ‘force-in-
being’ with physical separation between vector, the fissile material, and non-fissile 
assemblies is a thing of the past,” the C-in-C, SFC, Rear Admiral (retd.) Shankar 
insisted to the author. “Technology has intervened in the process,” he emphasized. 
“Consider the nuclear submarine…the missiles will be encapsulated on board the 
vessel. You can’t then separate the warhead from the missile. The implications of all 
this being that ‘procedural’ separation must replace ‘physical’ separation in the various 
states of operational readiness.”561 
 
In the last decade, therefore, there has been a steady stream of operational improvements at 
the procedural tactical level of force employment. However, optimization has eluded the 
Indian military at the aggregated level of nuclear and conventional operations. This is in part 
a legacy of the development trajectory of India’s nuclear weapons program. In the pre-1998 
era, there was no institutional link between the scientific agencies that designed and built 
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nuclear weapons and the services.562 Neither did the government task the services with 
developing an epistemic community in the realm of nuclear strategic thought and warfare. 
Services such as the army have an NBC directorate.563 But its task is defensive and not 
offensive operations. According to a former Chairman, CoSC, Admiral Prakash, “A start was 
made in 2005 [for the SFC], but till then our military training and courses had no component 
of nuclear war fighting…NBC protection and all that is there…but not even an academic 
study of the theories and doctrines of nuclear war fighting is there…the military is not 
encouraged to study nuclear war fighting doctrines…”564 This same individual who presided 
over the management of India’s nuclear forces for nearly two years in 2005-06 recently 
confessed his ignorance on matters nuclear at the inception of his tenure. In his own words: 
 
“…a few days into my tenure, when the C-in-C, SFC  came to make a formal call, his 
allotted 15 minutes stretched out to over an hour; because I found to my consternation, 
that much of what he wanted to discuss was alien to me. Apart from re-reading some 
long forgotten principles of physics, I spent many weeks poring over the works of 
analysts like Perkovich, Tellis, Karnad, and Menon to learn about India’s evolution as a 
nuclear weapon state (NWS), and trawling through the writings of Brodie, Gray, 
Wohlstetter and others, to comprehend the arcane nuances of deterrence theory. It was 
exasperating to find that after 39 years in uniform, the system had ill prepared me for 
the most critical responsibility that I was to ever shoulder; but equally galling was the 
realization that the time I devoted, as Chairman, CoSC, to the nuclear deterrent would 
be at some cost to India’s maritime security – my primary commitment as naval 
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chief.”565 
 
Post-1998, all nuclear operations have devolved upon the SFC. The act of cordoning off the 
SFC within the IDS, which is the secretariat and coordinating arm of the CoSC, has 
institutionalized the conventional-nuclear dichotomy. Similarly, the service headquarters 
exclusively concern themselves with conventional war; and no higher defense learning 
institution imparts training to military officers on nuclear strategy and operations. “The 
service headquarters,” according to Admiral (retd.) Prakash are “ill prepared for the conduct 
of operations of this nature and none of them have been asked to create a branch, 
directorate or even a cell dedicated to [the] conduct of nuclear warfare or for evolution of 
related doctrine.”566 The CDS at the head of the IDS was to be the coordinating link 
between nuclear and conventional operations. But as discussed earlier, with the 
government’s failure to appoint a CDS, these coordination tasks have fallen to the 
Chairman, CoSC and the CoSC, both infirm coordinating institutions in the military.  
 
Civilian decision-makers take their cue from a heuristic understanding of nuclear weapons --  
such weapons produce a big bang and kill lots of people. They tend to see such weapons in a 
largely dichotomous and genocidal role. However, senior military leaders in the SFC and 
CoSC view sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear operations part of a single spectrum 
of operations. They believe that low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, which China and 
Pakistan possess, could be used for strategic political effect on the battlefield with relatively 
low casualties. Conventional operations could therefore “seamlessly” transition to a nuclear 
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exchange.567 A nuclear attack by an adversary, at least in its early stages, would very likely 
assume the form of a symbolic strike, a demonstration or warning shot against some tactical 
Indian formation in the field.568  
 
The risk of Chinese nuclear strikes in the Himalayan theater of operations is generally 
considered to be low at present.569 But this is also, as a former Chairman, CoSC explained to 
the author, because India is “…grossly ill-informed about the Chinese military psyche, 
thought process, and mind sets…it has failed to devote adequate resources to a serious study 
of these factors.”570 More recently, in the last decade, the army’s NBC directorate has 
conducted internal studies and war-gamed several Pakistani nuclear use scenarios against 
Indian military formations on the western border.571 The latter are considered a more serious 
risk because New Delhi’s war approach in the last decade has evolved to punish Pakistan for 
waging decades-long sub-conventional war against India. The new Indian military doctrine 
of fighting a ‘limited conventional war under nuclear conditions’ proposes offensive and 
escalatory albeit shallow conventional operations against Pakistan.572 The Pakistani counter 
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to this development is the threat of “asymmetric escalation” through tactical nuclear 
means.573  
 
Senior Indian military leaders at the highest levels aver that such attacks, if they do 
materialize, would demand a highly calibrated Indian counter-response to terminate war at 
the lowest possible level of nuclear exchange.574 However, such a nuanced politico-military 
strategy would be difficult to pull-off given the current state of compartmentalization 
between India’s conventional and nuclear war commands. A decade after the 1998 nuclear 
tests, India’s former army chief General (retd.) Ved Malik publicly raised the question 
whether the services “had been able to interface… nuclear capability with conventional 
capabilities…?”575 To this question, former C-in-C, SFC, Air Marshal (retd.) Bhavnani 
replied in private that “this compartmentalization still exists…and…we’ve tried our 
best…we’ve said that it is important for everyone in the military to understand the nuclear 
issues…all I can say from the time…from 2001 till today there has been an evolutionary 
change in the understanding of nuclear warfare. Prior to 2001 nobody even thought about 
it…nobody said it is time to sit down and figure out the implications of a nuclear war.”576 
 
Senior SFC commanders claim that procedures now exist for coordinating conventional and 
nuclear operations. When India transitions from peace to wartime, “the relevant command 
and control authorities will simultaneously move into the SFC’s operational command posts 
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and the SFC will retain contact through close physical proximity and real-time 
communication links.”577  But paper plans and coordinating procedures, they also concede, 
are weak substitutes for horizontal organizational integration between the SFC and IDS. In 
the absence of a CDS, the SFC remains an orchestra without a conductor. In any war, the 
primary focus of the three service chiefs would be on fighting their own separate 
conventional wars.578 This will also apply to the Chairman, CoSC, the nominal head of the 
SFC, who is first a service chief and then the head of IDS.579 Operational direction of the 
SFC, they fear, will devolve by default on the NSA, an individual who due to his general 
foreign service background is untutored in the arts of operational strategy.580 This situation 
would be akin to the 1962 border war with China when Prime Minister Nehru and his senior 
colleagues subverted the military’s operational chain of command by literally interfering in 
troop deployments at the company and brigade levels with disastrous consequences.581  
 
Legacy Principal-Agent Relationships and Operational Dilemmas 
The most serious problem in India’s quest for operational optimization is the lingering path 
dependency effect of principal-agent relationships from the pre-1998 era. The 
compartmentalization of information, the institutional separation of the political principals 
from the military, the lack of agent competition between the military and the scientists and 
the lack of independent oversight bodies created information asymmetries whose policy 
effects are now hard to overcome. Those institutional legacies mar both force lethality and 
the execution of nuclear operations.  
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Public assurances to the contrary, military leaders harbor deep concerns about the reliability 
of India’s tested warhead designs. Critical open-source data analysis of the 1998 tests is one 
source that feeds their doubt.582 More importantly, dissenting opinion within the nuclear 
design establishment has fueled even greater doubts.583 Several Indian nuclear scientists 
believe that the thermonuclear design did not achieve “efficient burn” and requires further 
“hot tests” to be validated.584 Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that India may have 
foregone weaponization of the thermonuclear device.585 The latter’s boosted-fission trigger 
may have been developed into a weapon. However, yield reliability of the boosted-fission 
design also remains in doubt with some weapon designers and scientists averring that the 
reliability of boosted designs is more an empirical art and less a science.586 It is thus entirely 
possible, as the best open-source analysis of the Indian tests surmised a decade ago, that 
simple Hiroshima-type 20-30kt fission weapons constitute the core of India’s nuclear 
inventory.587 But even in the case of the latter, lesser known concerns have surfaced with 
regards to the reliability of its non-nuclear detonation systems, such as an accurate height 
burst fuse.588  
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The Indian military finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place. Because of its long 
institutional isolation from the weapon design establishment, it lacks independent means to 
force credible “truth tests” on the scientists. On the other hand, it “has no choice” in the 
words of a former Chairman, CoSC, but to accept what the scientists certify as reliable.589 
The nuclear design establishment has sought to assure the military that warhead reliability 
can be certified through means of computer simulations, the separate testing of components 
and sub-systems, and sub-kiloton tests. However, the users remain skeptical that simulations 
and sub-system tests are a reliable proxy for integrated system tests.590 They also find 
dubious claims made by Indian nuclear scientists’ that they were able to collect sufficient 
data for computer simulations and sub-kiloton tests on the basis of a hasty and limited 
program of just five field tests, especially when other nuclear weapon powers have had to 
conduct several dozens of tests or even hundreds to achieve similar results.591 But they have 
no means to force the issue. According to at least two former Chairmen, CoSC who spoke 
to the author on the condition of anonymity, “…the military can’t go public with these 
things…but it has expressed its views in laid down channels at every opportunity…it has 
been done at the highest levels…but…the politicians believe that the existing state of affairs 
is ok…”592 
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Warhead yield limitations and reliability concerns have inevitably shifted attention to the 
performance of delivery systems: aircraft and ballistic missiles. Performance, according to 
the SFC, is less a problem with aircraft, which remain by far the most reliable and “flexible” 
nuclear delivery vectors in India’s inventory.593 Any limitations have to do with the aircrafts’ 
short-range, which restricts their use to the Pakistani theater of operations; and the 
uncertainty surrounding penetravity due to the lethal nature of modern air defenses. An 
Indian Air Force study conducted in the early 2000s showed for example that a single 
nuclear mission against Pakistan could tie up as many as 60 aircraft to assist the penetrating 
nuclear vector, a huge resource drain during a conventional war.594 Reliability however is a 
lesser concern with dual-use aircraft because the entire inventory is imported. In the case of 
modifications on the French Mirage 2000 for nuclear missions in the early 1990s, one of the 
key constraints had to do with the lack of access to the aircraft computer’s source code.595 
That is presumably no longer the case in the Su-30s that India acquired from Russia in the 
last decade.596  
 
The air vector’s range limitation and vulnerability to air defenses means that long-range 
ballistic missiles, land and sea-based, will be India’s primary means for targeting China. 
However, reliance on simple fission devices has raised the performance and reliability 
demands on ballistic missiles. Fission warheads are heavier than their boosted-fission and 
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thermonuclear cousins.597 Compared to the latter, they also consume more fissile material 
per unit.598 Furthermore, their lower yield means that a ballistic missile unit will likely have to 
deploy multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) to achieve the same bang 
that a single thermonuclear warhead would have achieved. More accurate guidance systems 
must now compensate for lower yields when targeting large urban centers over long 
distances.599 In other words, reliance on fission warheads has generated demands for ballistic 
missiles with greater throw-weight capacity and the development of other challenging 
technologies.  
 
The trouble arises because India’s long-range ballistic missiles suffer from a high launch 
failure rate. Further, the missiles have not been tested thoroughly. Ballistic missiles 
incorporate a range of critical technologies: boost, post-boost realignment and spin, stage 
separation, warhead separation, re-entry and navigation systems.600 Critical failure of any of 
these systems individually or in conjunction can cause catastrophic mission failure. In the 
Indian case, missile tests have been few. The Agni technology demonstrator (TD) flew only 
thrice during 1989-1994.601 Similarly, the medium-range Agni II was tested five times 
between 1999-2011,602 and the Agni III four times during 2006-2010.603 Failure rates have 
been high in the few tests conducted so far. For example, the Agni TD had a launch failure 
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rate of 33 percent.604 The medium-range Agni II and III have suffered launch failure rates of 
40 and 25 percent respectively.605 Furthermore, launch successes and failures tell us nothing 
about the performance of the missiles’ other critical systems concerning which data is scarce. 
Open source reports suggest however that even missiles that launched successfully, some 
suffered navigation malfunctions.606 In other words, the failure rate of some Indian ballistic 
missiles could be as high as 40-50 percent.  
 
The nuclear warhead and missile duo therefore constitute a highly unreliable system, which 
raises serious questions about the Indian arsenal’s credibility. In comparison to the Agni, the 
US MX ICBM was tested 80 times. Soviet and Russian missiles on average were put through 
10-20 tests to establish reliability.607 The reliability for US nuclear warheads is estimated 
between 0.99-0.995 percent. Their overall system reliability drops “sharply to between 0.8 
and 0.95” percent when mated with delivery systems. In theory, the combined system failure 
probability (nuclear warhead plus delivery system) decreases with every percentage drop in a 
delivery system’s reliability.608  
 
In India’s case, the reliability concerns are enormous because the missile systems flown so 
far were custom built as test-beds for validating technologies. It is generally a rule of the 
thumb that quality control during the prototype-manufacturing phase is far higher compared 
to normal assembly line production. There are concerns therefore that unless Indian missile 
entities master the industrial line production process, systems unreliability will become the 
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Achilles heel of the nuclear force.609 In order to address the reliability gap, the SFC claims it 
“has… issued general staff requirements for both the vectors as well as nuclear warheads.”610 
It has also demanded a larger number of missile tests under realistic field conditions to 
establish credible reliability baselines. Nonetheless, the scientific agencies have overruled the 
military in the past. A scientific panel appointed in 2002 to review the problem 
recommended that statistical analysis of component, subsystem and system testing coupled 
with “three consecutive” successful flight tests were cumulatively a good proxy for 
reliability.611 Due to the gradual institutionalization of agent competition between the 
scientists and military, problems of force lethality persist.  
 
In light of the significant reliability concerns, the SFC’s principal attempt has been to force a 
change in the methodology for nuclear force planning, warhead and delivery system 
numbers, from one based on heuristics to one based on robust statistical DE estimates. In 
the pre-SFC era, it is highly likely that projections of fissile material availability and crude 
guesstimates for overall systems and pre-launch survivability were the basis for force 
planning. The former C-in-C, SFC Air Marshal Bhavnani who oversaw the process during 
2004-2006 alluded to this reality when he complained:  
 
“…one of these grey areas in India has always been that civilian control has been so 
strong over security matters on matters related to strategic security etc., the senior 
military people do not fit into their scheme of things…when calculating, when 
strategizing, when coming out with solutions for making nuclear strategy. So in that 
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aspect when a person who has less knowledge about nuclear issues, he then feels that 
perhaps 10 or 15 nuclear weapons are good enough. We do not think so. Whilst we are 
there making sure that the weapons are ready, the missiles are ready, the platforms are 
ready…the strategizing is left to somebody else. So in that sense, who decides whether 
you need a 100 odd weapons or 10 weapons to achieve that deterrence…it is the 
strategists. The nation’s nuclear strategy…should be decided by a group of people who 
are well informed in this area…who are not there to make short term decisions, but the 
long term ones.”612 
 
However, the greater availability of fissile material in the aftermath of the 2005 Indo-US 
nuclear rapprochement and the deeper institutionalization of the SFC appear to have 
changed that reality. Senior SFC commanders such as Bhavnani’s successor Rear Admiral 
(retd.) Shankar insists, “Everything is numbers based…on operations research-based 
probabilistic analysis. The former is necessary to arrive at facts…in contrast to the intuitive 
gut-instinct analysis of the nuclear scientists, politicians, and their civilian advisors in the 
past.”613 
 
Alongside reliability issues, force reconstitution and operational employment remain the 
SFC’s other principal concerns. Whereas problems of force lethality stem from the legacy of 
the institutional separation between the military and their scientific agents, the problems of 
operational employment emanate from the institutional isolation of political principals from 
their military agents. Intrinsically, there are two reasons why senior SFC and other military 
leaders are uncomfortable India’s recessed posture and divided command and control. The 
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first has to do with overcoming the challenges of weak physical and organizational 
infrastructure. The second concerns the slow development of robust operations 
management practices.614 India’s operating conditions in the past decade have encountered 
the worst of two worlds: a disaggregated arsenal embedded within weak physical and 
organizational structures and management practices. 
 
During the mid-2000s for example, the SFC judged the infrastructure invisibles of the Indian 
nuclear force, especially its communications and transport networks, to be sub-par. “If 
Pakistan decides to launch [an attack] in such a way that it takes out your command and 
control…it decides to take out some of your nuclear nodes,” asserted former Chairman, 
CoSC Admiral Prakash, “and they inflict enough damage…then even our response may not 
be assured…”615 In the SFC’s internal war games involving ‘first-strike’ scenarios, the results 
are grim: the war dead numbering in millions, the losses of nuclear vectors and warheads in 
large numbers and the debilitating impact on command and control.616 Based on the dry runs 
to simulate what it would take to launch successful retaliatory strikes amidst the compressed 
decision-making time frames, the SFC’s focus has therefore turned to building the sinews of 
its response mechanisms. One obvious focus is physical infrastructure, which encompasses 
everything from secure communication networks, multiple and redundant command and 
control nodes, safe storage and launch hideouts for the nuclear force, and robust transport 
links for the secure passage of warheads, fissile cores and delivery vehicles.617 Away from the 
shadow of nuclear hardware, the latter are the invisibles that are becoming the focus of 
budgetary attention.  
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Side by side with physical infrastructure growth, human capital development is the other 
invisible that has become the focus of attention. As mentioned earlier, SFC’s staff is now 
nearly 100 strong and greater expansion is planned in the future. Soon after it was first 
instituted in 2003, “SFC postings were considered some of sort of a shit creek…a dead-end 
career move,” according to a Shankar. This was partly the result of new tri-service 
cooperation rules under which officers did not know how they would stand in their parent 
service after a joint-services stint. But that changed mid-decade. Human resource 
development tasks for the SFC are now set at the prime ministerial level. Officers serving in 
the SFC are better paid than their counterparts in other military commands. SFC postings 
are also regarded upward career moves. All officers assigned to the SFC now come in at 
senior levels, by which time they are already through with assignments at the staff college 
and higher command institutional training. Once officers are deputed to the SFC, their focus 
becomes exclusively nuclear and they learn “on the job” doing staff work. Furthermore, 
once an officer joins the SFC, there is continuity even when he returns to his parent service. 
The officer is “recycled,” meaning he returns to the SFC at a later date, at more senior levels. 
The two key aspects of this process are “continuity” and “recycling.”618 
 
All this said, infrastructure and human capital development are weak proxies for operational 
management.  The latter is the aggregation of intra- and inter-agency cooperation practices.  
It is the net effect of the actualization of SOPs and cooperation rules on the ground. Within 
the military itself, the failure of the CDS system has greatly delimited intra-agency 
cooperation. To be sure, SOPs have been prepared to coordinate action between the SFC 
                                                
618 Shankar, interview (2) with author.  
 218 
and the services. The formal rules mask the enormous significance of formal command, 
tasking and coordinating functions. In India’s case, the SOPs allow the quarantining of dual-
use vectors. Nonetheless, the SFC commander cannot on his own task the service chiefs due 
to his junior rank. He similarly “has to borrow assets” from the latter for mission support. 
Since the services retain control over most nuclear vectors, training for nuclear missions and 
their mission support functions also devolves upon them.619  Further, because of the SFC’s 
compartmentalization within the tri-service IDS, the SFC’s routine tasking requests to tri-
service agencies are routed through the CoSC.620 All SFC-service conflicts are also resolved 
at the level of the CoSC, which is a committee of equals. Gridlocks, should they occur, 
cannot be resolved by the chiefs. Such institutional conflicts in the nuclear realm can only be 
resolved at the level of the NSA in the PMO. Former staffers in the NSA’s secretariat have 
complained about having to fight the military’s intra-agency battles.621 Such cumbersome 
institutional arrangements, senior Indian military leaders fear, do not bode well for intra-
agency cooperation during war, especially one each service operates as an independent 
fiefdom and where conventional and nuclear operations are compartmentalized.  
 
In comparison to intra-agency cooperation however, inter-agency cooperation has even 
greater room for tensions and gridlock. Among the three groups that control nuclear 
weapons – the political class, the scientific agencies and the military, the latter is at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy.622 Neither the SFC commander nor the CoSC can direct the 
two scientific agencies, BARC and DRDO, to do their bidding.623 Likewise, neither do the 
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scientific agencies have jurisdiction over each other.624 Only the NSA has that authority, in 
effect making him the institutional bottleneck for all aggregating decisions within 
government.625 Three problems, all of which threaten operational efficiency, have arisen 
from the current management practices. The first is a classic principal-agent problem. The 
principals, the political class in this case, lack the knowledge and expertise to effectively 
monitor their agents, both the scientific and military agencies. In the case of the scientific 
agencies, institutional means to resolve problems of weapons reliability are lacking.626 In their 
lieu, civilian leaders privilege trust and personal relationships instead of scientific peer review 
processes to resolve credibility concerns. The institutional parity between the weapon 
developers (scientific agencies) and their users (military) also leaves the resolution of 
reliability issues in an institutional limbo. Second, the scientific agencies individually do not 
exercise any crosscutting authority over one other. Neither does the military exercise control 
over the procedures and training protocols developed by the scientific agencies individually. 
Such compartmentalization creates gaps in operationalization: the mastery of the “man-
machine” mix. Finally, the civilians, the political class and their bureaucratic advisors, have 
no “stomach for conventional or nuclear operations.”627 In the case of conventional 
operations, the civilians have ceded nearly full institutional control to the military. Fearful of 
nuclear operations they have sought to over-centralize control, thereby impeding planning, 
training and execution.  
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It is this weak intra- and inter-agency coordination and the poor aggregation at the top, 
Indian military leaders claim, which is the bane of the India’s recessed posture and divided 
command and control institutions. These institutions implicitly reflect best practices drawn 
from Sagan’s application of Perrow’s “normal accidents” theory to military-nuclear 
organizations. Very simplistically, the fundamental assumption of the Perrow-Sagan model is 
that tight coupling among highly interactive techno-organizational complexes with many 
moving parts constitutes the enabling condition for accidents.628 As one thing goes wrong, it 
rapidly cascades through the tightly integrated system to produce catastrophic failure. India’s 
operational model of force management, partly through agency and partly through historical 
path dependency conditions, aims to avoid this pitfall by adopting the logic of loosely 
coupled complex interacting systems. What Indian military leaders fear however is that the 
arsenal’s loose coupling superimposed on weakly coordinated organizational links and 
relatively compartmentalized common operating procedures among the nuclear and military 
agencies  will produce a logistical failure or accident. The loose coupling per se is not the 
problem. But the lack of a thick common institutional knowledge base and coordination and 
training practices to enable the military master the “machine-man” complex is.629  
 
In an ideal world where operational concerns trumped all others, the military would seek to 
recast the existing principal-agent relationship; replacing the current scientific-bureaucratic 
domination of the military with control directly exercised by the political leadership. 
Institutionalization of the position of CDS would also proceed forward to raise the level of 
intra-service coordination and command. But neither is likely in the near term. However, the 
military has sought to make an end run around the current institutional logjam by persuading 
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the political leadership to create a professional, composite, and integrated staff to advise the 
government on nuclear and related strategic issues at the level of the NSA. This new body, 
the Strategy Program Staff, draws personnel from BARC, DRDO, and the SFC. It consists 
of operations research specialists, mathematicians, a nuclear net assessment specialist, and 
military planners advise the NSA and the PMO and help give long-term direction to India’s 
nuclear strategy and assets/infrastructure development. More important, in light of the time 
compression in nuclear decision-making, the military hopes the new body will better assist  
the NCA to perform its executive functions.630  
 
Conclusion 
Following the 1998 nuclear tests and formal claims to nuclear power status, the Indian state 
has gradually shifted from a process of nuclear adaptation to nuclear learning. In adaptation, 
systems respond incrementally to systemic pressures. They develop new technological 
programs and add corresponding institutional and organizational routines to older ones 
without fundamentally questioning the means from ends initiatives. However, in learning, 
systems respond strategically to align means with ends. Epistemic communities and 
organizational decision-making structures help determine whether states simply adapt or 
seriously learn when confronted with systemic threats. 
 
In the pre-1998 era, nuclear epistemic networks were weakly institutionalized within the 
Indian state. Members of the nuclear network were thus unable to extract commitments 
from their political overlords. Virtually all information concerning the nuclear weapons 
program in this era was tightly compartmentalized. In the absence of information availability 
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and turnover, peer review of the state’s nuclear decisions was impossible. Further, due to the 
disaggregated nature of policy planning and decision-making within the state, serious gaps in 
India’s operational nuclear capabilities remained unaddressed.  
 
The absence of strong institutions and organizational processes had spillover effects in the 
post-1998 decade as well. Affairs continued as earlier, at least for the first half of the decade 
following the 1998 tests. Decision-makers continued to resort to gut checks and the 
resolution of problems in the sequence in which they presented themselves. Operational 
planning suffered as the military’s role remained non-institutionalized and decision-makers 
attended to first-order political problems thrown up by India’s formal claims to nuclear 
power status. Some optimization in tactical operational planning and at the procedural level 
has followed the institutionalization of the SFC since 2003. However, in areas such as force 
lethality, the path dependent effect of prior principal-agent relationships has closed off the 
road to any further optimization. Similarly, intra-military and inter-organizational operational 
management and coordination remain principal concerns.  
 
However, starting in the latter half of the last decade, the Indian state has begun to slowly 
institutionalize an operationally centric epistemic community in the office of the prime 
minister. Consisting of scientists, technologists, policy planers and the military, this group 
has begun to superimpose deductive planning approaches on what was earlier an ad hoc and 
disaggregated policy process. With greater information availability and turnover within this 
group, some “truth tests” or peer review processes are now possible in both technical and 
organizational domains. The end of the internal regime of nuclear opacity has also created 
organizational space for problem decomposition and resolution by multiple agencies within 
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the state. These latter conditions have injected competition and oversight over what was 
once an insulated and black-boxed area of state policy. More significant, however, the 
institutional and organizational changes cumulatively hold the promise of transforming what 
was earlier a heuristics-based approach to nuclear policy into a more structured and rational 
one.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION:  
In this dissertation I have developed a theoretical framework and presented evidence to 
show the unusual time lags in India’s development of an operational nuclear capability.  I 
have identified the institutional and organizational pathologies that are responsible for 
Indian’s inchoate response to an emerging Pakistani threat in the 1980s, its hesitancy in 
embedding nuclear weapons within soft operational routines during the 1990s and the slow 
tempo of operational developments in the decade thereafter. Institutional and cognitive 
decision-making frameworks, I argue, explain these phenomena better than traditional 
structural, normative and cultural ones.  
 
Specifically, I tie the Indian state’s decision-making pathologies to weak learning among its 
leaders. I attribute weak learning in turn to poorly functioning knowledge markets within the 
state, informal and ad hoc decision-making processes and virtually non-existent institutional 
oversight. The causal reason for these prevailing institutional practices, I argue, was India’s 
regime of internal opacity, which stymied institutional processes and distorted the state’s 
oversight mechanisms. Cumulatively, secrecy cocooned Indian leaders in an environment of 
relative ignorance, which produced sub-optimal outcomes.  
 
Even in the post-1998 era, the period in which India has gained acceptance as a de facto 
nuclear weapons power, doubts remain of India’s ability to operationally deploy a nuclear 
force effectively. This has as much to do with the lock-down effects of past technical choices 
as the difficulties India’s national security managers face in sloughing off past institutional 
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practices. In the last decade, especially from 2006 onward, India’s nuclear trajectory has 
aligned more closely with the expectations of structural theories. After stepping out from 
behind the veil of secrecy, Indian leaders have gradually mobilized a wider range of national 
security actors within the state, institutionalized structured decision-making processes and 
established oversight mechanisms to monitor the performance of the nuclear enclave. 
However, the time it has taken Indian policy to match the rationality and optimality assumed 
in principle by structural theories points to the stickiness of existing institutions and the path 
dependencies they engender through sunk costs. 
 
Among all nuclear weapon powers, India’s case stands out as an exception. Although India’s 
development timeline for building a nuclear device is equivalent to that of its peers, it took 
India nearly four times as long to finish the process of weaponization. India’s gap between 
weaponization and the development of soft operational routines also compares unfavorably 
with other nuclear weapon powers. Due to this gap in state performance, two questions 
arise. First, if India is an exception then what explains that exception? Is there something 
specific about Indian institutions, the nature of its bureaucracy or its civil-military relations 
that set it apart from other nuclear weapon powers? Second, if secrecy and the institutional-
organizational pathologies associated with it produces distortionary effects, then are similar 
effects observable in other cases of nuclear proliferation? If they are not, then the natural 
question is why not? After all, secrecy is an institutional characteristic of all nuclear weapon 
programs. Is there then some variation in the institution of secrecy that distorts rationality 
and produces sub-optimal outcomes?  
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So far as bureaucracy is concerned, the Indian nuclear weapons program operated within a 
sequestered enclave. The state did not establish its standard supervisory controls over it and 
compensated for that deliberate oversight by placing the enclave under the direct control of 
the PMO. However, the development history of other nuclear weapon powers suggests that 
India’s practice was not unusual. In the US, the Manhattan Project unfolded under the direct 
oversight of the president and a small council of senior advisors. Through the duration of 
World War II, Congress, the president’s cabinet and other oversight authorities within the 
US government knew nothing of it. In France, scientists enjoyed significant autonomy in the 
first seven years of the nuclear program and civilian bureaucrats deferred to their judgments. 
In Israel as well, Prime Minister Ben Gurion ran the Dimona nuclear reactor project as a 
state within a state. The examples of China, Pakistan and Iraq were no different. In all states, 
nuclear enclaves showed characteristics of high centralization and administrative autonomy. 
The difference between the Indian and the US, French, Israeli and Pakistani cases, however, 
lies in the treatment accorded to institutional processes and the near total absence versus the 
existence of some albeit weak oversight mechanisms.  
 
The second question concerns civil-military relations. Many attribute the distrust in India’s 
civil-military relations as the cause behind its odd nuclear behavior. If this were true, 
however, we would see manifestations of distrust elsewhere: in conventional war operations 
and in military aid to civilian authorities. However, we observe contrary trends in both cases. 
The Indian military enjoys near total autonomy in conventional war operations. Civilians set 
strategic goals and allow the military autonomy to plan and execute operations.631 India’s 
civilian leadership has also not hesitated to use the military to manage India’s internal crisis 
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of governability. As Shashank Joshi has pointed out, of the 17 major military campaigns the 
Indian military has conducted in post-independent India’s history, 12 were domestic in 
nature. Between 1982-1989 for example, the army deployed 721 times to assist civilian 
authorities.632 Over the last decade as well, the Indian military’s role has become 
institutionalized in the nuclear decision-making process. In fact, over the last decade, the 
SFC has gained significant influence in nuclear force planning, user certification of weapon 
systems and the development of command and control institutions, training, and 
infrastructure invisibles. Institutional and operational changes in Indian nuclear planning 
have come without any fundamental rewrite in the DNA of civil-military relations 
 
In other nuclear weapon powers as well, governments gradually shared control of nuclear 
weapons with the military. Decision-makers either kept nuclear weapon programs outside 
the purview of the military as an institution or compartmentalized them within a small 
section of the services. A prominent example of this policy behavior is the US itself. 
Although the US allocated nuclear bombs to the air force for use against Japan during World 
War II, the Joint Chiefs and the air force were not privy to details about the nuclear weapons 
until 1949, the year the Soviet Union ended US nuclear monopoly and forced President 
Truman’s administration to take nuclear operational planning seriously.633 In France too, 
with the exception of a small group of military officers, the military as an institution 
remained more interested in guerilla warfare in the colonies and conventional rearmament, 
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until the Gaillard  government signed off on the development of a nuclear device in 1958.634 
In the Israeli case, the 1967 Six-Day War catalyzed the military’s institutional participation in 
nuclear operations planning.635 The Pakistani program too began as a civilian enterprise. The 
Pakistani military gained control of the program in the aftermath of a coup in 1977. But until 
the early 2000s, institutional planning with regard to nuclear weapons was tightly restricted 
to a small section within the military.636 
 
The difference between India and most other nuclear weapon powers essentially centers on 
the process of weapon development and operational plans and procedures concerning it. In 
other nuclear powers, the decision to develop nuclear weapons was followed by the 
mobilization of a highly select but diverse set of epistemic actors. The latter included 
scientists, civilian bureaucrats, military leaders and political authorities. The epistemic actors 
enjoyed formal institutional status and had relatively easy access to decision-makers. Once 
institutionalized, the epistemic actors were successful in persuading decision-makers to make 
political and budgetary commitments to bring the programs to fruition. No doubt, decision-
makers reduced the scale and scope of structured decision-making. But they did not abandon 
structure altogether. Above all, despite the regime of secrecy, the principals ensured a 
modicum of agent competition and third-party scrutiny to monitor the performance of the 
programs.  
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The institutional difference between the United States, France, Israel and Pakistan and India 
is one between the degrees of secrecy. Secrecy can be conceptualized as a continuum - low, 
medium and high - along two axes: internal and external. High external secrecy has a less 
debilitating impact on the domestic management of the program than a corresponding 
regime of high internal secrecy. The two are no doubt interlinked.  A state most concerned 
with hiding its proliferation effort from external scrutiny will also be inclined to keep it 
under tight wraps domestically. Correspondingly, a state less concerned with external secrecy 
will have more breathing room for establishing institutionalized management controls 
within. A lower degree of domestic secrecy also creates more institutional space for 
structured decision-making and parallel problem solving across multiple agencies within the 
state.  
 
In the rest of the chapter I briefly survey the nuclear management practices of four states to 
compare and contrast them with India’s. I classify India as a case of high external and 
domestic secrecy. My first three comparison cases are France, Israel and Pakistan. I show 
that France falls in the category of low external and medium domestic secrecy; Israel of 
medium external and medium domestic secrecy; and Pakistan of low external and medium 
domestic secrecy. I argue that the absence of high external and domestic secrecy in France, 
Israel and Pakistan were permissive conditions that allowed decision-makers and planners to 
design better institutional means to manage nuclear weapon programs. My fourth case is 
Iraq, which I show closely parallels India because it too followed institutional practices of 
high external and domestic secrecy. The Iraqi example, I argue, reveals many of the 
institutional pathologies that stymied Indian management. Other examples of states, which 
instituted regimes of high external and internal opacity are Libya and Iran. The latter two are 
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promising avenues for future research but are not part of this chapter. I finally cap the 
chapter with a brief  hypothetical discussion of the sources of India’s exceptional regime of 
secrecy.  
 
Regimes of Moderate Secrecy and Proliferation Outcomes 
The French, Israeli and Pakistani cases are time-lapse mechanisms that capture institutional 
variations in the regime of secrecy. Although each state conducted its nuclear program in 
secrecy, the secrecy was never sufficiently acute to jeopardize institutional controls within 
the state.  
 
France 
In many ways the French route to nuclear weapons shares similarities with India.  As in the 
Indian case, strong political direction was lacking. The political characteristic that best 
defined the French Fourth Republic was a series of unstable governments and rapidly 
changing cabinets. Prime ministerial direction was sometimes contrary to actual policy 
suggesting that prime ministerial incumbents were not on top of their nuclear policy game. 
Just like in India, a relatively small group of people in positions of authority operating 
though informal channels worked on the atomic energy program.637 And yet unlike India, 
despite the political drift, the French nuclear weapons program proved remarkably 
successful. Beginning in the mid-1950s, it took France just five years to explode a nuclear 
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device.638 Equally significant, weaponization and deployment followed in the immediate 
aftermath.639  
 
On closer examination, the evidence suggests that similarities between the French and 
Indian cases are more apparent than real. For one, the secrecy in the French program was 
not so obsessive so as to prevent the mobilization of epistemic actors or coordination across 
multiple agencies. Prior to World War II, France was one of the leading centers of atomic 
research in the world. Subsequent to World War II, the French government sought to 
resume the interrupted research for both civilian and potentially military purposes.640 There 
was little reason for excessive secrecy because there was no major opposition to the French 
program. The US knew little of the French program in its early stages from 1947-55. 
Further, until Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ program in 1953, the US was ambivalent 
about proliferation in the international system.641 Indeed, the French were so open about 
nuclear weapons development and impending tests in Algeria in the late 1950s that Morocco 
along with some other African states introduced a General Assembly resolution in the UN 
concerning the anticipated fallout from those tests.642  
 
The difference between the French approach to nuclearization and the one adopted by the 
US and Britain was the lack of sustained top-down political direction. The lack of such  
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political direction however did not mean that administrative direction was lacking as well. 
The French civilian bureaucracy wielded great power in drafting the directing and execution 
of the nuclear program. The lack of political direction and the absence of external 
opposition allowed policy entrepreneurs inside the bureaucracy free reign to shape policy. 
Three characteristics contributed to the successful execution of the French program. The 
first was the mobilization of an array of epistemic actors beyond scientists.  Second, the 
French bureaucrats formalized the policy planning process. All policy was subject to scrutiny 
by independent committees of scientists, private industry and civil bureaucrats before formal 
approval by political leaders. Third, strong institutional controls mitigated principal-agent 
problems common to all sequestered decision-making environments. 
 
The scientists under the leadership of Joilot-Curie dominated the program only briefly in its 
inception phase from 1945-52. The goals of the bureaucrats and scientists in this phase were 
to bring the French program back up to speed from where it had left off in the pre-World 
War II era, signal French interest in atomic energy and become included in the US-British 
strategic partnership. The primary focus of the Commisariat a l’Energie Atomique (CEA ) in the 
first seven years was therefore research and competence building.643 Thereafter, the CEA’s 
goal became industrial. It shifted to the production of electricity from atomic energy and 
possibly build nuclear weapons. With this change, power also shifted away from the 
scientists in favor of civilian administrators.644  
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The end of the autistic phase of the research and development program and the linkage with 
tangible industrial objectives invariably led to a wider mobilization of epistemic actors. 
Scientists came under pressure to accept the judgment of “technicians” and “planners.”645 
The need for specialized material and equipment for the conduct of nuclear experiments led 
to the establishment of linkages with French private industry. In the post-1952 phase, the 
Industrial Equipment Committee advised the CEA on all industrial, equipment and plant 
matters. The entire membership of the committee, 6-12 members, was associated with 
private industry.646 In the absence of any overwhelming requirement for secrecy, the military 
had representation in the CEA. There was no pressure from senior military leaders to build 
nuclear weapons. But the plutonium production program did not go unnoticed within the 
military. As the plutonium production plan gained momentum within CEA, the 
Commandement des Armes Speciales conducted studies to include the use of nuclear weapons and 
conditions necessary for their manufacture. The study concluded that nuclear armament was 
conceivable for France.647  
 
Institutional controls were weak in only the first seven years of the CEA’s inception. During 
these years, the CEA was unique among other French public sector organizations, which 
included electricity, gas, coal and banking. A ministry typically exercised control over a 
public sector organization. In contrast, the CEA was granted administrative autonomy, 
placed under the control of the prime minister and removed from the control of the 
traditional bureaucracy.648 The CEA was a “bicephalous” organization with a scientist High 
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Commissioner (HC) and a bureaucrat Administrative-General (AG) at its head.  Both were 
co-equal and in case of a dispute the prime minister arbitrated matters.649 In the first seven 
years the scientific experts gained almost exclusive control of the CEA due to the absence of 
parliamentary and cabinet guidance. Frequent changes in the cabinet made links with the 
government tenuous. Due to this lack of political interference, the CEA became used to 
“freedom of action” and “autonomy.” Joilot-Curie’s towering personality and the solidarity 
of the scientists also compelled the administrative branch of the government to defer to the 
scientific leadership.650 But even during the CEA’s phase of relative autonomy, the civilian 
administration exercised institutional checks on the CEA through an independent Scientific 
Council, which consisted of 10 scientists who were external to the commissariat and among 
the most prominent scientists in France.651  
 
After the CEA’s industrial turn of direction in 1951-52, institutional controls and oversight 
authority over it were strengthened. As early as 1950, the HC and eminence grise of French 
nuclear science, Joilot-Curie, was forced to resign his position because of his communist 
leanings.652 During the first phase of the nuclear program, a Secretary General (SG) served as 
the link between the HC and the AG. In 1953, the post of the SG was abolished because it 
represented a threat to the office of the AG.653 The selection of associates on the governing 
body of the CEA and the issues brought before the inter-ministerial body in government 
also became the AG’s prerogative. The number of associates appointed to the CEA’s 
governing board was increased. The new board included scientists to assist the HC, 
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members of industry, a military representative, the director of the Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique, and three civil servants appointed by the prime minister. This gave the 
civilian bureaucrats dominant control over the CEA.654 The independent Scientific Council 
was also expanded from 10 to 15 members. It was given more formal powers including the 
power to render advice independent of the CEA on all matters submitted to it. Furthermore, 
the AG acquired the power to revoke contracts without approval of the HC in matters of 
scientific and technical personnel.655 Such institutional controls and oversight authority 
mitigated some of the classic principal-agent problems that afflict closed decision-making 
systems.  
 
Without doubt, the French nuclear weapons program was fragmented. Many scientists in the 
CEA were opposed to building weapons on moral grounds. They were also concerned that a 
military program would precede the peaceful uses of atomic energy such as the building of 
electricity generation reactors; the bomb would siphon off money from such projects.656 The 
French military as an institution was generally more interested in the insurgent war in Indo-
China and in building up its conventional military strength.657 But despite the absence of 
overwhelming support for nuclear weapons, as an institution, the military undertook routine 
steps to acquaint military officers with atomic weapons and energy. Initial studies conducted 
by the military involved protection from atomic weapons rather than use. The Army also 
started the practice of sending a small group of officers to the CEA and universities annually 
for training in the nuclear sciences.658  
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Pressure for the weapons program came from civilian administrators such as Dautry and 
Lescop who gave it continuity. They, together with a small number of allies in the cabinet 
and the military, they gave it strong central direction. As the nuclear weapons program 
gained momentum in the mid-1950s, the civilian bureaucrats built a coalition with the 
services and persuaded the army to invest in a plutonium production reactor and the navy to 
invest in reactor project for nuclear submarines.659 The involvement of the services in the 
nuclear project through representation in the CEA, through investments in the CEA’s 
various projects and through training routines were standard coordination practices in an 
institutional setting where the nuclear weapons program was a classified project but not one 
that was subject to external threats, denial or excessive domestic secrecy. Despite the overall 
fragmentation and lack of political direction, there was an administrative continuity and 
simultaneity that gave the project technical coherence once political leaders decided in favor 
of a nuclear weapons program.  
 
 
Israel 
Unlike France, Israel developed its nuclear weapons program under a regime of medium 
external and domestic secrecy secrecy. A higher degree of external secrecy was considered 
necessary to protect France, Israel’s key supplier of the Dimona reactor and plutonium 
reprocessing plant. It was also a means to deny hostile Arab states the opportunity for pre-
emptive attacks on Dimona and to stave off pressure from the United States. The Israeli 
program spawned the regime of what we now term “nuclear opacity” under which a state 
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hints that it possesses nuclear weapons but then denies having them. All this said, however, 
there was no excruciating international pressure on Israel, either economic or military, to 
terminate its nuclear weapons program. The United States was ambivalent.660 After Egypt’s 
military setback in the 1955-56 Suez Crisis, the threat of a pre-emptive strike on the Israel’s 
Dimona plutonium production plant became manageable. In the aftermath of the Suez 
crisis, the French became even more steadfastly committed to investing in Israel’s nuclear 
weapons effort. And the British defended Israel’s nuclear innocence in public.661  
 
As with any secret program, institutional controls were weak. The Israeli parliament, the 
Knesset did not know of it until the project was well underway. The full cabinet did not 
debate its merits and implications. The program operated under the direct control of Prime 
Minister Ben Gurion and his principal aides in the defense ministry, Peres and Bergmann.  
Within the defense ministry itself, the program was fragmented. There was no formal chain 
of command or standardized procedures and accountability mechanisms. Defense minister 
Peres who ran the project on the prime minister’s behalf believed in personal relationships. 
The unusual nature of fund raising for the project through private donations also injected an 
element of non-accountability.662  
 
But the evidence is more complex. Although the nuclear weapons project was not debated 
within the cabinet at large, leading cabinet ministers and leaders of the ruling MAPAI party 
leaders knew of it and contested key aspects of the project. The Dimona project was also 
monitored by a section of nuclear scientists located in the Weizmann Institute outside the 
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state. This group of nuclear scientists acted as an independent institutional check. Third, as 
the Dimona reactor neared completion in 1963, Prime Minister Eshkol who succeeded Ben 
Gurion, ended the bureaucratic fragmentation and established centralized control along with 
accountability mechanisms. Finally, the lack of significant international opposition to the 
program and French role as a supplier of critical technologies, plant and equipment, 
mitigated internal principal-agent problems and allowed Israel to pursue weapon 
development and delivery simultaneously.  
 
Between 1955 and the end of the 1960s, Israel was extraordinarily sensitive to the French 
need for secrecy. Due to the unprecedented nature of the Dimona deal, French politicians 
were unsure if France should go through with it entirely. For that reason, there were two 
parts to the Dimona agreement. The first part was political in which French commitments to 
Israel were left deliberately vague. The second half was the technical agreement that too did 
not mention sensitive details about the Dimona project such as the size of the nuclear 
reactor and most importantly, details of the spent-fuel reprocessing plant, the key to 
producing weapons-grade plutonium. Both governments circumvented details by dealing 
with French companies directly.663  
 
Within Israel itself, the Dimona project, was not debated in the full cabinet. However, key 
ministers in Ben Gurion’s government such as Peres (defense), Eshkol (commerce), and 
Meir (foreign affairs) – knew of it, if not all the details. Meir in particular contested the 
project  and that conflict became intertwined with her political rivalry with Peres. As foreign 
minister, Meir resented Peres’s direct dealing with France, which she argued circumvented 
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the foreign affairs ministry and amounted to a separate foreign policy.664 Separately, the 
ruling MAPAI party’s senior leadership resented the secrecy of the project and Ben Gurion 
and Peres’s creation of a state within a state.665  
 
The Dimona project was also monitored externally by a strong lobby of nuclear scientists 
housed in Weizmann Institute, which was home to nuclear physicists focused on pure 
research other than the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), the state agency 
concerned with industrial projects. Within the state, Dimona was spearheaded by Bergmann 
who had a falling out at the Weizmann Institute over its institutional direction in 1951 after 
which he left and began his appointment as scientific advisor to Prime Minister Ben 
Gurion.666 Bergman found an ally in Mardor in the defense ministry. A team of nuclear 
physicists led by Shalit and Ze’ev opposed Dimona for both its scale and audacity. More 
specifically, they questioned Bergmann and Mardor’s competence to execute so complex and 
immense a project. In response then Defense Minister Peres formed a special three-man 
committee comprising Shalit, Ze’ev, and Lipkin to plan and monitor the project 
independently. Further, Bergman and Mardor were removed from direct oversight of the 
project. Peres also brought in a Colonel Manes Pratt, military officer from the outside, to 
execute the construction of the Dimona reactor and plutonium separation plant.667  
 
In 1963 Eshkol succeeded Ben Gurion as prime minister. As the Dimona reactor neared 
completion, Eshkol’s government enacted a series of organizational, financial, technical and 
strategic reforms within the defense ministry and the atomic energy sector to institutionalize 
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nuclear weapons production and embed it within institutional oversight, organizational 
coordination and a web of strategic thought.668 During Ben Gurion’s time, Peres ran the 
Dimona project out of defense ministry. He sub-divided the project into a series of mini-
projects and managed them on the basis of personal relationships with individuals who ran 
them. But there existed no centralized institutional management beyond Peres. Eshkol and 
his band of reformers changed all that.  
 
As a first step, Eshkol installed the economist and his senior aide Dinstein as Deputy 
Minister of Defense. As Dinstein recalls, until his time, there was no clear hierarchy, no clear 
chain of command, no clear cut division of labor, and no established procedures for order of 
business in the Dimona project. This is consistent with the theoretical observation in this 
dissertation that secrecy induces disaggregation and non-institutionalization within 
organizations. However, Dinstein ended the fragmentation within the nuclear program and 
established central oversight. Between 1955-1965, for example, the scientists had assumed 
oversight role in the program due to the absence of an independent authority. Dinstein 
brought an end to this practice by strengthening the role of the scientific advisor to the 
defense minister and institutionalizing his power with an independent advisory body. 
Similarly in 1965, Dinstein also divested control of the “leading project” from RAFAEL, the 
defense ministry’s scientific research and development body, and shared that authority with a 
revived IAEC.669   
 
The Dimona complex yielded plutonium in 1965. By 1966, Israel had accumulated sufficient 
plutonium to build a bomb. In November 1966 Israel conducted a critical test, most likely a 
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‘cold test’ to validate the weapon’s design.670 Parallel with the bomb program, Israel 
contracted to purchase nuclear-capable combat aircraft and ballistic missiles from France in 
1963.671 The special technical partnership with France and the absence of disruptive US 
pressure made that feasible. Simultaneously, Eshkol roped in the military to think through 
how Israel might plan to use nuclear weapons. The composite group consisted of Eshkol, 
Dinstein, Rabin, Yuval Ne’eman, and Colonels Avraham, Tamir, and Freier. Around 1966, 
Israel also commenced long-term systematic strategic planning and introduced five-year 
plans for developing a force structure alongside a 10-year research and development plan.672 
The 1967 Six-Day War ultimately acted as a catalyst to further the military’s participation and 
institutionalize its role in operational planning.  
 
What all this evidence tells us is that despite the intense secrecy, Ben Gurion’s government 
did not jeopardize institutional processes entirely. Ben Gurion’s senior colleagues in the 
cabinet were aware of and debated Israel’s Dimona project. Like any other classified 
program, Israeli leaders implemented the nuclear weapons program sequentially. Military 
leaders were not involved in strategic planning until the completion of the first phase of 
weapon development. However, many of Israel’s problems with disaggregation and 
sequential planning were mitigated by France’s role in the supply of dual-use delivery 
systems, both aircraft and ballistic missiles. The US decision not to challenge that supply 
relationship helped prevent schedule slippages. Likewise, the US decision not to disrupt 
Israel’s nuclear quest by threatening conventional military supplies gave Israeli leaders the 
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structural space to partially institutionalize and coordinate the program domestically despite 
the high secrecy.  
 
 
Pakistan 
Contrary to popular perceptions, Pakistan in the early 1970s was relatively open about its 
interest in nuclear weapons. The event that launched the Pakistani program was a conference 
of nuclear scientists that Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called in 1972 to solicit their 
effort in building a bomb. The conference in the city of Multan was a relatively open one 
with nearly 400 attendees including westerners and journalists. At the conference, the 
scientists openly supported the bomb project and Bhutto promised them the resources and 
political support to do so. Unlike the Indian program where the decision to build a nuclear 
device in 1972 was reached by the prime minister after consulting three nuclear scientists 
privately, Bhutto’s Multan meeting, according to one observer, had the ambience of a “fish 
market!”673 
 
Pakistan’s relative confidence that its bomb project would not stand thwarted had to do with 
its strategy and the nature of its relationship with the United States. Unlike India, which 
diverted fissile material from facilities acquired explicitly for peaceful purposes, Pakistan 
proposed to import an entire plutonium-based nuclear fuel-cycle, place all the imported 
plant and equipment under international safeguards, but then use the skills and experience 
gained from running them to replicate domestic capabilities for a weapons program.674 To 
provide the semblance of a peaceful nuclear program, the Pakistan Atomic Energy 
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Commission (PAEC) drew up an ambitious plan to build 24 nuclear power reactors and 
justified its proposed heavy water and plutonium reprocessing plants.675 Second, Pakistan’s 
alliance and special relationship with the US also gave it confidence that Washington would 
likely acquiesce to a Pakistani nuclear program. Prior in 1969, Pakistan had facilitated 
Kissinger and Nixon’s “opening” to China. Nixon returned that favor by ordering the 
famous “tilt” in favor of Pakistan during the 1971 Bangladesh War with India.676  
 
Due to relatively moderate regime of secrecy Pakistani leaders mobilized a larger array of 
epistemic actors and took several steps to establish institutional controls. The latter were not 
entirely successful as the example of A.Q. Khan’s nuclear shenanigans would later show. 
However, the institutionalization was sufficient for the task of coordination across multiple 
state agencies. In one manner, Pakistan’s institutional arrangements were similar to India. 
The PAEC and its chairman reported directly to the prime minister / president. However, 
Bhutto realized that he was unable to devote sufficient time on all matters nuclear. He 
therefore institutionalized the process by setting up the Defense Committee of the Cabinet 
(DCC) as the inter-ministerial coordination arm for the weapon program within government. 
The DCC consisted of the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, finance, information, the 
three service chiefs, a representative of the PAEC and the secretary to the Pakistan Peoples 
Party.677 It decided that Pakistan should pursue the nuclear cycle and the weapon design 
project simultaneously. Pakistan prepared a test site for the forthcoming nuclear bomb as 
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early as 1979.678 Further, the weapon design and test of the non-fissile material trigger 
assembly preceded the availability of fissile material from indigenous Pakistani facilities.679  
 
It would be a stretch to argue that Pakistan pursued the development of the weapon and 
delivery capability simultaneously. The modification of aircraft for nuclear delivery followed 
the development of the weapon. However, due to the integral nature of decision-making 
through the DCC and the military’s institutional representation on that committee, the 
Pakistani Air Force (PAF) was able to coordinate its efforts with the PAEC and begin 
tackling the task of modifying F-16s by the late 1980s. That effort did not bear fruit until the 
mid-1990s.680 Until then, transport aircraft were Pakistan’s delivery weapon of choice.  But 
the PAF drew up contingency plans involving a nuclear demonstration shot using C-130 
Hercules transport aircraft as early as 1986.681  Further, Pakistan’s feigned movement of 
nuclear assets during the 1990 Kashmir Crisis with India to draw US attention is indirect 
evidence of the existence of planning procedures for nuclear deployment and use.682  
 
Knowledge and material assistance from China also helped Pakistan outsource many of the 
coordination and parallel tasking challenges that states find difficult to tackle under a regime 
of secrecy. The Chinese assistance involved the training of Pakistani nuclear scientists in 
weapon design in Chinese laboratories, the sharing of an actual weapon blueprint, the design 
of explosive lenses for an implosion-type weapon, the transfer of a neutron initiator, 
assistance with underground testing, and possibly the conduct of an actual underground 
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nuclear test for Pakistan at China’s Lop Nur test site in 1990.683  China also transferred 
complete ballistic missile systems, the M-9 and M-11, to Pakistan in the early 1990s. The 
transfer package involved training Pakistani missile operators, maintenance, and storage and 
upkeep functions. China also built a turnkey missile facility in Pakistan for the manufacture 
of solid-fuel ballistic missiles,684 a step that enabled Pakistan to outsource the development 
of an entire category of delivery vehicles to a legally recognized nuclear weapon state, which 
was relatively immune to nonproliferation pressures.  
 
Like other organizations where information flow is generally restricted, the Pakistani state 
and decision-makers also encountered difficulties in monitoring the performance of their 
scientific agents. Thus, despite Bhutto’s enthusiasm for the plutonium fuel cycle between 
1972-76, he was unable to accurately assess the claims of the PAEC that it was making 
progress. One method leaders use to monitor performance within organizations is agent 
competition. The latter lowers the cost of information exchange and shines the light on 
problems, successes and failures. Regimes of secrecy however raise the bar for information 
exchange thereby compounding the problem of management. Pakistani leaders did not 
design agent competition but stumbled upon it by pursuing the plutonium and uranium 
routes to nuclear weapons simultaneously. The agent competition became institutionalized in 
the PAEC under Munir Ahmed Khan, the organization tasked with mastering the plutonium 
fuel cycle and the Engineering Research Labs (ERL),685 the organization that under A. Q. 
Khan led Pakistan’s centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program. Both entities and their 
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leaders acted as conduits of information for political decision-makers.686 They also provided 
institutional oversight over each other. Zia who succeeded Bhutto after staging a coup 
realized the benefits of this competition and extended it to nuclear weapon design.687 
Likewise, in the 1990s, the PAEC and the ERL competed against each other in the 
development of ballistic missiles, with the former pursuing solid-fuel rockets through 
collaboration with China and the latter liquid-fuel systems in collaboration with North Korea 
and Iran.688  
 
The agent competition did not address the problem of information asymmetries entirely. 
Pakistan’s dictator General Zia discovered to his unpleasant surprise that A Q Khan was 
prone to manipulating his political masters. Zia subsequently divested control of the weapon 
development project from ERL and reverted it back to the PAEC’s control.689 Subsequently 
in the 1990s, Khan peddled centrifuge and nuclear weapon designs to other states including 
Iran, Iraq and Libya among others. The Pakistani government denied sanctioning these deals 
and cited the problem of information asymmetries and control in conditions of secrecy.690 
The agent competition between PAEC and ERL also produced distrust and inefficiencies in 
the Pakistani program.691 The PAEC, for example, favored indigenous technologies versus 
Khan who preferred foreign vendors and refused critical inputs from domestic Pakistani 
vendors for his uranium enrichment plant. In the larger scheme of things, however, the 
agent competition between the PAEC and ERL worked to Pakistani decision-makers’ 
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advantage. They ultimately benefited from the independent oversight of Chinese entities and 
scientists who played the role of external consultants in helping Pakistan develop its nuclear 
arsenal.  
 
An Example of a Regime of High-Secrecy 
In comparison to the above cases, Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq instituted a regime of 
high external and domestic secrecy to hide its nuclear weapons effort during the 1980s. Like 
India, the regime of extreme secrecy became the source of several managerial pathologies, 
which produced serious lags in the execution of the program.   
 
Iraq 
In the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War, it became a common assumption that Iraq 
was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons; and that had the war not intervened, Saddam 
would have acquired them.  In the wake of the war, IAEA inspections revealed an extensive 
Iraqi uranium enrichment program, which encompassed all three industrial methods used to 
enrich uranium: Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS), gas diffusion and the 
centrifuge. International inspectors also discovered that Iraqi scientists were working on the 
design of a nuclear weapon.692 Together with Iraq’s possession of biological weapons and 
toxic nerve agents such as VX, Iraq emerged as the new menace in the Middle East. The 
discoveries concerning the scale and scope of Iraq’s nuclear ambitions came as a shock 
because so little was previously known about them in the outside world; and also because of 
the prevailing belief that Israel had ended Iraqi nuclear ambitions in June 1981 by destroying 
the Osiraq reactor.  
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But since the early 1990s, more sober re-assessments by international inspectors and the 
accounts of leading Iraqi scientists in the program suggest that initial assumptions about 
Iraqi nuclear advances were wrong. Not only was Iraq far from producing an actual weapon 
immediately prior to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, but it is unclear if it would have 
succeeded in the decade after. US inspector Robert Kelley who was part of the international 
inspectors’ team observed later that Iraq’s EMIS isotope separation effort amounted to 
investments in an industrial project on a gigantic scale, which had little to show for it. The 
EMIS machines were so poorly designed that each required its own team of operators. 
Overall 96 machines were required for producing sufficient uranium for a nuclear weapons 
program. Iraq, overall, did not even possess a fraction of the technical manpower needed. 
The gas centrifuge project was still in the feasibility stage. Finally, the nuclear weapon design 
itself, according to Kelley, was more like a student project. The Iraqi scientists and engineers 
had ploughed through the literature and collated everything needed to build a weapon 
without knowing how to build a workable design.693  
 
Serious management problems, according to Kelley, stymied the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
effort. Those problems, as the evidence below shows, had substantially to do with extreme 
secrecy: vertical compartmentalization of information, weak institutions, sequential planning, 
information asymmetries between principals and agents, and the lack of agent competition in 
general. Israel’s destruction of the Osiraq reactor drove the program underground.694 Prior to 
this event, the program had relatively strong institutional controls within and enjoyed the 
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benefit of independent French oversight, the external contracting party for the reactor.  It 
had not been Saddam’s intent to build a bomb using the Osiraq reactor. Several technical 
features of the reactor including its size, the nature of the special “caramel” fuel supplied by 
France and close monitoring by French technicians and international inspectors, rendered 
that impossible.695 Iraq’s goal in acquiring nuclear weapons through the reactor was likely a 
long-term one: to use the reactor to train scientific manpower, which could later be re-
deployed to develop such weapons.696  
 
But in the wake of the reactor’s destruction, Saddam ordered Iraqi scientists to develop 
nuclear weapons. Starting in 1982, the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission’s (IAEC) budget 
saw massive increases. Saddam ended his regime’s political vendetta against several nuclear 
scientists and rehabilitated them. Between 1982 and 1987, the IAEC enjoyed professional 
autonomy and there was seldom interference by political authorities.697 Saddam’s decision 
nonetheless came with the very specific condition that the uranium enrichment program 
should not arouse suspicion abroad. The IAEC was not to procure sensitive plant, 
equipment or material from abroad. The entire Iraqi program therefore went underground. 
This had four deleterious consequences. First, Iraqi scientists settled on vintage technologies 
that they could develop indigenously, but also those that were unlikely to succeed in 
producing enriched uranium on an industrial-scale. Second, secrecy conditions forced them 
to proceed with each technology through the trial-and-error method sequentially, a process 
that produced lags in the program. Third, because of minimal contact with the outside world 
and reduced communications within the nuclear scientific and engineering establishment 
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itself, the programs suffered from the lack of independent oversight and scrutiny. Finally, 
because the scientific teams working on different uranium enrichment technologies were 
isolated from each other, agent competition was minimal. The result was that Saddam until 
very late in the game accepted the assurances of progress from his agents without the benefit 
of independent audits.  
 
Iraq initially embarked on two rival paths to uranium enrichment: the EMIS and the Gas 
Diffusion methods. For secrecy reasons both teams worked independently of each other.698 
The head of the nuclear program Jafar Dhia drew up stringent procedures for documenting 
and auditing scientific and technical reports not just to assure technical quality but also to 
control their distribution within the agencies working on the programs.699  To further 
prevent leaks, Dhia settled on an over-centralized method of management. No horizontal 
communication was permitted between the physics, chemistry, and engineering teams 
working on the projects. Each team communicated its requirements through Jafar who then 
passed on the design specs for equipment, plant and machinery to specific individuals and 
agencies. The result was a failure to produce properly working components and program 
failures.700 Ultimately Dhia accepted that his management style was cumbersome and 
accepted the formation of “zumra” or multi-disciplinary teams to work on problems.701 But 
that occurred in 1987, five years after the program’s initiation.  
 
Within the EMIS program, Jafar Dhia also superimposed his ideas on the project. He 
insisted on a new Penning Ionizing Gauge (PIG) ion source as the heart of the EMIS 
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process instead of relying on the tried and tested Calutron technology, which was used 
during the Manhattan Project and then discarded because it was considered too inefficient. 
Many of Jafar’s scientific colleagues opposed the PIG process. In 1987, the program failed 
spectacularly, after which it was abandoned in favor of the Calutron method.702 In the 
absence of agent competition and the stove piping of all information via Jafar, Saddam and 
his henchman however were unaware of the dissent within the team until the failures 
mounted.  
 
The alternative Gas Diffusion method also proved unsuccessful. The method required 
highly advanced compressors and machines to push uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas 
through metal barriers. These were unavailable domestically and subject to export control 
laws in the international market. The Iraqi scientists were afraid that attempts to make 
purchases abroad would alert foreign intelligence agencies to Iraq’s nuclear quest. The chief 
Iraqi scientist Obeidi who was in charge of the program considered the program a scientific 
exercise and a technology demonstration project at best. Between 1982-87, all his team came 
up with was a prototype barrier with two compressors.703 This program, like the EMIS 
program, was directly under Saddam’s supervision. But like with most leaders he could not 
give sufficient personal attention to the program. In the absence of an independent 
monitoring body that could provide oversight and redress the problem of information 
asymmetries, Saddam also remained uninformed about the program’s lack of progress until 
1987.  
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Confronted by these multiple failures, in 1987 Hussein Kamal, Saddam’s son-in-law, 
assumed personal charge of the program and tried to revive it through the gas centrifuge 
uranium enrichment process. But in this program too the Iraqi nuclear team tasked with 
developing centrifuge technology worked in isolation. Without recourse to international 
assistance, the scientists started with a sequential trial-and-error method involving the World 
War II-era Beams centrifuge.704 Within a few months, the scientists and engineers realized 
the technology was incapable of yielding weapons-grade uranium. Next, they switched to 
maraging steel centrifuges and with Kamel’s acquiescence ended Saddam’s original 
stipulation of not seeking help from abroad. When this program ran into difficulties, the 
centrifuge team switched to developing carbon-fiber “super-critical” centrifuge 
technology.705 For the latter two programs, the Iraqi team successfully recruited vendors and 
consultants from Germany, Switzerland and Austria. Thanks to foreign assistance the 
program saw some success.706 Between 1987-1990, the Obeidi’s team was successful in 
demonstrating the technological feasibility of the project.  
 
The problem with the centrifuge enrichment program, like other programs within the Iraqi 
state, was that it operated in near isolation. Jafar and Obeidi’s teams did not talk to each 
other with highly negative consequences for the program. Thus even while the centrifuge 
program proceeded apace, there was a lack of coordination between the two teams on the 
production of UF6, the critical feed required for the centrifuges.707 This had highly negative 
consequences for the weapon program. In 1990 for example, Saddam and Kamel initiated a 
crash weaponization program in anticipation of the coming war with the US. To build a 
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weapon, they ordered a grab of the enriched uranium held by Iraq under IAEA safeguards. 
Their goal was to use a pilot centrifuge facility to enrich the uranium further to weapons-
grade. Although Obeidi’s team was able to set up a small pilot facility, Jafar’s team was 
unable to produce the UF6 to feed the centrifuges.708  
 
There were four groups within Iraq who were working on the nuclear weapons program. 
Group 1 and 2 worked on uranium enrichment. Group 3 provided administrative support 
while Group 4 was in charge of the weapon design.709 By 1990, Groups 1 and 2 had 
produced 5gm of weapons-grade Uranium-235. The total minimum required for a 
Hiroshima-type weapon was 18-20kg.710 The bomb itself was a paper design.  Group 4 had 
not developed the explosive lenses required to trigger detonation. Neither was any ‘cold test’ 
performed until then. At that point the delivery system and its guidance system were still 
under consideration.711 Despite the high-centralization, the entire program was 
compartmentalized and suffered from weak intra-institutional linkages. The principals were 
not only blindsided by the information asymmetries that worked against their favor, but were 
also generally oblivious of the challenges of managing their agents successfully. Such was the 
compartmentalization within the program that when international inspectors came calling 
after the Gulf War, the Kamal Hussein’s Special Security Organization carted and stashed 
away documents, plant machinery and lab equipment related to the weapons program 
without consulting the scientists.712 According to Iraqi scientists, this last act of 
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disaggregation would have made the program extraordinarily difficult to revive, even if 
Saddam had subsequently decided in its favor.  
 
Revisiting Secrecy in India 
The above cases suggest that regimes of moderate and low secrecy, both external and 
internal, have negative effects on the management of large technology projects. Yet, those 
negative effects do not prevent parallel processing and institutional oversight within the 
state. Regimes of high internal and external opacity however jeopardize institutional 
oversight and lead to poor management practices. The logical next question then is: what 
causes variation in the regime of secrecy. Why do some states adopt regimes of medium and 
low secrecy when others follow practices of severe opacity? More pointedly, what caused 
successive Indian decision-makers and governments to favor extreme versus moderate 
secrecy? Why did Indian leaders forego the legendary institutional oversight for which the 
Indian bureaucracy is famous? 
 
There are three hypotheses that potentially explain India’s behavior.  
 
The first is variation in external pressure from the US, the chief enforcer of the 
nonproliferation regime. In this regard, the French, Israeli and Pakistani cases are a time-
lapse mechanism, which capture the changes in the US approach to proliferation over four 
decades. Since President Eisenhower first announced the Atoms for Peace program in 1953, 
US opposition to proliferation in the international system has grown. However, in the case 
of US allies, nuclear nonproliferation has rarely occupied the top rung of the foreign policy 
agenda. The evidence shows that although the US sought to lobby and push its allies against 
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the acquisition of nuclear arms, successive US administrations did not exercise sustained 
pressure to either threaten them militarily or disrupt their economic or security interests. The 
absence of serious international pressure in turn permitted France, Israel and Pakistan to 
pursue their nuclear programs with relative impunity. Although each state conducted its 
nuclear program in secrecy, the secrecy was never sufficiently acute to jeopardize 
institutional controls within each state.  
 
In contrast, US nonproliferation pressure on India was more sustained, especially after 
India’s exploited the dual-use technologies route to conduct a “PNE,” which contained 
within it the seeds of a weapon program. Prior to India’s test, the US actively assisted India 
with acquiring the complete nuclear fuel cycle. It did not insist on full-scope safeguards as a 
condition for the supply of critical technologies and equipment. The Indian test, however, 
caused a sea change in US nonproliferation policy. It became the trigger for the enactment 
of tough technology export control regimes – the Zangger Committee and the London 
Suppliers Group. It also provided the push in the US Congress to enact tough domestic 
nonproliferation legislation against countries such as India, which did not renounce nuclear 
weapons and accept full-scope safeguards. In the two decades and a half following the 1974 
test, the US used both measures to cripple India’s nuclear power sector effectively. By 
threatening India’s other sectors such as space, computing, electronics and high-tech 
industry in general and by also seeking to deny India international financial aid and loans 
through World Bank and IMF, the US became instrumental in forcing India’s weapon 
program underground.  
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Nonetheless, the US did not threaten India with military action. Nor did it seek to sabotage 
equipment and facilities; or threaten the lives of Indian scientists working on the weapon 
program. Compared to Iraq where Israel destroyed the Osiraq reactor and assassinated its 
scientists or Libya against which the US launched air attacks, the threats to the Indian 
nuclear program and its economy were relatively benign. Thus external pressure may not be 
a complete answer to Indian paranoia and secrecy. There may be other domestic factors that 
in their interactive effects with external pressure shaped India’s institutions of secrecy in the 
pre-1998 era. Regional specialists speculate that the Indian state’s unusual proclivity toward 
secrecy is the path dependent legacy of British colonial rule. During the colonial era, the 
British classified information in a blanket manner to protect imperial interests. The post-
colonial Indian bureaucracy inherited that institutional legacy and has continued it to protect 
the interests of the ruling regime. Indian government rules mandate routine declassification 
of documents after 20 years. However, the government has used arbitrary national security 
classifications to staunch routine declassification in the areas of foreign policy and defense.  
 
Further, the nuclear weapons program in particular is embedded within India’s “strategic 
enclave,” the complex consisting of nuclear, space and defense industries, which operates as 
a state within a state. At the launch of the nuclear program the Indian government 
deliberately institutionalized the program as a semi-autonomous complex removed from 
collaborating with universities or private industry. This decision was disputed by a section of 
India’s political class and the scientific community who regarded such institutional practices 
as inorganic and even more draconian than the secrecy laws then instituted in the US and 
Britain at the time. Successive Indian governments stuck with their initial decision and 
tightened secrecy laws even further citing dual-use national security reasons. Among other 
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reasons, the creation of autonomous high-tech enclaves within the state was justified as a 
means to jump start Indian science by removing the state’s standard bureaucratic oversight 
mechanisms, which are associated with “red tape” and inefficient outcomes. In the case of 
India’s nuclear sector, as the program failed to keep up its stated promises and as accidents 
and environmental damage resulted from weak institutional controls, the atomic bureaucracy 
raised the barriers to accessing information even further. Eventually, even the weapons 
program, the jewel of India’s nuclear establishment, was left bereft of institutional oversight 
despite the high centralization and priority that was accorded it.  
 
Finally, secrecy may have normative-reputational roots but not in the manner historically 
understood in the context of Indian decision-making. Scholars have generally attributed 
Indian nuclear hesitancy to the beliefs of its leaders in norms against the acquisition of 
nuclear arms. Four Indian prime ministers in particular, Nehru, Shastri, Desai and Rajiv 
Gandhi were opposed to nuclear arms, some more unequivocally than others. However, 
Indian prime ministers, even those opposed to a nuclear weapons program, also pursued a 
Janus-faced strategy, publicly opposing India’s acquisition of nuclear arms while permitting 
weapons-related work to proceed in secret. Other prime ministers such Singh, Rao, Gujral 
and Gowda demonstrated lesser normative predilections. But they chose to pay lip service in 
public to such norms. It is thus possible that Indian prime ministers pursued secrecy for 
reputational reasons, because of their own or their predecessors’ normative commitments in 
public.  
 
Whatever the causes of India’s institution of extreme secrecy, its consequences should not 
remain in doubt. Secrecy stymied organizational learning within the state and cocooned 
 258 
Indian decision-makers in a regime of relative ignorance. Several technical lacunae in India’s 
current operational nuclear capabilities are the legacy of this institution. Short of upending 
the status quo entirely, they are likely to remain embedded in the operational DNA of India’s 
nuclear force.  
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